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Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal 
 This dissertation traces the development of Schelling's philosophy of time as it 
appears in the Ages of the World, a work which Schelling himself never completed but 
which he clearly intended as his magnum opus. My project focuses on Schelling's claim 
that time is the absolute, a claim which grew out of his Naturphilosophie and which later 
served as the basis for his fruitful interactions with Kierkegaard in Berlin. In the 
dissertation, I defend the thesis that Schelling's concept of "beginnings" paves the way for 
an "organic" understanding of time which articulates the latter as a living, breathing 
entity. In short, my work attempts to prove that Schelling does not conceive of time as a 
horizon of being, or as a category of consciousness, but as the ultimate basis from which 
living things grow and evolve. As I write in the introduction to my project, time, for him 
does not simply "pass by;" instead, it "ripens," and "bears fruit." Similarly, living things 
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are not merely in time, but time is in them insofar as living things produce time just as 
much as they are produced by it.  
 Supporting this thesis is my investigation into Schelling's concept of "ground" 
[Grund], which regards time as a contradiction-producing a priori. Time begins with the 
free decision of the subject; however, this free decision is grounded, paradoxically, in the 
subject's confrontation with its own fate. "Ground," then, has the character of irreducible 
indeterminacy, giving time the character of "unprethinkability" [Unvordenklichkeit].  In 
the opening lines of the Ages of the World, Schelling argues that "only the past can be 
known." However, as I demonstrate, Schelling's insights on "ground," in addition to 
fragmentary nature of his essay, prove otherwise. Instead, what we discover in the Ages 
of the World is the unfolding of the insight that even the origin of history remains obscure 
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Introduction: "Ground" as Dark "Ground" 
"I do not at all expect to be judged according to prejudices and provisional remarks 
alone. Whoever seeks to listen to me, listens to the end. It could very well be that in this 
case he would find something completely different from what, commensurate with his 
existing and somewhat narrow opinions, he expected to find." 1 
Preface 
 One might forgive Schelling if, in this, an excerpt from his 1842 Berlin lectures, 
he comes off a bit snarky. Though a child prodigy - publishing philosophical work as 
early as seventeen years-old - he never quite freed himself from the shadow of his 
Tübingen roommate. Schelling was a star throughout his staggering 60-year career, but 
his formative years with Hegel - and the meteoric exuberance for systematic idealism that 
they both shared - bound Schelling to him in a way which ultimately dimmed the 
brilliance of his own originality. Schelling's thought marked a radical shift in the 
direction of German idealism, a shift which ultimately gave birth to the likes of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and many others. Yet after the publication of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Schelling himself failed to surpass the stardom of his Tübingen 
colleague, never quite garnering the attention of a legitimate challenger to Hegel's 
system. Schelling's words were - and continue to be - deserving of their own careful 
study, but like the "light of understanding" in his Philosophical Investigations 
Concerning Human Freedom - which initially finds itself buried deep within the power of 
its opposite - the revelation of their fullness was saved for a later date, after Hegel's spell 
had run its course.2 If Schelling sounds contemptuous towards his audience in desiring 
                                                          
1 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures. 
Trans. Bruce Matthews. Albany: State U of New York, 2007. (pg. 189, paragraph 143). 
2 "All birth is a birth from darkness into light; the seed must be buried in the earth and die in darkness, so 
that the lovelier figure of light might arise and unfold itself in the rays of the sun." Schelling, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Von. Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related 
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that all who listen to him "listen to the end," one might do well to forgive him. Beneath 
the crustiness of his words is an honest desire to be heard on his own terms, divorced 
from the "somewhat narrow opinions" of those who believe philosophy's goal has already 
been accomplished. 
 As is generally recognized in Germany and France, Schelling's work undoubtedly 
helped usher in a dynamic shift in the history of philosophy. Even so, Schelling is often 
categorized as a "transitional figure," and it is because of this that he has taken on the role 
of modern philosophy's forgotten middle child, lost in the shuffle in the debate between 
idealism's claim to absolute knowledge, and existentialism's argument against it - a 
debate typically envisioned between Hegel and Heidegger. Schelling marks the definitive 
intersection between these two philosophical paradigms, revealing at once the incredible 
power of the dialectic and its inability to systematize the entirety of existence. Yet despite 
these insights, he continues to remain in the background of these proceedings, rarely 
stepping foot on its center stage. Some may suggest that Schelling's intermediate status 
means that "there is nothing new under the sun" with him, that he has nothing novel to 
say which has not already been expressed more clearly - or more interestingly - by 
others.3 But for those who have not already solidified this judgment of him, I would 
strongly discourage this interpretation, arguing instead that Schelling's position as the link 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Matters. Found in Ernst Behler's anthology, Philosophy of German Idealism. New York: Continuum, 
1987. (pg. 239). 
3 To be clear, this is not a claim which I have witnessed anyone making explicitly. However, based on my 
own survey of the secondary literature on Schelling's work, I would venture to say it is a statement which 
the Continental philosophy community has been uttering since Schelling's emergence on the scene. Almost 
every secondary source I have read on Schelling - from Jason Wirth, to Dale Snow - begins by mentioning 
the gross extent to which his original insights have been overlooked – at least in the United States. And for 
good reason. When we compare the great breadth of secondary literature on other 19th and 20th centuries 
Continental figures - such as Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger - with the available resources on Schelling, the 
contrast is immediately striking. Schelling has been - and continues to be - grossly undervalued as a 
significant idealistic/existential thinker, and it is because of this that I have chosen to work on him for my 
dissertation.   
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between idealism and existentialism actually makes the study of his philosophy all that 
more urgent for those interested in these philosophical movements. Admittedly, this is 
not a claim I can reasonably defend within the restraints of this introduction; however, it 
is my intent that by the end of this research project, I will have demonstrated how 
Schelling's insights are much like the "intermediate concepts" he so prizes in the WA - 
and which he accuses idealism of missing - concepts which are most difficult to define - 
"proceeding through everything and not being anything" - while yet being the most 
important - "nay, the only concepts that actually explain anything."4 Anyone familiar 
with the major players of 19th and 20th century Continental philosophy will immediately 
find an entry point into Schelling's work. But this should not be taken as implying that he 
has nothing significant to say on his own. On the contrary, it gestures toward a basis for 
Schelling's thought independent of both idealism and existentialism, a basis entirely 
unique to him, yet highly productive for idealists and existentialists alike. My objective in 
this project is to help bring this basis to light in the hopes of making a contribution to the 




                                                          
4 "It is not difficult  to observe that the main weakness of all modern philosophy lies in the lack of an 
intermediate concept and hence, such that, for instance, everything that does not have being is nothing, and 
everything that is not spiritual in the highest sense is material in the crudest sense, and everything that is 
not morally free is mechanical, and everything that is not intelligent is uncomprehending. But the 
intermediate concepts are precisely the most important concepts, nay, the only concepts that actually 






 The objective of this dissertation is to return to the original insights of Schelling's 
philosophy through an exploration of his magnum opus, the Weltalter (the WA), which 
Jason Wirth referred to as his cosmic poem about the genealogy of time.5 Having begun 
the project in 1810, Schelling was never able to finish the WA, delivering his last lectures 
under that name in the Winter Semester of 1827/28.6 Nevertheless, it certainly was not 
for lack of trying. Schelling worked on the project for almost fifteen years, during which 
time he composed at least twelve separate versions of its first volume.7 Only three of 
these drafts currently remain in circulation - many of the remaining drafts were destroyed 
in the Allied bombings of the Library of the University of Munich in 1944 - but all of 
them - including those lost - are incomplete. With the lone exception of material that 
Schelling composed during 1811 and 1812, that is to say, at the beginning of his project, 
he never advanced beyond the first book, "The Past." The aim of this dissertation is to 
discover why it is that Schelling was never able to move the project forward, why he 
                                                          
5 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be consulting the 1813 and 1815 editions of the WA, the first of 
which was translated by Judith Norman (and is included in Slavoj Žižek' commentary, the Abyss of 
Freedom/Ages of the World) and the second by Jason Wirth. Full citations for each of these texts can be 
found in the bibliography. 
6 F.W.J. Schelling, System der Weltatler: Münchener Vorlesung … , ed. Siegbert Peetz, etc. 
7 "Schelling composed multitudinous version of The WA, including numerous versions of the first book 
(The Past). In 1939 Horst Fuhrmans discovered in the cellar of the Library of the University of Munich a 
large chest, filled with a disorganized mass of many thousands of folio pages, each crammed with writing 
in Schelling's own hand. Among the sheets were not only the lectures for his late philosophy (The 
Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, etc.), but also two corrected versions, set but not printed, of the 
first book Schellings letzte Philosophie: Die negative und positive Philosophie im Einsatz des 
Spaetidealismus. Unfortunately, however, these manuscripts were all lost in July 1944 when the library 
burned after three consecutive days of Allied bombing." (This is from Jason Wirth's introduction to his 
translation of the Ages of the World. pg. vii.). Luckily another archive in Berlin containing further drafts of 
the Weltalter survived the war. Two volumes drawn from that material have been published. See Joseph 
Lawrence: F.W.J. Schelling, Weltalter-Fragmente: Schellingiana 13.1 & 13.2, Review of Metaphysics, 
Dec. 2003, vol. 57, issue 2,  437-439. More volumes will follow. 
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could never provide us with the definitive version of the first book, and the other two 
volumes he promised - "The Present" and "The Future." 
  Since Schelling abandoned the enterprise in the middle of his career, one might 
be lead to believe that he somehow lost faith in the project's value, no longer finding the 
work intellectually satisfying and/or the questions it sought to answer no longer 
significant. But this ignores the tirelessness with which he worked on what was very 
clearly intended as his magnum opus. Schelling's commitment to the project was 
unquestionable, and his belief in its importance unwavering; correspondingly, though he 
did indeed move on from it, the only plausible explanation for why he did so must have 
emerged as a result of the undertaking itself and what it conveyed to him. My goal is to 
elucidate this revelation as it is played out in the 1813 and 1815 editions of the WA. 
Having surveyed the two drafts already, I can safely say that there are substantial 
differences between them in terms of length, tone, and content; but, for the purposes of 
this project, we will not be dwelling on them - except where they prove useful in helping 
us understand the aims of Schelling's project - for our goal is not to compare and contrast 
the various editions of the WA, but to understand what Schelling actually accomplished 
by them. This is an especially important point to keep in mind, since the fragmentary 
nature of the work often lends itself to being criticized as something of a non-starter. 
However, as we will observe, the WA does indeed constitute a new beginning for 
metaphysics insofar as it attempts to understand reality without falling prey to the 
indulgences of systematic philosophy. In the opening words of the introduction, Schelling 
goes so far as to prime us for this insight when he says that the completed project was to 
be presented in terms of three modes of understanding that conform to the three modes of 
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time. Only the past, to be recounted in the opening book, was closed and finished. Only 
the past could be known, while the present was to be recognized, and the future only 
intimated. Built into the most basic conception of the project, then, was (and from the 
very beginning) a fundamental openness. As evidenced from these opening words, 
Schelling’s thinking, while systematic, was not intended to culminate in a closed system. 
My goal is to show how this openness is the project's most enduring asset, that it makes 
Schelling's notion of "ground" more successful as an explanatory concept than any 
concept at the center of a closed system.     
 So what was it that Schelling's multitudinous attempts at the WA revealed to him 
that compelled him to abandon it? As a preliminary hypothesis, I will suggest it was that 
the goal he sought to accomplish - even in the opening book, the book on The Past - was 
untenable, that it exceeded the limitations of what philosophy can achieve. The nature of 
this impossibility is what is most crucial. It was not because Schelling lacked the time 
that he did not finish the WA - he died over twenty years after he abandoned it - or 
because he believed himself intellectually incapable, but rather because he realized that 
the project itself outstripped the power of thinking altogether. As we will see, what most 
fundamentally characterizes the opening book of the  WA (“The Past”)  is that it is an 
attempt to understand "ground "- the "ground" of being, the "ground" of knowledge, the 
"ground" of consciousness; in its failure, Schelling is forced to confront the 
unintelligibility intrinsic to its status as unconditioned.8 To demonstrate what this claim 
                                                          
8 As a preliminary note, this is not to suggest that reason itself has no ground - that we cannot actually 
know anything at all - but rather that the ground which makes this possible is not accessible to it. To the 
extent that the world is accessible to our reason, it is governed by a rational necessity. However, to the 
extent that the ground of our knowledge is indeed the Abgrund, it is governed by a higher necessity, one 
which validates the rationality of the world while simultaneously transcending it. We will explore this 
higher necessity in greater detail when we enter into the WA.    
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means and how it might serve as a jumping off point for Schelling's future writings will 
be worked out over the course of the dissertation. However, it is my provisional thesis 
that it is through this insight that Schelling comes to find the fractured nature of his work 
productive, the "failure" of it to yield success. This is not to say that the incompleteness 
of the WA turned Schelling into a skeptic for whom the only positive truth is that there is 
no truth. On the contrary, it is to argue that, in a fashion much befitting the content of his 
own philosophy, Schelling's struggles to complete the WA - and, thus, finish the project 
of philosophy as he understood it - yielded an insight for him into the source from which 
philosophy acquires its power, its value, and most importantly of all, its vitality. In his 
essay On The Nature of Philosophy as Science - which he wrote in 1821 and which 
expresses in many ways the very heart of the WA's thesis - Schelling argues at length that 
the true philosopher "must give everything away in order to gain everything."9 In a most 
ironical fashion, the fragmentariness of the WA is living proof of this, for in its 
incompleteness, the project validates philosophy in the way that Schelling understood it. 
As I see it, this serendipitous turn of events in Schelling's work often goes unnoticed by 
scholars, and, yet, is the crucial juncture for understanding his corpus as a whole, both in 
terms of its dialogue with idealism and existentialism, and with respect to its original 
contribution to the history of philosophy. This dissertation will focus on Schelling's 
                                                          
9 "Only those have reached the ground in themselves and have become aware of the depths of life, who 
have at one time abandoned everything and have themselves been abandoned by everything, for whom 
everything has been lost, and who have found themselves alone, face-to-face with the infinite: a decisive 
step which Plato compared with death. That which Dante saw written on the door of the inferno must be 
written in a different sense also at the entrance to philosophy: 'Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.' Those 
who look for true philosophy must be bereft of all hope, all desire, all longing. They must not wish 
anything, not know anything, must feel completely bare and impoverished, must give everything away in 
order to gain everything." Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. "On the Nature of Philosophy as a 
Science." Trans. Marcus Weigelt. German Idealist Philosophy. Ed. Ruediger Bubner. London: Penguin, 
1997. 210-243. (pg. 218). 
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insights about "ground" as they appear  in the WA, wherein we can begin to see the 
uniqueness of his metaphysical outlook bubbling to the surface in his writings.  
2 
Project Introduction: The Metaphysics of Time 
 
 In the dissertation that follows, we will observe that the uniqueness of Schelling's 
insight lays in its attempt to establish a metaphysical account of time. By "metaphysical" 
in this instance, I am to referring Schelling's belief that time is indeed real, that it is not 
simply a product of the absolute, but the absolute itself and, thus, the transcendental 
condition of existence. Since its inception, metaphysical inquiry has positioned itself 
squarely as an investigation of being. One needs to look no further than Aristotle, who 
famously coined the term "metaphysics" as the study of being qua being [όν η όν]. But 
Schelling believes this attitude is why metaphysics has failed to produce a compelling 
account of time in the first place, for though "being" is a highly general concept, it is not 
exhaustive of reality, so to insist on it as the object of metaphysical inquiry necessarily 
presupposes a prohibitively narrow view of it, namely, that it is eternal and 
unchanging.10 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the fragments of Aristotle's 
predecessor, Parmenides, whose assertion that being is, and non-being is not, founds the 
binary in which any experience of time is inconceivable. For if being must be and non-
being must not be, there can be no experience of time because there can be no becoming, 
                                                          
10"When man turns original freedom into this object and wants to obtain knowledge about it, a necessary 
contradiction follows: he wants to know and feel eternal freedom as eternal freedom, but by turning it into 
an object, it imperceptibly becomes non-freedom, and, nonetheless, he searches for and desire it as 
freedom" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 229)   
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only what always is and forever will be. 11 For Schelling, this explains why much of the 
metaphysical tradition attempts to deduce reality from the essence of the absolute, and it 
is the reason why he believes philosophy needs a more inclusive metaphysics, for though 
philosophy has made penetrating insights into the nature of what is, until it is willing take 
up non-being as a topic of metaphysical consideration, it will continue to contradict the 
fact that we exist in time, that the world we encounter with each new day, the one which 
is constantly changing and evolving, is indeed real. What we need, then, is a metaphysics 
which goes "beyond being"12 in its willingness to take negativity seriously as an object of 
metaphysical consideration.13 This will entail adopting a dialectical approach in which we 
treat being and non-being as co-dependent in the creation of the real. It will require 
giving up the project of deducing reality from the essence of the absolute, and, instead, 
open ourselves to the possibility that it emerges from a contradiction-producing a 
priori.14 Schelling himself  refers to this a priori  as "ground," whereby we have to note 
at the outset that the "ground" in question, as unconditioned, is itself a groundless 
"ground." It is Schelling’s goal in the WA to understand the nature of "ground's" 
                                                          
11 "People who, without being cleansed beforehand, approach philosophy, as it were, covered in the 
impurity of this knowledge, must necessarily fall into an even greater confusion than the one they are in to 
begin with. of course, all their thoughts and endeavors can only serve to assert and defend this false 
knowledge as though it were their own lives - and rightfully so, because their lives exist only in this 
knowledge" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 239-240). 
12 Hence the reason why I describe Schelling's project as metaphysical and not ontological. "Ontology" is 
the study of being, which, when correlated with "ground,"  implies that the latter "is" and has a determinate 
nature. But "ground" is neither of those two since it is both determined and indeterminate simultaneously, 
implying that it is not exclusively being but both being and non-being. 
13 "The concept of not having being, but especially the not being that occurs everywhere in so many forms, 
has always led the beholder astray and, like a real Proteus, manifoldly brought them into confusion. For just 
as it is manifest to hardly anyone that actual power lies more in delimitation than expansion and that to 
withdraw oneself has more to do with might than to give oneself, so is it natural that where they encounter 
that which through itself does not have being, they rather regard it as 'nothing' and, when it is asserted that 
it 'is' precisely as that which does not have being, they rather explain this away as the greatest 
contradiction." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 14) 
14 "Were the first nature in harmony with itself, it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would 
never become Two. IT would be an eternal rigidity without progress. The contradiction in the first nature is 
as certain as life is. As certainly as the being of knowledge consists in progression, it necessarily has as its 
first posit the positing of the contradiction." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 12) 
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operation as it pertains to time.15 Our objective for this dissertation is to interpret his 
analysis and demonstrate how it provides the context for revisiting time from a fresh 
perspective, one which anticipates many of the benefits delivered by Heidegger and the 
existentialists, while also offering significant points of reform.16  
 In calling for a metaphysics of time, I mean to argue that Schelling's conception 
of it is, despite his repeated insistence that things must be taken in the most “personal” 
way possible, not in any precise and limited way phenomenological. I am speaking here 
of phenomenology in the Husserlian sense of the term, with its emphasis on a bracketing 
of the so-called "natural attitude" that enables one to gain access to the pure phenomena. 
Schelling, of course, predates phenomenology, and so does not offer a formal response to 
its inception; however, we can infer from his project the notion that phenomenology may 
too readily concede that we cannot make substantive claims about time beyond its 
phenomenal appearance. This is not to say that Schelling rejects a phenomenological 
account of time, rather, that the very that idea we must bracket any and all question of its 
reality undermines the essential truth which some phenomenology reinforces, namely, 
that time is the precondition of knowledge and existence. Heidegger realizes this about 
time in Sein und Zeit through his concept of anticipatory resoluteness, and it is what 
Schelling would say is the reason why we should not give up so readily on a 
                                                          
15 "The way this eternal freedom first adopts a particular form - an existence - and the way, proceeding 
through to eternal freedom again - as the eternally struggling, but never defeated, forever invisible force 
that ends up consuming each form it adopts, and, hence, rising from each one like a phoenix transfigured by 
its death in the flames - this is the content of the supreme science" (On the Nature of Philosophy as 
Science, pg. 220-221). 
16 I am referring here to Schelling' s conception of time as a living organism, which we will address at a 
later juncture in the dissertation. Time, for Schelling, is a living, breathing entity. It does not “pass by,” it 
“ripens” and “bears fruit.” In chapter 2, we will be able to see how this understanding of time distinguishes 
him from the his successors. While he anticipates the existentialists in fully acknowledging the anxiety that 
underlies existence itself, Schelling goes beyond them in this significant respect: his exploration of the 
“hell” at the bottom of reality is carried out ultimately in the name of hope rather than despair. 
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metaphysical account of it. For to suggest that philosophy can offer only a descriptive 
account of time is to neglect the vitality of its reproductive capabilities, specifically as it 
pertains to the generation (and regeneration) of life. Time, for him, is not simply a unit of 
measure, nor as Kant suggests, a category of consciousness, but the universe's 
unconditioned power for creativity. It is life itself, and so should not be treated 
exclusively as phenomenal, but as the maker of phenomena, not as created, but as that 
which generates existence. To know time in this way is to understand why Schelling 
would take issue with the phenomenological epoche, for while phenomenology does not 
openly criticize metaphysics, its methodology suggests otherwise insofar as its emphasis 
on phenomena connotes that we are much like the prisoners of Socrates' cave, who are 
reduced to interpreting shadows. In contrast, Schelling himself is more optimistic about 
metaphysics, believing that we have access to time's "ground." Correspondingly, his goal 
is to show that we are not confined to this merely descriptive account of it, but instead 
can understand that eternal tension which generates real change.  
 Before we get too far ahead ourselves, a word about Schelling's conception of 
time as the absolute is in order. Indeed, the uniqueness of this claim makes it a  
controversial one, which is why it is important for us to interrogate it more extensively, 
even at this early point in the project. Why is Schelling so enthusiastic about time?  There 
is, of course, the obvious answer: we are all in it! But this does not justify his insistence 
that time is the absolute, and, thus, the primary subject matter of metaphysics. For an 
answer to this question, we have to assess our own beliefs about time, all of which, 
according to him, stem from the intuition that the world is engaged in an ongoing process 
of self-differentiation. By "intuition" in this context, I am referring to  Schelling's belief 
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that pre-reflectively, and, thus, in an immediate way, we believe the world is subject to 
change. Schelling's claim here is less controversial than one might initially presume. He 
is not dismissing out of hand the literature which doubts the reality of time, but instead 
raising the objection that it cannot explain why we are compelled to conceive of time in 
the first place. For this seems like the ultimate sticking point for this objection to 
Schelling's belief, since the notion that things do not change implies that things exist 
outside of time, throwing us back onto the Kantian problem of things-in-themselves. 
Schelling's argument here is quite simple insofar as it establishes just how radical - and, 
thus, impractical - it is to deny the reality of time, since what it amounts to is a total 
renouncement of the world as we encounter it.  Most notably, it is a renouncement of the 
fact that the world has a history, that the way in which the world existed millions of years 
ago is not the same as it exists now.17 Indeed, Schelling's notion of time as "organic" is 
intended to convey the idea that time is fundamental to the constitution of living things. 
Living things are not simply in time, they are made of time insofar as each is engaged in 
its own process of self-differentiation. To deny this is to reject the idea that living things 
undergo becoming, that living things do not grow, flourish, and evolve, and, in the 
opposite way, decay and decompose. Certainly, there are many more permutations of 
becoming which we have omitted due to constraints of this dissertations. However, for 
Schelling, the fact remains that becoming is the reason why we care about our lives in the 
first place. For as we will see in the WA, unless we acknowledge the reality of time, we 
are not in fact free, and without freedom, the things which keep life from becoming rote 
and boring - i.e. the quest for a better, more satisfying life - disappear. 
                                                          
17 "In being there is no becoming, to be sure, rather being itself is posited as eternity in becoming. Without 
the concept of a humanly suffering God, which common to all the mysteries and spiritual religions of 
ancient times, all of history remains incomprehensible;" (Freedom Essay, pg. 274) 
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  So where, then, do we confront this reality that time is real? According to 
Schelling, one needs to look no further than one's own personal history.18 For the 
purposes of this project, let us go ahead and carry out this reflection. When I look at 
myself today - much like when I look at the rest of world - I do not see the same thing I 
saw yesterday. I know that it is I who has lived all these years, but I am not the same 
person I used to be. My body has changed, and not just in terms of its outward 
appearance, but also in terms of its abilities. Similarly, I think and feel differently than I 
used to; I have new beliefs, new passions, and I do different activities than I did when I 
was younger. I can even point to specific moments in my history when new thoughts and 
attitudes took root. In short, even though it is still I that has lived all these years, I 
recognize that I have become a different person. For me to doubt the existence of time 
would be to doubt the fact that these changes are real, as if to say that every time I 
believed I learned something, acquired a new skill, achieved personal growth, or made an 
impact on the world, I was merely deluding myself. To consider time in this manner is to 
recognize why Schelling associates it with a metaphysics of freedom. There is more at 
stake for him than perhaps other philosophical investigations of time, since the "ground" 
of time is also the "ground" of meaning.19 In this way, Schelling's metaphysics anticipates 
existentialism, for in calling his project a metaphysics of freedom, he recognizes that a 
metaphysics of becoming is inextricably linked to the discussion about how to do it well. 
                                                          
18 "There is a light in this darkness. Just as according to the old and almost hackneyed phrase that the 
person is the world writ small, so the events of human life, from the deepest to their highest consummation, 
must accord with the events of life in general. Certainly one who could write completely the history of their 
own life would also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos." (Ages of the 
World, third edition, pg. 3) 
19 "We have already explained that self-revelation in God must be viewed not as an unconditional, 
voluntary act, but as a morally necessary act in which love and goodness have overcome absolute 
inwardness." (Freedom Essay, pg. 273) 
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 The Schellingian relation between a metaphysics of time and a conception of 
meaning mirrors our own basic intuitions about what it means to live well. Take for 
instance, the notion of personal growth, which involves setting goals and achieving them, 
along with cultivating one's individual talents and natural abilities. It is no small wonder 
that most, if not all of us, take great interest in our own self-improvement. In fact, I 
believe most of us would find it altogether strange to meet someone who exhibited no 
interest in bettering themselves. Most likely, we would regard that person as complacent, 
and, if we were applying Kant's categorical imperative, as unethical. Herein I am 
reminded of the Parable of the Talents from the New Testament, in which a master 
rebukes his subject who takes the inheritance offered to him and buries it in the ground. 
Like all of Jesus' parables, the moral of the story is easier understood than it is practiced. 
However, that being said,  it is a lesson which I venture most, if not all of us would likely 
agree with, namely, that the value of life resides in what we make of it, that our worth 
resides primarily in the life we make for ourselves, not in the life we were born into. This 
emphasis on the value of personal growth transcends its religious context, which is why it 
is important for us to take seriously Schelling's metaphysics of becoming. By treating 
existence as synonymous with becoming, Schelling is initiating a new understanding 
perfection, one which is distinctly tailored to our existence in time. Instead of a standard 
of perfection which takes its cue from the attributes of the logical concept, exhibiting 
characteristics of withdrawal and inaction, Schelling is inviting us to consider one which 
takes seriously the open future gifted to us, which remains receptive to the possibilities 
that come our way. Indeed, this is a metaphysics which takes seriously the fact that we 
are free and that that freedom is tied to action. Just as action driven by necessity is 
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meaningless, the same can be said for freedom that does not produce becoming since it 
does not accomplish anything. Thus, what is stake for Schelling is a conception of 
perfection that is imperfect insofar as it is founded on desire; for the best life in 
Schelling's view is one ultimately driven by desire, one which, paradoxically, finds 
satisfaction in its desire and subsequent striving to become something.   
 Does Schelling's interest in a metaphysical account of time imply that he is giving 
us an ethics? Perhaps, but only in the fashion of his successors, the existentialists, who 
talk about how to live without implying any universal standards of behavior.20 I am 
thinking specifically of Schelling's immediate successor Kierkegaard, who famously 
attended Schelling's Berlin Lectures and who is well-known to be influenced by his 
metaphysics. In the same way that Kierkegaard's emphasis on the religious is not an 
attempt to refute the ethical so much as it is an argument for a superior way of being, 
Schelling's metaphysics is less an attempt to refute deontology as it as an attempt to 
reposition it within the metaphysics of time.21 Just as "ground" charges God with the task 
of actualizing his own freedom, our existence in time charges us with the task of 
                                                          
20 "Conscientiousness can have a completely formal appearance in the strict fulfillment of duty, where even 
a harsh and acerbic character is added, as in the soul of M. Cato, to whom one ancient ascribed this inner, 
almost divine necessity of action when he said that Cato was most virtuous in that he never acted rightly in 
order to act so (out of respect for the law), but because he could not have acted otherwise. This severity of 
disposition is, as the severity of life in nature, the seed from which true grace and divinity first blossom 
forth; but the supposedly more distinguished morality, of the opinion that it may despite this seed, is like a 
sterile blossom which bears no fruit. What is highest is not, just because it highest, always universally 
valid: and whoever has become acquainted with the trace of spiritual voluptuaries, who must appropriate 
what is highest in science and feeling in order to indulge in the most abandoned indecencies of the spirit 
and to elevate themselves above so-called common duty, will think twice before speaks of th highest in 
these terms." (Freedom Essay, 266) 
21 "Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal - yet, please note, in 
such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the single 
individual isolates himself as higher than the universal." Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. Edited 
and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
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actualizing the self that rests latently inside us.22 This articulation of the absolute renders 
Schelling in close proximity with his contemporaries, which is why it is important to 
keep in mind that he believes that this self-actualization is only achievable through 
action, and, thus, self-differentiation. That is the point of Schelling's emphasis on God's 
decision, which emphasizes the fact that the complete realization of God's freedom 
necessitates the creation of the world. For God to become free, he must create the world, 
meaning he cannot remain where he is in eternity but become something genuinely 
different than he is now. To this effect, any conception of ethics which does not insist that 
we become something new is not exhaustive of what it means to live well. It is my belief 
that this is what Schelling finds problematic with deontology, which, to the degree that it 
emphasizes duty, stresses one's obligation to the past over against one's openness to the 
future. We see this in the case of the categorical imperative, whose proscriptions are 
strictly negative: for while I am obligated - based on the fact that I have reason - not to 
lie, commit suicide, or squander my talents, the concept of duty does not explain which 
truths I should care the most about, what kind of life I should live, or what talents I 
should choose to cultivate. In other words, duty-based ethics are too generic since they 
offer little guidance in terms of the specific pursuits that define and differentiate the 
subject from all others, and which make the subject more than just another instance of the 
concept "human." Just as God becomes real as his concept (i.e. as "everything") by 
becoming the particularized world, so too do we become real as "human" by intensifying 
                                                          
22 As a point of clarification, Schelling himself does not offer a distinction between the terms "God" and 
"absolute." Both are synonyms for "ground" insofar as they represent the unconditioned subject that 
reproduces itself from itself. "Ground" is the absolute insofar as it is indeed "groundless" and it is "God" in 
the sense that this activity intensifies its own subjectivity. For more on this topic, please see the 




our subjectivity. In this way, it would be wrong to say that Schelling is offering an ethics, 
since he is not trading in one set of duties for another. Rather, he views ethics as a 
stepping stone to a plane of existence which eclipses the "perfection" of the concept, a 
plane that is analogous to but decidedly richer than a life which is strictly rational. We 
will not be speaking on this issue at length in the dissertation because it is not a topic 
Schelling himself addresses in the WA. However, for those interested in this topic, I 
recommend that they seek out some of Schelling's later projects, especially the Berlin 
Lectures.     
 With Schelling's concept of "ground," it will be become clear over the course our 
reading of the WA, that a purely theoretical understanding of time is self-contradictory. 
This is because theoretical philosophy is dependent on the notion of a priori concepts 
whose immanent necessity robs existence of its contingency. There is no time in a world 
bereft of freedom, and so the very fact of time's existence implies that reality must be 
extralogical, or irreducibly contingent. For those already familiar with the WA, this claim 
will appear inconsistent with Schelling's argument that God's essence is his freedom, 
which is why it is important to remember that the Godhead is only the potency of 
freedom and not freedom fully actualized as itself. For Schelling, it is this former version 
of freedom which becomes the centerpiece of theoretical philosophy and which he means 
to critique through his metaphysics, since it is freedom that does not lead to action, and, 
thus, is not truly freedom, but rather necessity in disguise. Such an understanding of 
freedom cannot account for our experience of time because it is perpetually inactive, and, 
thus, incapable of producing difference without the help of its opposite, i.e., desire. 
Hence God can reveal himself as free only by positing necessity as his ground, since it is 
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the only way for him to show that he has acted, and thus, fully realized himself as free. 
With respect to the WA, we will take notice of fact that this inverse logic is what 
differentiates  Schelling's metaphysics of time from traditional ontology. Given that time, 
and, thus, becoming is real, the beginning of this process necessarily emerges from the 
subject's willingness to affirm precisely the opposite of its concept. 
3 
Time as Dialectic: Schelling and his Forbearers 
 
 Before we go any further on Schelling's understanding of time, a word about 
Hegel is in order. Schelling's dialectical approach to metaphysics lends itself to many 
valuable comparisons between him and his Tübingen colleague. Due to our intentions of 
hearing Schelling on his own terms, this dissertation will not be interacting with those 
comparisons extensively. Nevertheless, what we will observe is that Schelling's 
metaphysics differs from Hegel's in its insistence that spirit's capacity for self-knowledge 
is itself an irreducibly strange phenomenon. By "strange" in this context, I am referring to 
Schelling's insight that dialectical knowledge follows directly from the contradiction that 
subject and object are equally unconditioned, that each necessarily grounds the existence 
of the other.23 The ultimate "ground" of this relation is a logical impossibility, meaning 
                                                          
23 "For example: 'The natural is outside the supernatural.' Of course this is so, and we feel this separation 
painfully. Indeed, it was from this very pain that we demanded to be freed by a higher kind of knowledge. 
But since these people are completely captivated by the present, by what is at a standstill, they fail to see 
that there existed a point where the natural was in the supernatural (that eternal freedom, from which 
everything stems, is beyond all nature), as well as a point where it will be within it again, as it should be 
within it in man. 'That wonderful connection of freedom  in man does not tell them anything. The two are 
infinitely far away from each other, and infinitely close. Freedom estranged from itself is nature, nature 
withdrawn back into itself is freedom. What is missing is only a reinversion. Man has fallen into error 
precisely because he has separated the natural from the supernatural. Those, then, who fight for this 
dualism, are basically fighting for the guilt of man, and they want to project what only man is guilty of on 
to nature, the object itself.  (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 240) 
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that all its products, including being and knowledge, are logical impossibilities as well. 
Schelling himself articulates this insight most lucidly in his philosophy of nature when he 
argues that the origin of our belief that we have knowledge of the external world must lie 
in a “ground” that transcends both knowledge and world. As he puts it, my ideas are real 
for me only insofar as they correspond with what is legitimately external, so, insofar as I 
have knowledge - or, more strictly speaking, I believe I can have knowledge - that 
capacity presupposes a "ground" beyond my consciousness and the external world,  a 
"ground" which affirms simultaneously the sameness and difference of subject and 
object. In the WA, Schelling refers to this "ground" as time, meaning that becoming is the 
condition for spirit's self-consciousness. Those familiar with Hegel will immediately find 
common ground on this terrain, but whereas Hegel goes ahead to discuss the end of 
history, suggesting that time is simply a means to an end, for Schelling, the notion that 
time grounds spirit's self-consciousness prohibits this move, for as the condition for the 
possibility of knowledge, time cannot cease, lest our capacity for knowledge do so as 
well. Time, then, is the precondition for the intelligibility of the universe, meaning that 
the effectiveness of systematic thought presupposes an unsystematic "ground." 
Why, one will ask, must "ground" be unsystematic? Because the very notion of 
becoming - that something emerges out of nothing, or, rather, that it becomes what it is 
not - presupposes the contradiction that something already is what it will become and 
vice versa. Correspondingly, to say that time is the precondition of spirit's self-
consciousness is to recognize the logical impossibility of self-consciousness, and hence 
what I have called its strangeness. From a logical point of view, self-consciousness 
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should not be.24 Schelling himself finds this realization especially crucial for philosophy 
insofar as it creates the space for a genuine, metaphysical account of time, by which he 
means an intelligibility not reducible to - and, thus, superior to - the criteria of systematic 
philosophy. We will explore the effect this insight has on Schelling's approach to 
"ground" in the following section of this introduction; but for now, it is enough that we 
acknowledge its role as the motivation behind Schelling's belief that we cannot approach 
"ground" through the eyes of reason alone.  
 As a point of reference, Schelling's distinction between dialectical knowledge and 
"ground," which motivates his belief in the latter as a distinctly metaphysical concept, has  
roots, surprisingly enough, in Hume's critique of modern science. Schelling's metaphysics 
borrows from Hume's skepticism in the sense that it clearly acknowledges the practical 
usefulness of empiricism, while simultaneously questioning its epistemological 
foundations. Like Kant, Schelling is deeply influenced by Hume's claims that causality is 
only an inference and not itself an observable phenomenon. But whereas Kant takes these 
revelations as justification for an inquiry into the subjective conditions of human 
experience, Schelling takes them as a source of renewed interest in metaphysics insofar 
as they confirm the Ancients' belief that what is really real is "beyond physical 
appearances." I am referring, of course, to Hume's analysis concerning matters of fact and 
his emphasis on the imperceptibility of causal connections. Schelling himself treats this 
aporia as justification for challenging the notion of causality, which, as he understands it, 
                                                          
24 "Our ego, namely, is placed outside itself, i.e. outside its role. Its role is to be subject, for the absolute 
subject cannot behave like an object. It must, then, give its place, it must be placed outside itself, as 
something that no longer exists. Only in this state of having abandoned itself can the absolute subject 
appear to it in its state of self-abandonment, and so we also behold it in amazement...It is a wonderful 
expression with which you should profoundly inscribe your souls, especially since there are so many half-




follows the lead of Parmenides in presuming the nonexistence of time. We see this in our 
own habit of making causal inferences, which itself is contradictory insofar as it negates 
the very ground on which it stands; for, if indeed the necessary connection between 
events I inferred was real, I would not be capable of observing separate events in the first 
place, only one "event," eternal and unchanging.25 Time, then, presents a unique problem 
for philosophy insofar as it establishes the rational intelligibility of the universe while 
challenging the assumption that it can be resolved into a determinate "essence." The latter 
is a Procrustean tendency which truncates the vitality of things in order to make them 
rationally accessible to us. In its place, Schelling believes we need a language that is 
more appropriate to becoming, one which goes so far as to recognize that, at the level of 
the absolute, the need for total transparency hinders our capacity to articulate accurately 
the natural rhythms of life. 
 Now that we understand what is at stake in the question of "ground," we are in a 
position to anticipate Schelling's goals for the WA. With regard to the objectives 
Schelling hopes to achieve, we have to adjust our expectations; the nature of "ground" 
resists the language of causality, so we cannot expect determinate answers to our 
questions regarding the origins of existence.26 This, after all, is Schelling's wager, that the 
indeterminacy of "ground," that is to say, the groundlessness of "ground" itself, will yield 
                                                          
25 If I were capable of observing a necessary connection, then the events in question would be entirely 
necessary as well, meaning that there could be no time - and, thus, not separate events - since the current 
moment could be only that which it always already is.    
26 "Therefore, everything known, in accord with its nature, is narrated. But the known is not here something 
lying about finished and at hand since the beginning. Rather, it is that which is always first emerging out of 
the interior through  a process entirely specific to itself. The light of knowledge must rise through an 
internal cision and liberation before it can liberate" (the WA, 1815 edition, xxxvii). 
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understanding,27 so we must be patient and allow the entirety of his system to unfold 
before we presume its adherence to certain truth criteria. 28 This is the true methodology 
of his systematic philosophy, which draws its inspiration from the symbiosis in nature, 
not the absolute's imposition of uniformity.29 For if indeed the latter were true, there 
would be no time since there would be no distinguishable difference, just the hegemony 
of the eternal.30 Schelling's project, then, marks the pinnacle of systematic philosophy 
insofar as its focus is not on a single, organizing principle, but on the interaction of 
diverse components, each of which is indispensable to "ground's" founding act.31 
"Ground," for Schelling, is not simply a placeholder for an identity which he has yet to 
uncover; rather, it is a reminder that systematic unity flows from the cooperation of 
contradictory elements, drawing strength from their diversity rather than antagonism and 
                                                          
27 "Science originally develops only when a principle departs from its original state of ignorance and 
becomes knowledge and, after it has gone through all forms, returns to its original ignorance. That which is 
the absolute beginning cannot know itself. In its transition to knowledge it ceases to be the beginning and it 
therefore has to proceed until rediscovers itself as the beginning. The beginning, restored as a beginning 
that knows itself, is the end of all knowledge" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 222). 
28 "Perhaps the one is still coming who will sing the greatest heroic poem, grasping in spirit something for 
which the seers of old were famous; what was, what is, what will be. But this time has not yet come. We 
must not misjudge our time. Heralds of this time, we do not want to pick its fruit before it is ripe nor do we 
want to misjudge what is ours. It is still a time of struggle. The goal of this investigation has still not been 
reached. We cannot be narrators, only explorers, weighing the pros and cons of all views until the right one 
has been settled, indubitably rooted forever" (the WA, 1815 edition, xl). 
29 "Finally, for there really to be an endeavor to find a system, one must have come to see that his conflict 
between opinions is not something incidental, grounded in subjective imperfections such as superficial or 
erroneous thinking by individuals, or, as some shallow minds would have it, in mere logical fabrications. 
One must have understood that his conflict has an objective basis, that it is grounded in the nature of the 
matter itself, namely in the primary roots of all existence. One must have given up all hopes that this 
conflict, this bellum omnium contra omnes, might come to an end, that one individual view could become 
absolute master over the others, that one system could subjugate the others" (On the Nature of Philosophy 
as Science, 210-211). 
30 "One must give up the hope of ever terminating this conflict by having one system become master over 
another. If, however, a one-sided subjugation of one by the other is impossible then we must not imagine 
finding a unity in which they all annihilate one another either, because in this way, too, the concept of the 
system would perish, and the task consists precisely in having them all truly coexist" (On the Nature of 
Philosophy as Science, pg. 213). 
31 "Hence the idea of the system as such presupposes the necessary and irresolvable conflict of the systems, 
without the latter the former would not arise" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, 212). 
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discord.32 At the same time, though, “antagonism and discord” always remain 
possibilities. Systematic unity is never more than a possibility. To the degree that 
Schelling has set out to articulate a system of sorts, it is always emphatically a system of 
freedom. This is Schelling's way of approaching metaphysics authentically through the 
concept of "system," which emphasizes the production of unity through the eternal 
ground of contradiction. The latter, in this case, is time, meaning that becoming is the 
universe's attempt to define itself anew. Since this creative act is eternal, an inquiry into 
the concept of time, as if in the vein of an ontological proof, would be inappropriate.33 
Rather, our focus must be on the manner in which time operates, focusing on the 
components through which it generates each new moment. That is the space where an 
understanding of time is plausible, since we cannot know why this eternal beginning 
persists - and, correlatively, its aim -  only the power by which it reproduces itself.     
 To the extent Schelling seeks to investigate "ground" without doing violence to its 
indeterminate nature, he is more interested in how existence is generated than in the 
organisms that "ground" generates.34 This is the essential difference between metaphysics 
and modern science, which, as he understands it, is more focused on articulating what 
nature does,35 than on the means by which nature accomplishes it.36 Science tries to 
                                                          
32 "The systems, however, are not supposed to be annihilated, they are supposed to coexist, like the 
different systems of one organism, and in this coexistence they are supposed to produce a perspective that 
goes beyond the individual systems, a healthy perspective which gives pleasure to man, the same way as in 
a healthy human body all differences between the organs and functions blend into one inseparable life 
whose feeling is well-being" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 213-214). 
33 "In philosophy, nothing begins as a pure and finished law. A complete concept is only produced 
gradually" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 233). 
34 "Now I must not ask any more about how I know this movement. For the movement itself and my 
knowledge of this movement, each moment of the movement and my knowledge of this moment are one in 
each instant, and this slowing, retarding, reflecting knowledge is actually the philosopher's knowledge, is 
what he call his own in this process" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 236) 
35 "Whoever is occupied with the study of nature and the mere enjoyment of its riches will not ask whether 
nature and experience are possible. It is enough that nature exists for him; though the deed itself has made 
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predict the ways organisms will mature based on the ways they have done so previously. 
But metaphysics is different, since it seeks to understand the fact of becoming itself, and, 
thus, the conditions which make it possible.37 What is it that allows organisms to change 
and evolve? I know that when I plant an acorn in fertile soil, it will grow into an oak tree, 
and science confirms this because it has been observed many times in the past. But what I 
do not know, and which science cannot explain, is the mechanism by which the acorn is 
capable of doing this in the first place, for the very fact of its flourishing implies an 
important contradiction, namely, that it can become something it is not, and, thus, put in 
the past its character as a seed. How is this possible? Certainly, it is not because the acorn 
is completely predestined to become an oak tree, because then there would be no acorn, 
just an oak tree; and yet, as an acorn, it indeed must be an oak tree already, since 
otherwise it would not be capable of becoming one. So it seems, then, that the acorn's 
flourishing depends on it being both a seed and a matured plant simultaneously; but how 
is this possible? How can the same thing be itself and its negation at the same time, its 
future necessitated, and yet, still not?  
                                                                                                                                                                             
it actual. Only the man who does not believe he holds actuality in his hand will ask what is possible" 
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study 
of This Science. Philosophy of German Idealism. Ed. Ernst Behler. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 
1987. 167-202, pg. 168). 
36 "Everything, absolutely everything, even that which nature is eternal, must have already become internal 
to us before we can present it externally or objectively. If the writer of history does not awaken in himself 
or herself the past age whose image they want to project to us, then they will never present it truly, nor 
vividly, nor in a lively fashion. What would all history be if an inner sense did come to assist it? It would 
be what it is for so many who indeed know most all that has happened, but who know not the least thing 
about actual history." (the WA, 1815 edition, xxxvii) 
37 "These monuments of nature, for the most part, lie there in the open, and are explored in manifold ways 
and are, in part, actually deciphered. Yet they do not speak to us but remain dead unless this succession of 
actions and productions has become internal to human beings. Hence, everything remains 
incomprehensible to human beings until it has become internal to them, that is, until it has been led back to 
that which innermost in their being and to that which to them is, so to speak, the living witness of all truth." 
(the WA, 1815 edition, xxxvii). 
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 Already, we can see why Schelling prefers to discuss time in terms of necessity 
and freedom. They are traditional metaphysical concepts, yes, but, more crucially, they 
share in "ground's" likeness as imperceptible agents of change. For even though they 
have no observable referents, freedom and necessity are nonetheless pervasive in the 
development of all organisms. Schelling's goal is to demonstrate that these concepts are 
less abstract than perhaps one might believe. They are not concepts in the logical sense, 
completely separate from the physical, but as part of "spirit," they are intermediaries 
between the ideal and material.38 Our objective is to understand how the two of them 
work together to produce the insight which leads God to express himself.  
4 
Translating Time into Freedom  
 
 Given that Schelling's metaphysics of "ground" is  interchangeable with his 
metaphysics of freedom, it is worth our time at the outset to consider how Schelling 
understands these concepts as supporting each other. What is Schelling's conception of 
freedom? On the one hand, as a reader of his, it feels strange to ask this question so 
explicitly since, if asked, I would likely point to the entirety of the WA as the answer. 
However, at the same time, it is important that we explore this issue directly since 
                                                          
38 Is there a difference between spirit and "ground?" As is typically the case when we discuss Schelling's 
concept "ground," the answer is both Yes and No. Broadly speaking, spirit refers to the union of subject 
and object, and this union functions as God's affirmative principle. However, it exists at different levels  in 
the process, making it difficult to define beyond that point. Indeed, spirit resides in God's freedom, and 
primal nature, and the unity between them, meaning it is both God's freedom and primal nature, but neither 
reducible to his freedom, nor primal nature. Spirit, then, closely resembles "ground" which is why I suggest 
it is convenient for the purposes of this dissertation to think of spirit as a synonym for God, the eternal 
subject. If God's decision to create is motivated by his self-consciousness, spirit (as unity) is the thing that 
understands and "ground" is the condition for that knowledge. Hence the reason why we discuss the 
activity of the absolute in terms of spirit's self-consciousness. Spirit is the subject whose self-consciousness 




Schelling himself does not offer a definition of freedom, which, in turn, creates a 
situation whereby new readers of him most understandably feels uncomfortable and 
unsure of themselves. I imagine this to be the case especially for those who are familiar 
with the history of the metaphysical tradition, in which we see a variety of interpretations 
concerning what it means to be truly free. It is not my intention here to go against 
Schelling's aim for his discussion in the WA, which is to discuss freedom's relationship to 
"ground," and, thus, an articulation of the former which is decidedly non-conceptual. 
Instead, I want to clarify some of Schelling's motivations for focusing on the issue of 
freedom in the WA and how his notion of "ground" attempts to resolve them. 
 From the insights we will encounter in the WA, Schelling's understanding of 
"ground" is an attempt to clarify multiple senses of the term "freedom" that emerge in our 
experience of time. The first has to do with our basic intuition that time is real, which 
entails that things in the world are capable of undergoing change. If I deny this, or, rather,  
I do not take this belief seriously, then it is impossible for me to have a discussion about 
freedom. Again, this does not mean I know indubitably that things change, simply that I 
have practical grounds for believing so, making it difficult for me to say otherwise 
without denying altogether the reality of my experience. To say that the world is capable 
of becoming implies that it is not logically necessary that it exists, meaning the fact that it 
does exist is a result of freedom. Indeed, this a controversial claim since we are not 
inclined to say that change necessarily implies freedom. So why, then, would Schelling 
argue this way? Does he not recognize that some change is deterministic, and, 
conversely, that some things happen strictly by chance? Without getting too far ahead of 
ourselves, it is important to keep in mind that Schelling's notion of freedom is 
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considerably more robust than our conventional use of the term, a point which he makes 
clear in the WA  through his association of freedom and necessity with the forces of 
contraction and expansion respectively.39 To discuss these concepts as "forces" [Kraft] 
highlights Schelling's belief that each concept has its own inertia that "ground" 
overcomes through the production of time.40 We will cover this issue in greater detail in 
chapter 2, but suffice it to say that, time, for Schelling, is inconceivable via freedom or 
necessity. Without God's eternal desire to be outside himself (i.e. his necessity), 
everything would remain concealed in the eternal essence, and without his eternal 
freedom serving as the limit to that striving, God's desire to be outside himself would 
produce the whole of time in an instant - rendering it impossible for us to experience 
things changing gradually over time. Correspondingly, even though freedom and 
necessity are necessary conditions of God's existence, neither is both necessary and 
sufficient.  
 As it pertains to the issue, Schelling's point in this discussion is that our 
experience of change - by which I mean our belief that "A" becomes "not-A," or, rather, 
                                                          
39 "It wants to be in itself inasmuch as it posits or collects itself together as what-is [als Seyendes], as a 
subject; to this extent it opposes development and expansion. It wants to be out of itself inasmuch as it 
desires to be what it is in itself once more, and hence externally. In the first case it is something withdrawn 
by itself, which sets itself in opposition to what is outside of itself; but it sets itself in opposition only in 
order to reveal and declare itself against this outside as what it is in itself. It cannot, therefore, remain in 
this withdrawn condition. Likewise with being. For considered purely as such, being is selfless and 
completely immersed in itself. But on precisely this account, being draws its opposite into itself and is a 
constant thirst for essence [Wesenheit], a yearning to attract what-is, or to attract a subject [Subjekt], so that 
by means of this subject it might step forth from a state of mere potentiality into activity. But when being is 
considered as already active [wirkendes], as a being that is also again by itself, then it is necessarily already 
accompanied by a thing-that-is [ein Seyendes]; and this conflicts with the being, with what is based entirely 
in itself." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 123-124)  
40 "If this other principle were to provide no resistance, then there would be no time, because development 
would occur in an uninterrupted flash rather than successively; yet if the other principle were not constantly 
overcome by the first, there would be absolute rest, death, standstill and hence there would again be no 
time. But if we consider both of these principles to be equally active in one and the same essence, we will 
have contradiction straight away." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 123) 
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that the same thing becomes something else - is such that the metaphysical conditions of 
that experience are not reducible to chance or predestination. Take, for instance, our 
example of the acorn. Minus a ground to do so, 41 the acorn would never actually become 
an oak tree, since the potential for growth alone does not guarantee that the acorn will 
grow. 42 Schelling himself does not argue explicitly for what I am about to say, however, 
as I understand it, the notion of chance conflates our inability to know the future  with the 
idea that things happen randomly.43 This is a misunderstanding of the idea of 
contingency, since the fact that events could have transpired differently does not imply 
that they happened without a ground. To be sure, I am not suggesting that all becoming is 
exclusively rational, simply that there is a basis which motivates each organism's self-
transformation.44 In the case of human beings, this is evidenced by the fact that we 
exhibit no proclivity for making decisions randomly. Again, I do not mean to argue that 
we are always inclined to act intelligently - acting on the basis of a ground is not 
synonymous with acting correctly or even well - simply that there is always a basis which 
                                                          
41 The term "ground" in this context is a synonym for the acorn's biological necessity that compels it to 
grow. This term is not to be confused with the use of "ground" found in other sections of the dissertation 
which is synonymous with the absolute. "Ground," as absolute, is the unity of acorn's necessity to become 
an oak tree (i.e. its ground) and its freedom to grow. See next footnote for textual support. 
42 "The first beginning of creation is the longing of the One to give birth to itself, or it is the will of the 
ground. The second is the will of love, through which the word is spoken in nature, and through which God 
first makes himself personal. The will of the ground thus cannot be free in the same sense the will of love is 
free. It is not a will that is conscious or connected with reflection, but neither is it entirely unconscious, 
moving according to blind mechanical necessity. It is rather of an intermediate nature such as desire or 
appetite, and is most comparable to the lovely urge of a nature in the process of becoming which strives to 
unfold itself, and whose inner movements are involuntary (cannot be neglected), yet are made with no 
feeling of compulsion" (Freedom Essay, pg. 267). 
43 Schelling authors the briefest of comments on this insight about midway through the Freedom Essay. In 
reference to any kind of proof which attempts to prove that things happen by chance, he says: "This sort of 
proof is poor in every respect, since it infers the non-existence of a determining ground from the ignorance 
of it; but it could applied here the other way around, for precisely where ignorance enters, there 
determination is the more certain to take place" (Freedom Essay, pg. 257). 
44 "But accident is impossible and conflicts with reason as with the necessary unity of the whole; and if 
freedom is to be saved only by the complete accidentalness of actions, then there is no saving it at all" 
(Freedom Essay, pg. 257).  
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motivates our choices, even the poor ones.45 Just as ferns do not randomly produce spores 
and beavers do not randomly build dams, no one randomly goes to work, commits a 
crime, or goes to war. In fact, I would go so as far as to say that it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, for one to act randomly since it implies a willingness on the agent's part 
to act without the basis of thought or desire, and, thus, without any self-consciousness 
whatsoever. Put differently, it requires the ability of the agent to act while being 
conscious of nothing at all, a feat which is extremely doubtful at best, and perhaps 
conceivable only under the most artificial of circumstances - such as, for instance, asking 
someone to pick a number between 1 and 10 randomly.46 Ultimately, it is in this sense 
that Schelling believes that the acorn does not flourish by chance. Like all other living 
things, the acorn always flourishes because it is motivated to so, not simply because it 
can.        
 Compared with the notion of chance, it is considerably easier to refute the idea 
that living things are thoroughly predestined to change. Such a claim is self-contradictory 
insofar as it rejects the belief that living things can evolve. Predestined things can only be 
what they already are, meaning they have no real past from which they have emerged, 
                                                          
45 I am thinking specifically of the account of the pears from Augustine's autobiography, the Confessions, 
in which he argues that he stole the pears because it was sinful. Although much of the secondary literature 
focuses on the contract between Augustine's explanation concerning Plato's claim that one always does 
what one thinks his best, I am citing it here as evidence for Schelling's claim that it is inconceivable for 
becoming to take place randomly. Even though Augustine did not steal the pears because he thought it was 
appropriate, he ne vertheless had a reason for doing so in the first place. 
46 In the Freedom Essay, Schelling himself casts doubt on the randomness of such choices when he 
considers a hypothetical scenario in which one is prompted to choose randomly whether to retract or extend 
one's arm. Even in this type of situation, he argues, the agent is acting on the basis of some ground insofar 
as one is determined to prove that the statement is true. Interestingly, Schelling does not go on to say 
whether or not the choice that is made is indeed random. However, his point is clear that such 
circumstances are themselves not natural and, even in those cases, still motivated by some ground. 
(Freedom Essay, pg. 257) 
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nor a real future towards which they are heading.47 As result, one cannot even say 
truthfully that they exist in the present, since this requires that they stand in relation to 
what is before and after. Instead, predestined things exist outside the historical process 
altogether, which is why Schelling implies that they are not really real. Concerning our 
example, this criticism reveals that the acorn is not predestined to change since such a 
claim rejects the possibility that any such past for the oak tree could exist. On the 
contrary, to say that the acorn is predestined to become an oak tree is to say that it has 
always been an oak tree, and, thus, removed from any world that is in time. Thus, the 
acorn's very existence subverts the claim that it is thoroughly determined to become 
something else.  
 For Schelling, what is meant by articulating freedom and necessity as forces is 
that neither on its own is fully-developed as self-consciousness.48 This is a crucial point 
when it comes to understanding "ground" insofar as it underscores the depth of 
Schelling's enthusiasm for idealism. Becoming is always produced by the subject's 
decision, and this decision is grounded in the subject's self-consciousness; however, this 
self-consciousness can only take place through the symbiotic relation of opposites, not 
the dominance of one antipode over another. As we will see in the WA, Schelling 
identifies God's freedom with his subjectivity, meaning that the mind of God is not 
synonymous with his self-consciousness. This is a continuation of Schelling's critique of 
                                                          
47 For a fuller explanation of these points, please see section three of chapter 2, "Ground" as the Unity of 
Essence and Existence. 
48 "But precisely this inner necessity is itself freedom, formally it is necessity. The I says Fichte, is its own 
deed. Consciousness is the positing of the self; however the I is nothing different, but is itself this very self-
positing. This consciousness, however, insofar as it is thought of merely as apprehending the self or 
knowing the I, does not come first, but presupposes true being, as does all mere knowledge. But this being 
presumed to be prior to knowledge is not being, though it is not knowledge either; it is real self-positing; it 
is original, basic willing that makes itself into something and is the ground and basis of all essence." 
(Freedom Essay, 259). 
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idealism from the Freedom Essay when he argues that all philosophy since Descartes has 
the common defect of lacking a "living ground."49 The notion of a "living ground" is 
meant to suggest that self-consciousness, which motivates God's self-revelation, is not 
reducible to ideas and/or mind. Subjects, for Schelling, are conscious, not ideas, and we 
see this very clearly throughout Schelling's corpus.50 Ideas become real as knowledge 
when they correspond with the external world, and this knowledge becomes real as self-
consciousness when it is understood by the subject. Correspondingly, the subject is the 
locus where ideas realize their full potential insofar as it is the place where they become 
the basis for the subject's self-expression. In this way, Schelling's enthusiasm for idealism 
is considerably more robust than new readers of him might anticipate. His criticism is not 
aimed at rejecting idealism altogether, but instead, arguing for and extending the depth of 
its insight. Reality, for him, is fundamentally "ideal," not in the sense of hylomorphism, 
that is, of forms being conjoined with matter, but in the sense of time, that is, in the sense 
that the changes that take place in the world follow directly from the subject's self-
understanding. Schelling believes that this self-understanding can be found at every level 
of reality, achieving its zenith in the ultimate beginning (the absolute's creation of the 
world) and extending to all the new beginnings (i.e. living things) that the absolute 
engenders. 51   
                                                          
49 "All new European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does 
not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground." Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters. Found in Ernst Behler's 
anthology, Philosophy of German Idealism. New York: Continuum, 1987. (pg. 236) 
50 "But we have explained God as the living unity of forces, and if personality according to our earlier 
explanation lies in the combination of the ideal principle within him with the independent (relative to the 
ideal principle) ground - since basis and existence are necessarily united in him in one absolute existence - 
the highest personality" (Freedom Essay, pg. 267).  
51 "But in a sense much more definite than this general one, these truths have immediate pertinence for 
man...The act by which his life in time is determined does not itself belong to time, but to eternity, nor does 
it precede time, but moves through time (untouched by it) as an act by its nature eternal. Through this act 
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 Passing over the issue of human freedom for now, a quick word about the 
"freedom" of non-human organisms is worth our time. New readers of Schelling's will 
likely take issue with the implication in Schelling's metaphysics that all becoming is the 
product of freedom and necessity, especially in the case of non-human organisms which 
are not rational.52 After all, how can one say that animals and plants are free when they 
lack the capacity to reason? Is the basis of the acorn's metamorphosis truly due in part to 
the acorn's freedom? While Schelling's notion of "ground" does not imply that these 
organisms are as intelligent or free as human beings, it also rejects the claim that they 
lack intelligence and freedom altogether. The paradoxical nature of "ground" supports 
this claim insofar as it refutes the binary that living things are either free or not free, 
intelligent or unintelligent. Instead, living things, for Schelling, are always both free and 
necessary, meaning that they are capable of self-consciousness even though they are not 
as intelligent as we are. Although a full treatment of this issue extends beyond the scope 
of this introduction (and even this dissertation), I am suggesting that Schelling's claim 
about the universality of "ground" is considerably less controversial than one might 
assume and becomes more compelling the more we scrutinize possible accounts of 
becoming. Take, for instance, our example of the acorn. Why does it grow? Based on our 
previous insights, it is not by chance or predestination, meaning that the acorn must 
contain a ground for its own transformation and this ground must be dormant - or rather, 
not yet affirmed as the ground of the acorn's becoming. The question, then, naturally 
                                                                                                                                                                             
man's life extends to the beginning of creation; thus through it he is beyond creation as well, free and 
himself eternal beginning." (Freedom Essay, pg. 259) 
52 "While this dark principle is effective in animals, as in all other natural beings, it has not yet been born 
into light in them as it has in man; it is not spirit and understanding, but blind craving and desire. In short, 
no fall is possible here, no separation of the principles, where there still is no absolute or personal unity. 
The conscious and unconscious are united in animal instinct only in a certain and determined manner, 
which for this reason is unalterable." (Freedom Essay, pg. 249) 
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follows: what activates the acorn's ground to become an oak tree? Certainly, good 
conditions, such as water, nutrients, and soil; but we have to be careful, since even 
though these added elements are a necessary condition of the acorn's transformation, like 
the ground itself, they are not a sufficient one. Water and soil do not produce the ground - 
as if to say that they coerce the acorn to grow - just as much as the ground does not 
produce the water and soil. And yet, each needs the other, since without water and soil, 
the ground will not have the resources needed to sustain the organism as it grows, and 
without the ground, the acorn will have no need for taking on these resources in the first 
place. Correspondingly, what allows the acorn to flourish is an intermediary between 
these two conditions, a "ground" prior to them both which enables them to support and be 
supported by each other. In the context of the WA, this is what we mean when we use the 
term "ground:" we are not referring to the mere biological drive of the acorn to grow, but 
rather the ultimate basis from which an organism (or, in this case, organic matter) 
evolves. For Schelling, this "ground" is none other than the organism's self-
consciousness, its "knowledge" of when it is appropriate to flourish. As we will see in the 
WA, this notion self-consciousness reflects Schelling's understanding of metaphysics as 
an "open system" insofar as it espouses the idea that organisms are internally and 
externally sensitive: the acorn has  the drive to become an oak tree, and yet, it only 
actually flourishes when it senses that its surrounding conditions are hospitable. 53    
                                                          
53 The compelling nature of Schelling's metaphysics of "ground" becomes increasingly apparent the more 
we consider our intuitions about how becoming takes place. For just as we can appreciate that the acorn 
always grows in a similar way, under similar conditions, we can also appreciate that it would never grow at 
all had those conditions not been in place. That is to say, we can appreciate the fragility of the acorn's 
becoming alongside its persistence, that the acorn is determined to grow, but not in such a way that the 
result is a foregone conclusion. I am suggesting in a preliminary way that this duality strikes a compelling 
balance when it comes to competing perspectives on the appropriate attitude one should when it comes to 
man's relationship with nature. Indeed, nature is resilient, but not in such a way as to make us complacent 
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 Having established this groundwork, we are in a position to understand the 
manner in which change implies freedom. Becoming implies freedom insofar as the 
former implies self-consciousness, ruling out the possibility that living things are only 
passively engaged in their own transformation. Whereas the concepts of chance and 
predestination presume that living things are caused to change, as if to suggest that 
becoming is forced upon them, self-consciousness connotes Schelling's belief that each 
organism is actively engaged in this process, "deciding" when the circumstances are most 
appropriate for it to flourish. In our example, it is the timeliness of the acorn's growth 
which is most crucial. Whereas the concepts of chance and predestination presume that 
becoming is imposed on the acorn, the notion of "ground" implies that it is self-directed, 
following directly from the acorn's sensitivity to the external world.54 This is the sense in 
which becoming implies freedom; it implies a level of self-awareness on the part of the 
subject where the latter recognizes when the time is ripe for change. Living things are 
"free" not simply in the sense that they have the ability to change, but in the sense that 
they are cognizant of and looking for these suitable conditions. They are free in an active 
sense, to the degree that they are searching for the best possible conditions to express 
themselves.    
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
in thinking we cannot alter and make it worse. And yes, nature is fragile, but in such as a way as to make us 
think that its patterns are not models of strength and vitality. To hit the mean    
54 The notion that organisms are self-directed to change does not repudiate the claim that such becoming 
can be affected by other organisms. Certainly, I can choose whether or not to plant the acorn in good soil, 
and so, to this extent, I am a factor in the acorn's development. However, what is more crucial is that, when 
I plant the acorn in good growing conditions, at no point do I ever force the acorn to grow. Indeed, the 
acorn may never find itself in a suitable environment to thrive, but when it does thrive, it is always by its 




Freedom as Self-conscious Act 
 
 Now that we understand the relation between change and becoming, we are in a 
position to investigate  how freedom necessarily leads to the creation of difference. To be 
sure, this concern goes beyond our basic intuition that becoming happens, since, at the 
same time, it addresses our understanding of what it means to call something free. For 
who would say that something which has the potential to act, and, thus, become 
otherwise, but never actually do so, is truly free? Is the person with the potential to be a 
great pianist, truly a great pianist if she never, in fact, learns how to play the instrument 
well? No, and, in fact, given enough time, we would begin to doubt whether or not that 
individual truly has the potential to become a great pianist.55 Potency and act are 
antipodes for Schelling, meaning that the only way for freedom to become fully realized 
is for it to become its opposite, namely, something determined by necessity. Indeed, 
Schelling's association of activity with necessity is reminiscent of  the classical notion of 
teleology, which argues that things are real to the extent that they have an end. But we 
have to be careful, since while real things are indeed motivated by necessary ends, they 
are still free, meaning it is always contingent in the first place that they follow (and 
continue to follow) any particular path. Freedom, then, is paradoxical since it leads to 
becoming - and, thus, is actualized - only by taking necessity as its ground. In the WA, 
Schelling argues that this dynamic characterizes God's existence insofar his freedom is a 
                                                          
55 Naturally, this assumes that the person in question is not already a great pianist. By becoming a great 
pianist, one shows that such becoming is, in fact, the product of one's own decision. We can assemble the 
timeline of events thusly: one is a great pianist now, but was not previously, meaning that one became a 
great pianist because one decided to do so. If one were thoroughly necessitated to become a great pianist he 
would already be a great pianist.   
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necessary but not sufficient condition for the world's generation. God is free to create or 
not create the world, and yet, if he never creates, he does not realize his freedom. The 
result is that God can reveal himself as free only be taking on some determinate 
existence. This is the inverse logic which grounds becoming: that God becomes "that 
which can be anything" - including the option to be nothing - only on the condition that 
he actually becomes something, abandoning the blissfulness of eternity in order to take on 
the burden of a life guided by fate.56   
 The interdependence of freedom and necessity brings us to our intuitions about 
the "ground" of the free act,57 which center on the notion that freedom is an expression of 
the agent, and, thus, of her identity.58 I mean "identity" in the sense that the free act is 
done in "accordance with the laws of its own essence, and is determined by nothing else 
either within or outside it."59 Since the absolute's decision is made freely, it necessarily 
expresses what it (i.e. the absolute) is; but we must be careful, since this identity must 
itself function as positive third, for it must affirm both the absolute's capacity to create 
and its existential desire to do so.60 Now deontology argues that this identity is reason to 
                                                          
56 God's fate in this instance is his desire to express himself, which doubles as his desire for self-
consciousness. 
57 Alternatively, I am asking the following question: if freedom must culminate in action  in order to realize 
itself as freedom, and the ground of this free action necessarily lies in some necessity - i.e. a necessity 
separate from the subject's freedom but still contained within the subject - what is the nature of  this 
ultimate "ground" that makes  free action possible while simultaneously functioning as the subject's 
identity?  
58 "True freedom is in accord with a holy necessity, the likes of which we feel in essential knowledge, 
where spirit and heart, bound only by their own law, freely affirm what is necessary." Freedom Essay, 264. 
59 "For that is free which acts only in accordance with the laws of its own essence, and is determined by 
nothing else within or outside it." (Freedom Essay, pg. 258) 
60 This is where Schelling's metaphysics exhibits common ground with the Medieval conception of 
"freedom for the Good." Because the free act is impossible lest it takes desire as its ground, it necessarily 
follows from a "ground" which is simultaneously free and not free. For Schelling, this is the ultimate source 
of God's decision, which doubles as his identity, what Schelling will call the 'absolute I of divinity.' The 
feeling of God's action being his own is maximized to the extent that he believes he is acting rightly, but to 
say that this rightness is identical with the fact that the decision is done freely is a misinterpretation. God, 
for Schelling, does not act in the image of Thrasymachus' tyrant, whose power affords him the authority to 
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which Schelling himself would likely raise the point that Kant himself articulates about 
reason in general,61 namely, that it alone is not suitable for securing happiness, and, thus, 
is distinguishable from our inclinations.62 The problem here lies in Kant's emphasis on 
duty, which runs aground of the problem that freedom qua freedom does not ground 
becoming. If reason alone does not incline us to act, how, then, can it overcome the issue 
Schelling's identifies in the WA concerning freedom's indifference?63 To be sure, it is not 
my contention that Schelling rejects deontology, or even the belief that reason is crucial 
to being ethical, but simply that he questions the attitude that pure reason is the ultimate 
motivating force of our actions.64 Hypothetically speaking, this is Schelling's response to 
Kant's metaphysics, namely, that there is an understanding of freedom within deontology 
that exceeds the parameters of the categorical imperative, for whereas the latter implies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
determine what is indeed good. Instead, "ground" as the absolute I of divinity, functions as the authority 
internal to the self which actualizes its capacity to act freely. 
61 "Now suppose that nature's real purpose for you, a being with reason and will, were that you should 
survive, thrive, and be happy - in that case nature would have hit upon a very poor arrangement in 
appointing reason to carry out this purpose! For all the actions that you need to perform in order to carry 
this intention of nature - and indeed the entire regulation of your conduct - would be marked out for you 
much more exactly and reliably by instinct than it ever could by reason." Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans. James W. Ellington. United States: Hackett, 1981. 
62 In the Freedom Essay, Schelling says in relation to Kant: "We can already foresee that when everyone 
would rather be a beautiful soul than a rational one, and would rather be called noble than be just, morality 
will come to be derived from the general concept of taste, according to which vice will consist merely in 
bad or corrupt taste. When the divine principle of morality as such breaks through in the serious 
disposition, then virtue appears as enthusiasm; as heroism (in the battle against evil), as the lovely, free 
courage of a man to act as God instructs him, and in his actions not to fall from what he has recognized in 
knowledge; and as belief, not in the sense of holding something for true which might be considered 
meritorious, or which lacks what certitude requires - a meaning which has been appended to this word in its 
use for common things - but in its original meaning as trust, confidence in the divine, which excludes all 
choice." (Freedom Essay, pg. 266) 
63 "In fact we are expressing the Kantian concept - not, indeed, exactly in his words, but in the manner in 
which we believe it must be expressed in order to be understood. But if this concept is assumed, then it 
seems the following has been correctly inferred as well. Free action follows immediately from the 
intelligible in man. But this is necessarily a determined action, one that is, for example, either good or evil. 
However, there is no transition from the absolutely undetermined to the determined. The statement that the 
intelligible essence should determine itself from pure, utter indetermination without any basis, leads back to 
the above-mentioned system of the impartiality of volition....." (Freedom Essay, pg. 258)  
64 "For however highly we may value reason, we still do not believe, for example, that someone can be 
virtuous, or a hero, or a great man at all, by means of pure reason, nor even that the human race, as the 
well-known saying goes, will be propagated by it. Only in personality is there life; and all personality rests 
upon a dark ground, which, to be sure, must also be the ground of knowledge." (Freedom Essay, pg. 282) 
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that the most complete articulation of our freedom follows from the strength of our 
capacity to be rational, Schelling argues that this act proceeds from a higher "ground" 
insofar it affirms both reason and unreason, the Godhead, and his existential desires.65 
Schelling's emphasis on becoming throughout the WA is especially crucial to keep in 
mind at this juncture, since the very notion of time is antithetical to a strictly theoretical 
account of the universe. Instead, our belief  in becoming points to the fact that we ought 
to make room for the possibility that the ultimate "ground" of things is indeed non-
conceptual, or more specifically, beyond a conceptual understanding.66  
 Since becoming does not follow from logical necessity, the identity which 
"grounds" the free act necessarily exceeds the limitations of a priori reasoning. 
Admittedly, the provocative nature of this claim will likely challenge any newcomer to 
Schelling's metaphysics, since we naturally seek precise explanations about why things 
are the way they are - and the very notion of a contradictory "ground" immediately 
delimits that potential. But that is the reason why it is crucial for us to take Schelling's 
project seriously in the first place, since that desire for clarity can blind us to the true 
nature of becoming, which is that the self which authors it exceeds any theoretical 
conception of it. The compelling nature of this claim becomes clearer when we think 
about why it is that we make meaningful changes in our lives, such as, for instance, the 
                                                          
65 "But what is this inner necessity of essence itself? Here is the point at which necessity and freedom must 
be united, if they can be united at all. If this essence were dead being and with respect to man something 
merely given to him, then since the act can proceed from only by necessity, responsibility and al freedom 
would be annulled. But precisely this inner necessity is itself freedom; man's essence is essentially his own 
dead; necessity and freedom are interrelated as one being which appears as the one or the other only when 
viewed from different aspects; in itself it is freedom, formally it is necessity." (Freedom Essay, pg. 259) 
66 Bruce Matthews echoes a similar point in his introduction to the Berlin lectures: "That there is a world at 
all, and that this world has precisely this vibrant explosion of life in all of its ongoing differentiation, 
communicates to Schelling a truth of existence that precedes the application of reason's web of order and 
necessity...What is not accidental, what appears to Schelling as much more essential to life than reason and 
thinking, is desire and action. In the Berlin lectures, he repeatedly stresses this obvious yet all too 
frequently overlooked fact that since thinking is not action, logic cannot be the author of history" (pg. 2).  
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decision to fall in love. I use this example because Schelling himself associates love with 
the subject's freedom, meaning that the decision to change is no less an expression of her 
desire than it is of her will.67 Why do we fall in love? If we asked someone this question, 
our interlocutor would likely respond by listing some of her partner's positive attributes, 
such as, their intelligence, humor, or kindness, or even their physical attractiveness. 
While all of these traits serve as rational justifications for caring about someone, they do 
not explain sufficiently why our interlocutor loves the specific person she does. First and 
foremost, having these qualities does not necessarily make someone more lovable, since 
being more intelligent or kind does not automatically mean that one loves that person 
more or less. And also, these qualities do not explain why the subject loves anyone in 
particular, since there are others who share these same qualities, including some who 
likely have them to a higher degree. Now we might be willing to hold out the possibility 
that our interlocutor could produce a more compelling account of her love, but more 
likely, I believe we would agree that the inadequacy of her explanation confirms our 
intuition that no such account is possible. After all, we ourselves are just as rational as 
our interlocutor, and yet I doubt any of us believe that, through her explanation, she could 
persuade us to fall in love with her partner as well. Within the context of the WA, this 
inability of hers to articulate the ultimate "ground" of her love raises a crucial question 
about the subject's decision, since she has the power to love anyone she chooses, which is 
why it is unclear why she chooses to love this particular person.68 In this way, we can see 
                                                          
67 "For even spirit is not the highest; it is but spirit, or the breath of love. Love, however, is the highest. 
Love is what existed before the ground and before existing beings (as separated)..." ((Freedom Essay, pg. 
276) 
68 This is one of many instances in Schelling's philosophy in which readers of him must be cautious not to 
take any particular line out of context or interpret a specific portion of his system in isolation. Indeed, the 
subject is free to love whom she chooses, but only on the condition that she is also determined to love 
someone in particular and posits that necessity as her ground. For if the subject were, strictly speaking, only 
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why Schelling associates freedom with love, since while we are always free to love 
whom we choose, we are only in love to the extent that we choose to love someone in 
particular.69 In fact, this is the paradox which gives love its meaning, since if it were 
impossible for me to love anything other than my beloved, the love I show that person 
would lose all of its value. Instead, what makes me appreciative when I receive love - and 
vice versa - is that it does not have to be, that the person who gives it me is not coerced 
into doing so. For Schelling, the contradictory nature of love, specifically the fact that it 
is both fated and free, is the reason why he introduces the notion of "ground." "Ground" 
functions as that positive third, that locus within the self, which affirms the self's free will 
and existential desire without being reduced to either one. Indeed, "ground" is Schelling's 
non-theoretical concept which motivates becoming. Understandably, we might be 
inclined to question the explanatory potential of such a concept; but then again, we have 
to be careful, since if by "explanatory" we mean that a concept is self-evidently true, 
then, we have presumed the very thing which contradicts the reality of time since 
becoming is not a logical necessity. For this reason, we have to make room for concepts 
like "ground" which are more apt for articulating the nuances of life, avoiding logic's 
proclivity for reducing events into false dichotomies. For when it comes to becoming, 
there is no single cause for why events as they happen do - and, in fact, if there were, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
free to love whom she chooses, she would not actually be so, since she would be indifferent to all possible 
objects of affection, and, therefore, incapable of choosing between them. Thus, in arguing that the subject is 
free to love whom she chooses, I am not suggesting that the subject can choose arbitrarily whom she will 
love, rather that the subject's decision to love confirms that it was freely given. This is one of the ways in 
Schelling's system is counterintuitive to us, since even though subject is free before the decision occurs, 
that freedom is realized as freedom only through (or after) the decision. Thus, when it comes to the 
question of whether or not the subject can love whom she chooses, the answer is both "Yes" and "No." 
"No" in the sense that the subject cannot arbitrarily choose whom she loves, but "Yes" in the sense that 
being free to love whom one chooses means loving the person one is fated to love. 
69 "For there is love neither in indifference nor where opposites are combined which require combination in 
order to be , but rather (to repeat a word already spoken) this is the mystery of love, that it combines what 
could be by itself and yet is not and cannot be without the other." (Freedom Essay, pg. 278) 
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there would be no time in the first place - but instead a variety of sources, some of which 




 I view this dissertation as a hermeneutical enterprise, which means that its method 
is primarily interpretative. The WA is a strange essay, in part, because of its close 
resemblance with mythology, and it is because of this that we must be willing to suspend 
certain value judgments about the claims Schelling makes within it - as well as the 
assumptions upon which these claims are based. The circulation of the drives eternally 
grounding creation, God's will to exist, and the groundlessness of God's freedom; these 
are concepts which Schelling himself struggles to define clearly, so there is certainly 
good reason to question their validity. But just like the mythology of the Greeks and the 
parables of Christian and Hebrew Scripture, to which many thinkers - such as Ricouer, 
Kearney, and Heidegger, just to name a few - continue to return despite their obvious, 
historical inaccuracies, the WA is able to convey knowledge outside the literal truth-value 
of its propositions.70 In fact, because the WA is written in such mythic tones, I believe we 
must suspend our concerns about the literal truth-value of its statements if we are to reach 
its most crucial teachings. The WA poses a unique insight concerning the relation of 
existence to transcendence, but, by its very nature, it is an insight which cannot be 
communicated explicitly within the purview of traditional propositional logic. Like the 
                                                          
70 Based on the title of Schelling's magnum opus, it is tempting to think that the WA is a historical project, a 
recounting of the actual events leading up to the creation of the world. But like the mythologies of other 
cultures, which, even when they appear to be telling a history, are not in fact attempting to tell a history, I 
believe the WA operates likewise. As opposed to giving us a historical record, the WA's primary objective is 




center of Schelling's system - "ground" - which grounds everything and yet can never 
enter into the clear light of intelligibility, this insight which organizes Schelling's work is 
pervasive without ever being made fully transparent by its author. Hence the reason why 
I believe an exegesis is necessary. The insight must be "led out" so to speak from the text, 
transferred as much as possible from the implicit to the explicit. The truth of the WA is 
the product of the logic internal to it; accordingly, if we are going to gain access to it, we 
must be willing to enter the text with a certain level of naiveté lest we begin importing 
our own prejudices about what does and does not constitute a valid assertion - and, in 
turn, obscuring what Schelling himself really means to say. It is this preliminary 
approach that enables us to deal with Schelling on his own terms - which is the 
overarching goal of this dissertation -  and, correlatively, keeps us open to the possibility 
- which I am wagering - that the WA is indeed a successful philosophical project despite 
its apparent failings. 
 In attempting to read Schelling on his own terms, I am guided by his own 
suggestion that genuine philosophy is akin to a work of art.71 Intuitively, anyone who 
appreciates the history of philosophy can see why Schelling would make this claim. 
There is a long metaphysical tradition of discussing the absolute in terms of the beautiful. 
But Schelling is doing more than reiterating an old claim, for when he says that 
philosophy is a creative exercise, he is also talking about the manner in which we 
approach the absolute, and, by extension, the metaphysician's attempts to understand it. 
                                                          
71 "What philosophy is as such cannot be answered immediately. If it were so easy to agree about a definite 
concept of philosophy, one would only need to analyze this concept to see oneself at once in possession of 
a philosophy of universal validity. The point is this: philosophy is not something with which our mind, 
without its own agency, is originally and by nature imbued. It is throughout a work of freedom. It is for 
each only what he has himself made it; and therefore the idea of a philosophy [is] only the result of 
philosophy itself; a universally valid philosophy, however, [is] a vainglorious figment of the imagination 
[ein Hirngespinst]" (pg. 4 in Matthews' introduction). 
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For when I approach a work of art, it would be nonsensical of me to ask "Is this true?" 
and instead more appropriate to consider "what truth does this reveal?" Similarly, when 
we approach Schelling's metaphysics, Schelling himself believes the appropriate question 
is not "Is his system correct?" but rather "what parts of it as a unity are operational?" 
Admittedly, this approach may go against some of our most cherished intuitions about 
what it means to think rigorously, but, for Schelling, that is the point, because, for him, to 
do metaphysics necessitates that we relinquish all prior expectations of what can be said 
about reality. Why? Because as we will observe in the dissertation, it is impossible to do 
metaphysics without first acknowledging the dissonance between theoretical truth and  
practical reality, that reality is not exhausted by what we inferentially know of it.72 This 
explains why Schelling associates metaphysics with "ground," for since metaphysics is 
concerned with reality itself, it is concerned with what is prior to truth. The "ground" in 
question is, as he so often points out, a “dark” ground. Furthermore, the very nature of 
truth confirms this insight, even when truth is understood in its narrowly propositional 
sense. A proposition, after all, is dependent on multiple terms for its very existence.73 So 
too when we consider the correspondence of a proposition with objects in the world. In 
every instance, truth presupposes a "ground" that is independent of it.  
 Theoretical reason, then, is a poor means for approaching "ground," to which 
Schelling himself poses the alternative of art. Just as I do not question whether a 
                                                          
72 "The basic character of the work of art is thus an unconscious infinity [synthesis of nature and freedom]. 
The artist seems to have presented in his work, as if instinctively, apart from what he has put into it with 
obvious intent, an infinity which no finite understand can fully unfold" (Deduction of a Universal Organ of 
Philosophy, or Main Propositions of the Philosophy of Art According to Principles of Transcendental 
Idealism, pg. 209)  
73 This is true even with statements as simple as "A = A." Just as one does not say "A" is true, only that 
"A=A" is true, the truth of a proposition is never reducible solely to the subject of the proposition, even if 
that proposition is an assertion of logical identity. True propositions always require multiple terms, 
meaning that the "ground" of their veracity transcends both terms since it presupposes both of them.     
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particular life form is true or false, I do not question whether or not a work of art is true 
or false; but whereas an organism typically conceals the origins of its presence, art is 
more explicit in this regard, more readily disclosing the font of its liveliness. If all things 
emerge out of a dark "ground," art enables us to see this.74 Reason, on the other hand, is 
ill-suited for this investigation because it assumes the very presence which it seeks to 
explain. As logos, reason is "word." But just like the word in the Gospel of John, this one 
too must first be "spoken," meaning that it is not real as truth until "ground" gives birth to 
it. Thus, reason is like any other offspring in organic nature insofar as it resembles its 
parent while simultaneously concealing the origin of its existence. Indeed, reason is the 
genetic material passed on by "ground." But like the genetic material that resides in each 
us, that information alone is insufficient to explain why it was passed on. To understand 
that act requires an investigation of the subject which decided to reproduce itself, which 
is a separate discussion from what that subject actually reproduced.      
 Although it may appear hasty or conceited to liken the WA to a work of art, 
Schelling himself does this because it coincides with the nature of "ground," which is not 
accountable to rational standards of truth since it is the very condition of their existence.75 
It would be fallacious of us to assume from the outset that Schelling's analysis must 
adhere to certain standards of intelligibility, since it would be the equivalent of reducing 
"ground" to what it "grounds," throwing us back on the problem posed by the ontological 
                                                          
74 "Conscious and unconscious activity are to be absolutely one in the (artistic) product, just as they are also 
in the organic product; but they are to be one in a different way - both are to be one for the ego itself." 
(Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or Main Propositions of the Philosophy of Art According 
to Principles of Transcendental Idealism, pg. 204-205) 
75 "This primordial consciousness itself in its potentiality, in its mere capacity to be restored, is reason. Or 
more emphatically, primordial consciousness which strives to restore itself in this separation, which we 
only perceive as a stimulus, as a signal, as an aspect of us, is reason. This illuminates the potential, the 
merely suffering nature of reason, but this also shows that reason cannot be the active principle in science" 
(On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 234). 
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argument. I find this to be one of the reasons Schelling is often overlooked by his own 
contemporaries insofar as they argue that Schelling's analysis must be unremittingly 
rational - which misses the mark in terms of Schelling's focus on "ground." Schelling 
himself would likely identify this attitude as itself the real conceit insofar as it operates 
from the assumption that reason has cornered the market on truth, when, in fact, the very 
existence of time refutes this very idea, since a thoroughly rational universe is one which 
has no time because it has no negativity - and which is subsequently sterile since it has no 
freedom, and, thus, no power to produce anything, not even itself.76 Understanding 
"ground," then, requires a willingness on our part to let go of the expectation that 
intelligibility is synonymous with reason, an insight Schelling himself alludes to in his 
Essay Concerning the Nature of Philosophy as a Science when he cites the Biblical adage 
that only "he who is willing to lose everything will get it back tenfold." Schelling's point 
is not that "ground" is totally incomprehensible, but that there is a higher intelligence, one 
above reason, which stands in closer proximity to the absolute. It is a brand of knowledge 
which coincides with Schelling's concept of "presentiment," inarticulate, yet still 
"known," an understanding, which, first and foremost, demands to be expressed.77 We are 
talking about self-consciousness on the level of becoming existential, by which Schelling 
means self-consciousness which grounds our creativity.  As we will observe, accessing 
                                                          
76 "It could be said that error arises by merely wanting to know. So only by not wanting to know are we 
safe from error. True, this is the household remedy that most people employ. But wanting to know does not 
depend on man. He wants to know before he knows that he wants to know. For already each individual 
consciousness arises in man from an attraction, from turning that which he is into his object." (On the 
Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 239) 
77 "Just as the fateful man does not accomplish what he intends or has in view but rather what he must, by 
an incomprehensible destiny under whose influence he stands, so the artist, however purposeful he may be, 
nevertheless, in regard to what is truly objective in his creation, seems to stand under the influence of a 
power that sets him apart from all other men and compels to express or represent things he does not himself 
fully see through and whose meaning is infinite" (Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or Main 
Propositions of the Philosophy of Art According to Principles of Transcendental Idealism, pg. 207) 
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this brand of intelligence will require a shift in our focus away from the analysis of 
isolated propositions toward an analysis of how concepts work together. This does not 
mean, of course, that we should not question Schelling's individual assumptions, rather 
that, when it comes to evaluating Schelling's system, we should do so primarily on the 
basis of how his concepts work together to provide an account of how becoming 
originates. Indeed, we are talking about an intuitive understanding of becoming as 
opposed to a logical one. The contradictory nature of "ground" implies that becoming is, 
in essence, relational. Consequently, our judgments about Schelling's system should 
follow this lead, evaluating if the concepts internal to "ground," (i.e. freedom and 
necessity) exhibit the signs of cooperation and symbiosis.     
7 
Being Yields to Transcendence: Schelling's Philosophy of Nature    
 
 This dissertation is divided into three chapters, the first of which has to do with 
Schelling's  philosophy of nature. My goal in this chapter is to offer a brief overview of 
Schelling's early philosophy as it pertains to his discussion of time in the WA. At the heart 
of this discussion is Schelling's concept of "ground," which, for all intents and purposes, 
animates the entirety of his philosophy. We will not be attempting to define "ground;" it 
is, after all, the indefinable itself. Rather, we will be attempting to understand why our 
belief in our capacity to have knowledge presupposes this irreducible remainder.  
 The reason why we should study Schelling's concept of "ground" is because of its 
insights into the nature of truth. Schelling is a relatively obscure figure in the Western 
intellectual tradition, frequently overlooked even in his own time, but his findings about 
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the preconditions of knowledge remain relevant for us insofar as they offer what I believe 
is a compelling alternative to the excesses of realism and idealism, an alternative which 
bypasses the difficulties in suggesting that knowledge is a distinctly one-sided affair, 
reduced either to the impressions objects impose on us from outside, or the projections of 
our consciousness as its strives to know itself.  How do I come to have knowledge? For 
Schelling, the uncontestable fact is not that I have knowledge, but that I believe I have 
knowledge, that I am constrained to assume a concordance between myself and nature. In 
experience, I encounter a multitude of objects, and these things appear to operate 
according to a certain purposefulness, but at no point am I led to believe that the 
orderliness I am privy to is merely accidental to the object, or that the object itself is 
illusory, but that the object is indeed real and that the orderliness is constitutive of what it 
actually is. The acorn, with proper soil and nutrients, always grows into an oak tree, and 
the caterpillar, under the appropriate conditions, always transforms into a butterfly; but 
never am I convinced that these objects are just appearances, but actual things outside 
myself, purposeful in their activity, directed by themselves. In other words, I am 
compelled to conceive that my ideas correspond with the objects of my perception, that 
my understanding of their purposefulness is consonant with what they really are. 
Schelling is not alone in suggesting that we are constrained to assume the correspondence 
between ourselves and things, however, what he recognizes about realism and idealism  
is their inability to locate the "ground" of this belief - i.e. the condition under which the 
continuity I experience between myself and nature, ideas and things, is made possible. 
The realist places the heavy lifting on objects, arguing that things cause me to have 
experiences of them by imposing themselves on me, while, for the idealist, the ground of 
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my knowledge is the subjective conditions of experience - which in turn cause my 
experiences of things by projecting appearances outside me. Schelling recognizes, 
though, that both paradigms fall short insofar as they rely on questionable assumptions. 
For the realist, it is the implicit faith that objects necessarily appear to us as they actually 
are, while for the idealist, that my consciousness can produce objects/appearances outside 
myself. Taken together, Schelling's critique of these  positions reveal to us that the 
"ground" of my knowledge is not reducible to either myself or nature, ideas or things, but 
rather is established through a positive third which brings them together without sublating 
their respective differences.   
 Without going beyond the limitations of this brief introduction, what this inquiry 
into the conditions of truth reveals to Schelling is a correspondence (i.e. a unity) between 
ourselves and nature which does not eliminate the differences between the two but rather 
is composed out of them. Inasmuch as we believe we have knowledge, we assume a unity 
between ourselves and the objects of our perception. What preoccupies Schelling about 
this unity, though, is its  presupposition of the difference between ourselves and nature, 
for if the unity of man and nature cannot be traced back to either myself or objects, my 
ideas or external things, then it would seem that they are in fact divergent from the 
correspondence in which they participate - in addition to proving divergent from each 
other. As I will demonstrate in the dissertation, the unity constitutive of our knowledge is 
composed through the interaction of different components, not through the imposition of 
sameness upon them. As a result, it confronts us with a highly pertinent question about 
that deep past (i.e. "ground") from which all things come, a question about the link which 
brings together these different parts and the whole which they produce. For the fact that 
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in knowledge we synthesize what fundamentally is not the same suggests the existence of 
a "ground" in which both of these moments (i.e. the sameness and difference of ourselves 
and nature) are simultaneously affirmed. But how is this possible? Is this not, in fact, a 
contradiction, and, if so, how can such a ground properly be said to exist? Without 
advancing beyond the constraints of this introduction, we can already infer how this 
question has important ramifications for our understanding of truth. If "ground" is indeed 
this paradoxical unity of sameness and difference which makes being and knowledge 
possible, then Schelling has made room for a conception of truth which is not thoroughly 
reducible to the principle of non-contradiction,  a conception which affirms the principle 
while simultaneously acknowledging another, higher, realm which truth also occupies, a 
realm beyond rationality, in which all things are possible. Inasmuch as the WA seeks to 
understand this "ground," our objective in this dissertation is to explore the possibilities 
this conception of truth holds with respect to how we  can come to have knowledge. 
8 
God's A Priori Hell: The Divine Madness Grounding the Divine Revelation 
 
 In the second chapter, we shift our attention to the WA, focusing on the 
metaphysical difficulties which Schelling hopes to address in the work. Our goal is to 
highlight Schelling's insight that time is founded on a contradictory "ground," by which I 
mean a condition which is simultaneously itself and its antipode. The WA describes this a 
priori in terms of the seminal moment when God created the universe, when the absolute 
abandoned the blissfulness of eternity and emerged into existence. Schelling's intentions 
here are not overtly religious, nor does he seek to allegorize time as a mere rhetorical 
flourish; instead, he means to argue that time is the unconditioned, and, thus, that which 
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produces itself from itself. Schelling ascribes this name to God because it clarifies the 
assertion that God is eternal, which often lends itself to the misinterpretation that God 
preexists the world but is nevertheless capable of creating it. This indeed is a 
contradiction - since it is inconceivable for God to be eternally at rest and then create - 
meaning that unless we are willing to abandon the principle of sufficient reason - and 
thereby imply that time itself is illusory - our only plausible alternative is that God 
himself does not preexist creation, but instead, is always already engaged in the act of 
creation. 78 This is why Schelling calls him an "eternal beginning." He is not separate 
from the act of creation, but rather is defined by it, having time as his very nature.    
 Having the character of "ground," time is characterized by an irresolvable tension 
between freedom and necessity, which Schelling himself allegorizes as the tension 
between God's ability to create and his desire to do so. The theoretical nature of the WA 
often lends itself to the interpretation that Schelling is a strict idealist for whom the 
source of reality, including all things concrete, is fundamentally abstract. But that is not 
the case, since his allegory of time suggests that the abstract and concrete are 
codependent in the generation of becoming. Imagine what God must have experienced in 
that moment before creation! While the most strident idealist will argue that this is a 
question of God's thoughts, implying - in the tradition of Leibniz - that God creates 
because he is rational, Schelling is more equivocal, suggesting instead that the situation is 
considerably murkier on account of the tension which grounds the moment. God's ideas 
are free, and, thus, capable of shaping matter without being affected by it. But this is the 
                                                          
78 "We must also not imagine that thought precedes and posits the absolute subject, but that both emerge in 
one and the same act - in the same decision. Both are born together and emerge at the same time from a 
primordial unity." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 235). 
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issue, since this indifference makes it inconceivable that they alone could ever create a 
material universe. God's ideas, then, are only a necessary condition of his existence, 
meaning that the moment of creation depends, in part, on the material world already 
residing within him, latently, desiring to be expressed. What could this desire look like? 
Schelling believes it takes the form of an existential crisis in which God experiences the 
disorientation constitutive of his longing to externalize himself. Our goal in this chapter 
to examine more closely this understanding of necessity and why it too is a necessary 
condition of God's existence. Those familiar with the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, will find this chapter especially interesting insofar as it marks Schelling's attempt 
to refine Kant's concept of freedom. Like Kant, Schelling regards the ground of free 
choice as necessary, but whereas Kant treats this necessity as fundamentally rational, 
Schelling sees it as irrational, constituted by confusion and chaos. The truly free act is not 
born out of supreme self-certainty  but only when reason gives itself over to an uncertain 
fate. God does not determine himself so much as he allows his own destiny to determine 
him. It is indeed a moment of resoluteness, but resoluteness founded on God's yielding to 
a higher power (i.e. "ground"). We will observe how Schelling arrives at this position 
through his dialectical analysis of subject and object, what he refers to in the text as what-
is and being, respectively.      
9 
The Inexpressible Expressing: God's Unprethinkable Decision 
 
 My third and final chapter focuses on God's decision to step into existence by 
putting in the past the turmoil of his existential crisis. Schelling calls this decision 
"unprethinkable," which is shorthand for the fact that the "eternal beginning" is both 
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necessary and free. We will be tracing the steps leading up to this act, paying special 
attention to the moment God achieves self-consciousness - when, as absolute, free 
subject, he acknowledges his desire to exist. This is the moment immediately preceding 
the decision, when the Godhead identifies itself with primal nature. Our intent is to 
understand how God arrives at this insight, focusing on the role of "ground" as his self-
reflecting mirror.  
 Through our analysis of the WA, we will be defending the claim that the 
revelation which motivates the decision is itself unrecoverable. By "unrecoverable" in 
this context, I am referencing the revelation's status as "ground," which produces time 
while remaining outside it. Schelling likens this insight to a bolt of lightning which 
strikes so quickly as to leave the observer non-plussed; it appears, but in a such a way as 
to conceal the source of its power. "Ground" operates similarly insofar as it compels God 
while concealing the nature of its authority. God does not know "ground," only the force 
of its imperative. Correspondingly, what he knows is not what "ground" is, only that he 
ought to express himself, and, thus, emerge into existence. God's self-consciousness, 
then,  most closely resembles a form of inspiration, a point which Schelling himself 
articulates through his concept of the "absolute I of divinity." Our task is to unpack why 
God's self-knowledge appears to him (i.e. God) this way and to explore the degree to 
which this understanding of self-expression makes the act of becoming more intelligible 




Chapter 1: Being Yields to Transcendence - Schelling's 
Philosophy of Nature 
 
Preface 
 The goal of this chapter is to introduce Schelling's notion of "ground" [Grund] as 
it arises in his philosophy of nature.79 The WA is an attempt to understand "ground" in its 
creative power, how it gives birth to being, knowledge, and time. Schelling's philosophy 
of nature, though, begins from the opposite direction, not from a "time before time" in 
order to consider what stirred in the heart of God before he created the universe, but 
rather from the present moment in order to uncover the metaphysical beginning from 
which life emerges. The following chapter will focus on the latter formulation of 
Schelling's conception of "ground" - which dominates the early portion of his career - in 
order to reveal how this principle serves as the dynamic center that organizes the universe 
and every living thing within it. In essence, I view this chapter largely as an introduction 
to the discussion that takes place in the WA. "Ground" is the most "general" of concepts 
for Schelling insofar as it marks the origin from which truly everything comes. However, 
before we talk about this concept independent of its relation to the world, we have to 
establish its relation to the world so that we know for sure that we are not wasting our 
                                                          
79 Although I acknowledge the desire to have a working definition of the term "ground" at this early stage 
of the dissertation, the transcendent nature of "ground" makes any such definition impossible. Schelling 
confirms this in his introduction to his Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of 
This Science when he argues that we have to let the true concept of philosophy "arise before the eyes of the 
reader." On account of its transcendent nature, "ground" is not a concept which we can treat analytically, 
assuming its truthfulness and then dividing it up into its parts, but instead must be won through a lengthy an 
laborious search through the entirety of being and the entirety of history. "Ground" is not the beginning of 
Schelling's corpus, but its conclusion. Likewise, I ask the reader to approach the entirety of this dissertation 
as an attempt to define "ground." 
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time chasing an illusion. 80 To this end, we need a "proof" for "ground" before we 
examine its role in the WA; a demonstration which clearly substantiates its crucial status 
as the metaphysical beginning of being. In the WA, Schelling's stresses the point that the 
beginning of something lies in its negation.81 Correlatively, the beginning of our 
knowledge of "ground" lies in the analysis of "ground's" products, i.e., being and 
knowledge, and not "ground" itself. "Ground" is the conclusion of Schelling's 
metaphysical project, not its jumping off point, so while it is (and it is not) the true 
beginning of things, our knowledge of it cannot be achieved without an understanding of 
its connection with these things.82 The following chapter is an attempt to provide this 
understanding, highlighting the ties of being and knowledge to a transcendent past - what 
Schelling refers to as "The Past" - a time before there was anything at all.83    
Introduction 
 Why are we not starting the dissertation with the WA? It seems a very reasonable 
question since this project's main objective is to interrogate that particular work. The WA 
is about "The Past," a past before all pasts, before creation itself, a past so prior, in fact, 
that no temporal designation can be attributed to it since it precedes time altogether. So, 
                                                          
80 "How general is the expression that finite beings are modifications or consequences of God! What a gulf 
must be filled in here, and what questions must be answered!" Philosophical Investigations into the 
Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters. See Ernst Behler's anthology, Philosophy of German 
Idealism. New York: Continuum, 1987. (pg. 230). 
81 "For the beginning really only lies in the negation. All beginning is, in accord with its nature, only a 
desire for the end or for what leads to the end and hence, negates itself as the end. It is only the tension of 
the bow - it is not so much that which itself has being as it is the ground that something is. It is not enough 
for a beginning that now commences or becomes not to be . It must be expressdly posited as that which 
does not have being. A ground is thereby given for it to be." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16)  
82 As a point of clarification, "ground" is indeed the true beginning of philosophy insofar as it is the 
beginning of all things - even the possibility of raising the question of "ground" - but we do not have 
immediate knowledge of it, and so our knowledge of it must begin with its products, not itself directly. 
83 "What then is the system's principle, the one subject that proceeds through everything and does not 
remain in anything?...The answer: the indefinable itself, the aspect of the subject which cannot be defined, 
has to be made the definition" (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, 216). The term "transcendent" is 
my own and not a term which Schelling himself uses in this particular context  
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why, then, are we not starting there? Should this not be the locus of our project's 
disembarking? If our goal is, like Schelling's, a metaphysical one insofar as we seek to 
know the nature of being, the nature of time, and what was stirring in the heart of God 
when he created these things, then this past, the beginning of the beginning, seems the 
most fitting place to turn. So, why, then, are we not starting on this topos? Ultimately, it 
is for the same reason Schelling himself did not attempt the WA before he composed the 
System of Transcendental Idealism and the Freedom Essay: because though the 
groundlessness of "ground" is indeed primary, it is not primary to us. To see this, one 
needs to look no farther than the opening line of the WA: "Just as with the ending of time 
to come, God shrouds for himself in dark night the beginning of time gone by."84 
Schelling's point is that there is no easily accessible entryway into this past. It is the 
beginning of everything, and so, is always in us, of us, near us; and yet, by the same 
token, it is infinitely far away, and so, cannot be accessed directly, but only indirectly, 
through time, through being, through history.85 Historically speaking, one cannot help but 
be reminded of the Second Question of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae wherein 
Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle in drawing the distinction between truths which are 
self-evident in themselves and truths which are self-evident to us.86 God's existence is a 
                                                          
84Alternatively translated: "As with the coming time, God self-referentially shrouds the point of departure 
for the past beginning in dark night. It is not given to everyone to know the end and it is given to few to see 
the primordial beginnings of life and it is given to even fewer to think through the whole of things from 
beginning to end." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 3) 
85 "There is a light in this darkness. Just as according to the old and almost hackneyed phrase that the 
person is the world writ small, so the events of human life, from the deepest to their highest consummation, 
must accord with the events of life in general." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 3) 
86  "A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to 
us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is 
included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. 
If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to 
all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things 
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there 
are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident 
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truth self-evident in itself, yet it is not self-evident to us, and can only be demonstrated 
through proofs from God's effects.87 Similarly, "The Past," for Schelling, is what is truly 
original, and yet, whoever seeks to know it must be willing to trace its passage through 
history. As Schelling writes, "the darkness of the spirit cannot be overcome suddenly or 
in one fell swoop,"88 so while the "abysses" of that "great life" are still in us just as much 
as the present,89 to know it, to feel it, one must accompany history "along its great path, 
linger with each moment, and surrender to the gradualness of the movement"; he must 
watch history vigilantly, "keeping a firm hold of the interrelation of movement from 
beginning to end."90 "The Past" is everything, and everything is "The Past," so the events 
of history must concord with "life in general;" correlatively, the one who can write the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. 
Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the 
learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," 
of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as 
will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-
evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their 
nature— namely, by effects." Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros., 1948. (First Part, Q. 2, A. 1.)  
87 For Aquinas, the reason God's existence is not self-evidently true to us is because we do not know God's 
essence immediately, without demonstration. If we did, we would recognize that his existence is self-
evident inasmuch as his essence is being, that is, his essence is to exist. I am not attempting to import 
Aquinas' metaphysical language into this discussion of Schelling, but simply to draw the connection that, 
like Aquinas, Schelling recognizes that we do not begin with the knowledge of the divine (i.e. what is first), 
but instead, must demonstrate the divine's existence from its products. 
88 "The darkness of spirit cannot be overcome suddenly or in one fell swoop. The world is not a riddle 
whose solution could be given with a single word. Its history is too elaborate to be brought, so to speak, as 
some seem to wish, to a few short, uncompleted propositions on a sheet of paper." (the WA, 1815 edition, 
pg. 4) 
89 "Most people turn away from what is concealed within themselves just as they turn away from the depths 
of the great life and shy away from the glance into the abysses of that past which are still in one just as 
much as the present." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 3-4) 
90 "Then just as all history is not just experienced in reality or only in narration, it  cannot be 
communicated, so to speak, all at once with a general concept. Whoever wants knowledge of history must 
accompany it along its great path, linger with each moment, and surrender to the gradualness of the 
development. " (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 3-4) 
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genealogy of his own life will have some semblance of how the ultimate past (i.e. "The 
Past") gave birth to time.91 
 Where does this leave us in terms of an entry point into the question of what 
"ground" is? Since we cannot start with the true beginning, we have to start with our 
beginning, which, for Schelling, is the fact we exist in nature, and that we believe we 
have knowledge of it. "For we presuppose as an undeniable fact that the representation of 
a succession of causes and effects outside ourselves is as necessary for our spirit as if it 
belongs to our spirit's being and essence."92 The beginning for us is the necessity with 
which we are constrained to believe we have knowledge of an outside world. In 
experience, I encounter a multitude of objects, and these things appear to operate 
according to a certain purposefulness, but at no point am I led to believe that the 
orderliness I am privy to is merely accidental to the object, or that the object itself is 
illusory, but that the object is indeed real and that the orderliness is constitutive of what it 
actually is.93 The acorn, with proper soil and nutrients, always grows into an oak tree, and 
the caterpillar, under the appropriate conditions, always transforms into a butterfly; but 
never am I convinced that these objects are just appearances, but actual things outside 
                                                          
91 "There is a light in this darkness. Just as according to the old and almost hackneyed phrase that the 
person is the world writ small, so the events of human life, from the deepest to their highest consummation, 
must accord with the events of life in general. Certainly one who could write completely the history of their 
own life would also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 3) 
92 "This is more or less the way the study of nature comes to completion. But it is not our task here to 
portray such a system, once it exists, but rather to find how such a system could exist at all. The question is 
not whether or how this connection of appearances and the sequence of causes and effects (that we call the 
course of nature) has become actual outside us, but for us. The question is how this system and this 
connection of appearances have found their way to our spirit, and how they have acquired in our faculty of 
representation the necessity with which we are clearly constrained to think of them." Schelling's 
introduction to his Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science (pg. 
181) 
93 "In knowing as such - in the fact of my knowing - objective and subjective are so united that one cannot 
say which of the two has priority." Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. System of Transcendental 
Idealism (1800). Trans. Peter Heath. Charlottesville: U of Virginia, 1978. (pg. 5). 
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myself, purposeful in their activity, directed by themselves. In other words, I am 
compelled to conceive that my ideas correspond with the objects of my perception, that 
my understanding of their purposefulness is consonant with what they really are. The 
fundamental question at stake for Schelling in this regard is the relation of subject and 
object, ideas and things. How is it that ideas, which only have reality in relation to my 
understanding, somehow find expression in things outside me? How do objects external 
to me correspond with my subjectivity? Do ideas actually cause my appearances - in 
which case, we find ourselves in the purest of idealisms; but if, so, how is it that I am still 
constrained to believe these ideas are outside me? Or, do external objects cause my ideas 
of them - in which case, we find ourselves in the purest of realisms; but if so, how is it 
that they correspond with my ideas? Schelling's philosophy of nature is an attempt to 
answer all these questions with an eye toward answering the most crucial one of all, 
namely, how it is that this relation of subject and object, ideas and things, nature and 
spirit, came to be in the first place.  
 Without going beyond the scope of this brief introduction, what Schelling 
unearths through his subsequent investigation of our relationship to nature is a unity of 
subject and object in which neither one is reducible to the other. The phenomenologist 
will certainly find resonance in this philosophy of nature. Subject and object for Schelling 
- consciousness and things for the phenomenologist - arise simultaneously and together, 
and their congruence is what makes possible the necessity with which I am constrained to 
conceive that I can make judgments about external things. But whereas the 
phenomenologist is content to suspend any further questions about how this congruence 
is possible for the sake of investigating more thoroughly the relation itself, Schelling 
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himself is bothered by the unity's presupposition of difference between subject and 
object, for if the unity of subject and object cannot be traced back to either subject or 
object, or my ideas or external things, then it would seem that they are in fact divergent 
from the unity in which they participate - in addition to proving divergent from each 
other. As we will observe in our brief survey of Schelling's philosophy of nature, the 
unity constitutive of our knowledge of things is composed through the interaction of 
legitimately different components, not through the imposition of sameness upon them. As 
a result, this insight confronts us with a highly pertinent question about that deep past 
from which all things come, a question about the link which brings together these 
different parts and the whole which they produce. For the fact that in knowledge we 
synthesize what fundamentally is not the same suggests the existence of a "ground" in 
which both of these moments (i.e. the sameness and difference of subject and object) are 
simultaneously affirmed. But how is this possible? Is this not, in fact, a contradiction, 
and, if so, how can such a "ground" properly be said to exist? We can already infer how 
these questions pertaining to the "ground" of our experience have important ramifications 
for our understanding of truth. If "ground" is indeed this paradoxical unity of sameness 
and difference which makes being and knowledge possible, then Schelling has made 
room for a conception of truth which is not consistent with the principle of non-
contradiction. Indeed, his conception of truth affirms this principle while simultaneously 
acknowledging another, higher, realm which truth also occupies, a realm beyond 
rationality, in which all things are possible.94 Inasmuch as the WA seeks to understand 
                                                          
94 Historically speaking, this appears to be the jumping off point for Kierkegaard's Christian existentialism. 
Schelling's influence on Kierkegaard is well-documented, and I will refrain from exploring it in any 
substantive depth - although an excellent source on this issue is Michelle Kosch's book, Freedom and 
Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. However,  I think anyone familiar with Kierkegaard's works 
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this "ground," this dissertation will not be exploring the broader implications of 
Schelling's conception of truth. Instead, our goal in this first chapter is simply to establish 
the justification for investigating this "ground" more thoroughly in the WA by 
demonstrating its status as the precondition of our experience and of the conviction that 
we can make judgments about the world.  
1 
The Story of "Ground": Philosophy's Origins in Freedom 
 If there is one takeaway from Schelling's early writings on the philosophy of 
nature, it is that "ground" functions as both the alpha and the omega of philosophical 
thinking. Philosophy is in pursuit of "ground" inasmuch as it seeks an explanation of how 
we come to have representations of external objects. However, this "ground" is the very 
condition which makes philosophical thinking possible in the first place, and so it 
necessarily precedes philosophy at the same as philosophy desires it. In this way, 
Schelling's conception of "ground" bears a striking resemblance to Aristotelian teleology 
inasmuch as the end of things stands in both a "before" and "after" relation to that of 
which it is the basis.95 Just as the "final cause" of substance (i.e. its purpose or end) for 
Aristotle is simultaneously its "formal cause" (i.e. its essence or definition), "ground" for 
Schelling is simultaneously the beginning from which philosophy emerges and the end to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
will find consonance between Schelling's conception of truth and Kierkegaard's articulation that truth is 
subjective, that its highest expression is irrational (although Kierkegaard himself does not refute reason).  
95 What I am referring to in Aristotle' Physics is the distinction he makes between the "formal" and "final" 
cause of a substance, which appears more semantic than it does substantive. In other words, it does not 
appear that "formal" and "final" are separate causes, but rather two different ways of talking about the same 
cause.  What something is for Aristotle is its purpose, and so what defines substance specifically is 
simultaneously before and after the thing it causes. This paradoxicality in Aristotle's metaphysics is one 
which Schelling seeks to take up more intensely on his own terms.  
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which it is directed.96 My objective in this section is to provide a brief account of this 
relationship, which will serve as a reference point for the remainder of the dissertation.97 
Since we have not yet investigated Schelling's philosophy of nature, nor the WA - in 
which Schelling discusses how the groundlessness of "ground" leads to the creation of 
the universe - we are not in a position to give a complete account of philosophy's relation 
to "ground" in this respect. In fact, even if we were, it would be debatable whether or not 
we could achieve this feat, since to do so would effectively constitute providing the 
definitive account of "ground" - which Schelling himself was not able to do as evidenced 
by his numerous, unsuccessful attempts at completing the WA. Nevertheless, even in the 
early part of his career, Schelling believed he was capable of articulating this relationship 
in broad strokes, which is an immensely valuable tool for those encountering his work for 
the first time. In this section of chapter 1, I provide a brief overview of this articulation in 
Schelling's early work as a means of introducing the reader to the parameters under 
which Schelling conceives of philosophy's unity with "ground." 
 In the briefest of terms, the "ground" of philosophy, for Schelling, and thus, its 
alpha and omega, lies in ignorance, not knowledge.98 The key concept at work in this 
                                                          
96 For more on Schelling's relation to Aristotle, please see Joseph Lawrence's excellent article Schelling as 
Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian in International Philosophical Quarterly: Lawrence, Joseph P. 
"Schelling as Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian." International Philosophical Quarterly 4th ser.26.104 
(1986): 317-30.  
97 I recognize that I may be jumping ahead of myself in making this claim since Schelling himself believes 
it cannot be understood properly without having practiced philosophy. However, my intent is not to usurp 
his insight so much as it is to offer a helpful context for the reader as they prepare to engage with 
Schelling's concept of "ground."   
98 "Science originally develops only when a principle departs from its original state of ignorance and 
becomes knowledge, and after it has gone through all forms, returns to its original ignorance. That which is 
the absolute beginning cannot know itself. In its transition to knowledge it ceases to be the beginning and it 
therefore has to proceed until it rediscovers itself as the beginning. The beginning, restored as a beginning 
that knows itself, is the end of all knowledge." Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. "On the Nature of 
Philosophy as a Science." Trans. Marcus Weigelt. German Idealist Philosophy. Ed. Ruediger Bubner. 
London: Penguin, 1997. 210-243. (pg. 222). 
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claim is Schelling's notion of beginnings.99 The "beginning" of something is just as much 
the end of its product as it is its source, however, what constitutes this "beginning" is 
actually the product's negation.100 Schelling makes this point in the WA: "Precisely that 
which negates all revelation must be made the ground of revelation."101 Knowledge is a 
progression, and the beginning of a movement is never an inactive point of departure, but 
rather the expressed negation of that movement.102 A point, for example, is the beginning 
of a line, not because the point itself is extended, but because it is the negation of all 
extension. Likewise, one is the beginning of all number, "not so much because it itself is 
a number but because it is the negation of all number, of all multiplicity."103 Something 
must recoil in order to grow further. Correlatively, in order for knowledge to blossom, its 
antithesis (i.e. ignorance) must be expressly posited. Intuitively, we can infer how 
Schelling is able to make this claim. Before we can even begin to know something, we 
must know that we do not know it, and so what follows in the progression of knowledge 
is the overcoming of this negation, this negation of knowledge. Nevertheless, what is 
                                                          
99 "For the beginning really only lies in negation. All beginning is, in accord with its nature, only a desire 
for the end or for what leads to the end and hence, negates itself as the end. It is only the tension of the bow 
- it is not so much that which itself has being as it is the ground that something is. It is not enough for a 
beginning that now commences or becomes not to be. It must be expressly posited as that which does not 
have being. A ground is thereby given for it to be." (The WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
100 I recognize that this term "negation" has a very complicated history, especially following its starring in 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Science of Logic, however, due to the constraints of this particular 
chapter - and of this particular dissertation on the whole - my use of this term will be limited to the manner 
which Schelling uses it in Die Weltalter. Schelling does not give us an explicit definition of the term 
"negation," nor, in my experience, does he use it very much in his philosophy of nature, however, when he 
does use it, it is usually in the context of motion. As we observe in this paragraph, "negation" for Schelling, 
when applied to the beginning of something, is not strictly an absence but the active denial of an opposing 
force. We will explore the relationship of the "forces" in "ground" more closely when we begin our analysis 
of Die Weltalter. 
101 (The WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16). 
102 "No beginning point (terminus a quo) of a movement is an empty, inactive point of departure. Rather, it 
is a negation of the starting point and the actually emerging movement is an overcoming of this negation. If 
the movement was not negated, then it could not have been expressly posited. Negation is therefore the 
necessary precedent (prius) of every movement." (The WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
103 "One is the beginning of all number, not so much because it itself is a number but because it is the 
negation of all number, of all multiplicity." (The WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
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even more intriguing in Schelling's early works is the insistence that this ignorance is also 
the final goal of philosophy.104 As we will observe, this ignorance, as the beginning of 
knowledge, will take on a varied form by the time philosophy has achieved its end. It will 
become, as Schelling writes in his essay On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science, "a 
knowing ignorance" in which all desire is obliterated. 105 I will offer some brief thoughts 
on this return to "ground" at the end of this section and more as we discuss the WA in 
depth. However, it is not the primary focus of this dissertation and so those interested in 
exploring this topic in greater detail would be wise to look elsewhere in the secondary 
literature. In particular, I highly recommend the final chapter of Jason Wirth's book, The 
Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time, which deals with Schelling's 
reflections on the Bhagavad Gita and its articulation of a non-dualistic conception of the 
Good.106 For now, though, since we are still finding our bearings on Schelling's terrain, 
and since the main objective of this chapter is confined to Schelling's philosophy of 
nature, I will only be dealing with this particular strand of Schelling's thought as it 
pertains to the revelation of "ground" in our interactions with nature. 
    
                                                          
104 Although Schelling acknowledges in his early work that philosophy terminates in ignorance, Schelling's 
own understanding of that insight evolves over the course of his career. In the WA, this insight takes on a 
noticeably different hue insofar as Schelling begins to articulate it in terms of the interiority of the subject 
(i.e. what God was feeling before he created the world) instead of the sober language of logic and 
contradiction.    
105 "When the absolute subject is restored, knowledge must wither away into ignorance, it is a knowing 
ignorance. It is not, as in the beginning, an outward ignorance, but an inward ignorance. It has assimilated, 
internalized again, the eternal freedom from which it had been discharged in that crisis. Or it has 
remembered eternal freedom for itself. Now it knows this freedom, knows it indeed immediately, namely 
as that which itself is the interior of it, of ignorance." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, 231). 
106 Wirth, Jason M. The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time. Albany, NY: State U 





The Beginning of Philosophy 
 When did philosophy begin? In his introduction to his Ideas on a Philosophy of 
Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, Schelling suggests it was born 
when man first asked a question about "how a world outside [himself], how nature and 
experience, is possible."107 Prior to this, he lived in a "philosophically-natural state," 
thoroughly engrossed "with the study of nature and the mere enjoyment of its riches."108 
It was, as Schelling describes, a time when man was most "at one with himself and the 
world around him," a time when he studied, explored, probed, and delighted in his 
habitat, blissfully untroubled by thoughts about how or why he got there. After all, what 
need did he have to ask about his origins when there were mountains to climb, seas to 
sail, and new territories to explore? Why would he bother himself to consider the 
invisible, the intangible, and strictly speaking, the metaphysical, when there was so much 
before his eyes waiting to be examined? It took several years before Descartes was able 
to successfully free his mind from all his cares and passions in order to embark on 
establishing "anything firm and lasting in the sciences."109 Similarly, entire ages passed 
by man before he was able to free himself from the study of nature - and his curiosity 
                                                          
107 "Whoever is occupied with the study of nature and the mere enjoyment of its riches will not ask whether 
nature and experience are possible. It is enough that nature exists for him." (Ideas on a Philosophy of 
Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
108 "We owe it to philosophy that we can ask how a world outside ourselves, how nature and experience are 
possible, or rather, with this question philosophy arose. Prior to this man had lived in a (philosophically) 
natural state. At that time man was still at one with himself and with the world around him. This state still 
hovers in the dark memories of even the most misguided thinkers. Many  never left this state and would 
have been content in themselves had not a disagreeable example led them astray; for nature releases no one 
freely from her tutelage, and no one is a son of freedom from birth." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as 
an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
109 "Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my 
youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. 
And thus I realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the 
original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science,  pg. 39) 
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about its endowments - in order to consider how and why they came to be. As Schelling 
writes, "Only the man who does not believe he holds actuality in his hand will ask what is 
possible."110 But as he also cautions, man does not easily reach this state, "for nature 
releases no one freely from her tutelage, and no one is a son of freedom [Freiheit] from 
birth."  
 For those familiar with Schelling's predecessors, especially Descartes and Hume, 
Schelling's jumping off point will appear as an oversimplification of man's natural 
disposition, since both Descartes and Hume demonstrate quite clearly that we are not 
constrained unequivocally to assume the consonance of our ideas with the external world. 
In the case of the Meditations, this is lucidly presented through Descartes' enactment of 
radical doubt, which motivates his search for a verification basis of clear and distinct 
ideas. And likewise, in the case of the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, the 
same point is represented in Hume's skepticism concerning matters of fact. Indeed, both 
thinkers show that it is not unusual for us to question our ideas about the external world, 
which is why it is crucial for us to consider now the veracity of Schelling's starting point. 
 To clarify, when it comes to the correspondence of ideas with things, Schelling 
himself does not believe we are constrained completely, that is, in such a way that 
negates our intellectual freedom - by which I mean our ability to question and doubt - 
simply that we are compelled to believe more regularly than not that the patterns we 
observe in nature are indeed in nature, and, thus, not derivative of ourselves as knowing 
subjects. When I observe a caterpillar transform into a butterfly, I believe it is the 
caterpillar which changes, not simply that my consciousness arranges these 
                                                          
110 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
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representations in a repeatable pattern. Additionally, what is even more crucial, is that I 
maintain this belief even though I am not entirely certain of it, that my lack of certainty 
does not cause me to jettison the belief altogether, or keep me from acting on it. Here 
Hume's analysis concerning the probabilistic nature of inductive arguments is especially 
helpful, since it offers a more nuanced understanding of the epistemic grounds for belief. 
For who truly believes that we cannot have knowledge of the external world? Certainly, 
each of us recognizes the uncertainty of our knowledge; our inability to portend the future 
provides ample proof of this. But, in the same vein, do we not also recognize that we can 
foretell the future to some degree, and that that is precisely what science allows us to do? 
Otherwise, would not more of us be concerned about gravity continuing to work or the 
sun not rising tomorrow? We clearly believe in our capacity to have knowledge of these 
things, which is why it is important for us to be cautious in not making the perfect the 
enemy of the good by insisting on absolute certainty as the criteria for knowledge, since 
this would limit all knowledge to relations of ideas. As it pertains to this project, my 
contention is that Schelling himself takes on a similar position in his philosophy of nature 
when he says that we are constrained to believe in the correspondence of ideas and 
things. His point is not that we are compelled to believe in the correspondence of our 
ideas with things beyond any doubt, rather, that we are compelled to have a high level of 
confidence in our capacity to understand them.          
 So how, then, did man ever come to engage in philosophy - and, thus, abandon his 
blissful naiveté? Schelling believes it must be the result of his spirit, whose fundamental 
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element is freedom.111 Man is his spirit; philosophy is its attempt to release itself from the 
bondage of nature and make itself free again. In his original state, man is  the nexus of an 
"equilibrium of forces"112 in which "subject and object are most intimately united,"113 but 
through his spirit, he annuls this equilibrium in order to "reestablish it through freedom," 
seeking "to return one day as victor by its own merit to that state in which it spent the 
childhood of its reason in ignorance of itself."114 Health lies only in the equilibrium of 
forces, so the ultimate goal of the activity of man's spirit is to return to its initial 
ignorance freely. But it needs philosophy in order to accomplish this end, and because of 
this, its task presupposes an "original separation," because without it, "there would be no 
need to philosophize."115 This "original separation" is the separation between subject and 
object, between man and external things, between his representations and objects.116 
                                                          
111 "Indeed, how man ever left that state would be [certainly] incomprehensible if we did not know that his 
spirit, whose element is freedom strives to make itself free. It must cast off the fetters of nature and its 
provision and entrust itself to the uncertain fate of its own strength in order to return one day as victor by its 
own merit to that state in which it spent the childhood of its reason in ignorance of itself." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
112 "Originally there is an absolute equilibrium of forces and consciousness in man. But through freedom he 
can annul this equilibrium in order to reestablish it through freedom." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as 
an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169)  
113 "Whoever first noticed that he could distinguish between himself and external things, and thus between 
his representations and objects, and vice versa, this person was the first philosopher. He first interrupted the 
mechanism of his thinking and annulled the equilibrium of his consciousness in which subject and object 
are most intimately united." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg  170) 
114 See note 6. 
115 "For this reason philosophy assigns reflection only a negative value. It takes that original separation as a 
point of departure in order to reunite through freedom what was originally and necessarily united in the 
human spirit i.e., in order to annul that separation forever." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
116 "As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external world (how he does this will be discussed 
later), he takes the first step towards philosophy. For with this separation reflection first begins. Henceforth 
he separates what nature had forever united: object from intuition, concept from image, and finally, by 
becoming his own object, he separates himself from himself." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 168-169) 
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 How do representations of external things arise in us?117 To ask this question is to 
annul the equilibrium of subject and object in man's consciousness constitutive of his 
original ignorance of such questions. In the "philosophically-natural state" preceding the 
utterance of this question, man could not conceive of a separation between his 
representations and objects - when an object was represented to him, the representation 
and the object were one and the same - and it was because of this that he became 
convinced of the reality of objects external to himself.118 But in asking this question, he 
now acknowledges for the first time that he can distinguish between himself and external 
things, and, in doing so, breaches the congruence of his consciousness in which "subject 
and object are most intimately united." Schelling states emphatically that, in the study of 
nature, we should not begin "from above (with the putting forth of principles), but from 
below (with the experiences and with the examination of previous systems)."119 This 
"below" is the necessity with which we are constrained to think the reality of external 
objects, how it is that we have an experience of an outside world, and why we are 
compelled to believe that that world exists as we perceive it. Each of us has experiences 
through a succession of appearances that take place in our faculty of representation. 
Schelling seeks to understand why it is that we must approach this succession as 
"necessary," why we are compelled to seek the ground of the succession in the 
                                                          
117 "The philosopher annuls the identity of object and representation by asking: how do representations of 
external things arise within us?" (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 169) 
118 "And it is only this inability to separate the object from the representation while one is representing it 
that convinces common understanding of the reality of external things, which in fact make themselves 
known it only through representations." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of 
This Science, pg. 169) 
119 "But this text does not begin from above (with the putting forth of principles), but from below (with the 
experiences and with the examination of previous systems). Only when I have arrived at the goal I set for 
myself will I be allowed to retrace my path in the reverse direction." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as 
an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 202) 
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"appearances themselves."We will examine the relation of subjectivity and objectivity in 
this succession at a later point in this chapter. For now, it is enough that we recognize it 
as Schelling's jumping off point for his inquiry into the study of nature and human 
experience.  
  For Schelling, the fact that I am able to question the source of my representations 
not only effects a separation between myself and the things external to me, but also 
between myself and my representations. "That I am able to raise this question is proof 
enough that as such I am independent of external things, for otherwise how could I have 
asked how these things themselves are possible for me in my faculty of 
representation."120 Many philosophers (and presumably all natural scientists) seek to 
account for human experience as a product of external objects, as if the objects external 
to us cause us to have certain impressions of them. Schelling, though, suggests that this is 
implausible on account of its implication that we are in no way free from our 
representations, and, thus, nothing more than the cumulative effect of its mechanism. 
"Deed and action alone can be in me, effects alone can proceed from me."121 Causation 
implies that there is a "passivity"122 in me, the kind constitutive of objects that exist "only 
for other rational beings."123 But my raising this question about the source of my 
representations immediately elevates me above this status, for it establishes that I am not 
simply an object for others, but an object for myself, an object of which I myself inquire. 
                                                          
120 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 172) 
121 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 171) 
122 "There can be no passivity in me, for passivity exists only where there is effect and counter-effect, and 
these exist only within the connection of things, above which I have raised myself." (pg. 171-172) 
123 "...for in order to be able to say this he must presume that he knows himself, that he is something for 
himself. But he is not. He exists only for other rational beings, not for himself; he is a mere object in the 
world, and it is in his and science's best interest that he never hear or imagine it to be otherwise." (Ideas on 
a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 172-173) 
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Schelling articulates this claim through the imagery of  a stream current:"Whoever is 
nothing more for himself than what things and circumstances have made him; whoever, 
having no control over his own representations, is caught and swept away by the current 
of causes and effects, how should he know where he comes from, where he is going, and 
how he has become what he is?"124 It is inconceivable how such a man could know 
anything about himself - not even that he is the result of the combined effects of external 
things. The relentless tide of representations consistently drags him below the current's 
surface, making it impossible for him to inquire about such matters. Fortunately, for us, 
we can be confident that we do not exist under those conditions. That we can ask how it 
is that we have representations of external objects means that there is part of us which 
remains independent of our representations - while always still being penetrated by them. 
Concurrently, it means that our head is always above water, so to speak, that we are not 
like the poor victims in Socrates' cave, chained to a wall, forced to observe a never-
ending parade of shadows. 
 Even at this early stage, we can infer why Schelling is so intent upon introducing 
freedom as the "ground" of philosophy. If we were not free from our representations of 
external things, then it would be impossible for us to interrogate them, for instead we 
would be confined simply to having them. Experience, for Schelling, is the unity of 
subject and object. However, the very fact that we are able to inquire about these 
representations necessarily means that at the same time as we have them, we also have 
the possibility of standing outside them and reflecting on them. In other words, that we 
are able to interrogate the source of  our representations points to a "ground" in us in 
                                                          
124 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 172) 
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which we are both the unity of subject and object and the disunity of subject and object 
simultaneously. This is the paradoxical precondition of philosophy. We can have 
knowledge only of what we stand in relation to, and we only stand in relation to what is 
like us, yet, in order for us to reflect on ourselves, we must somehow be able to stand 
outside ourselves, otherwise we would have no experiences of external things, or we 
would be unable to reflect on those experiences. I do not want to jump too far ahead of 
the text before we have adequately addressed Schelling's reasons for suggesting as much. 
However, all that said, as we are going to observe, our capacity to question the source of 
our representations  presupposes a "ground" in which our experiences and our freedom 
from those experiences coincide. We are constrained to believe that external objects 
appear to us as they actually are, and this fact compels us to believe that we can have 
knowledge of the external world, but if we are not also allowed to be distanced from 
those experiences which give way to this compulsion, it is impossible to think that we 
could ever reflect on the experiences themselves. Thus, the fact that we are not merely 
the effect of our representations is crucial for us insofar as it is indeed the sine qua non of 
philosophical inquiry, i.e., what enables us  reflect on the conditions which compel us to 
believe that we can have knowledge in the first place.  
 For man to question the source of his representations is to disturb the equilibrium 
in his consciousness between himself and the representations of external things 
constitutive of his "philosophically-natural state." The equilibrium is the original state of 
man's consciousness in which he is unreflective, yet thoroughly engrossed in the world; 
philosophy is the "means" by which he annuls this equilibrium in order to reestablish it 
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through freedom.125 Schelling's talk of an "equilibrium of forces" gives us a clearer 
picture of what he intends by man's original state.  It is a time when there is no gulf 
between man and the world, in which he exercises "all his forces over against a world 
that has influence on him, that lets him feel its power, and upon which he can reciprocally 
act."126 Man's being lies in activity, but the whole of this activity lies in the extent to 
which man can immerse himself headlong into the world of his representations.127 That is 
exactly what the equilibrium of forces makes possible for him. Insofar as the forces of his 
consciousness interact with each other in a harmonious fashion, they make it possible for 
him to enjoy its treasures, untroubled by questions about how or why they (or he himself) 
got there. Such a man engages in the "purest activity," which, according to Schelling, 
"ceases to know itself at all."128 Objects are real for him insofar as they appear in his 
intuitive faculty, and his ideas about them are likewise insofar he is "constrained to 
assume concordance between [them] and things."129 But most importantly, he is bereft of 
the impression that there is something beyond himself and the representations to which 
he is privy.  
 At this early juncture, we can already observe that there is something deeply 
paradoxical about this original state, which, as we are going to unravel over the course of 
this dissertation, will prove central to Schelling's overall insight about the reality of being 
                                                          
125 "But this separation is only a means, not an end. For man's being lies in activity." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
126 "Man was not born to waste his spiritual force battling against the phantasms of an imagined world, but 
rather to exercise all his forces over against a world that has influence on him, that lets him feel its power, 
and upon which he can reciprocally act." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study 
of This Science, pg. 167) 
127 "For man's being lies in activity, The less he reflects upon himself, the more active he is;" (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 167) 
128 "...his purest activity ceases to know itself at all." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to 
the Study of This Science, pg. 167) 
129 "For our representation is real only to the extent that we are constrained to assume concordance between 
it and things." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 170) 
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to time. The man with his house in order is the one who invests himself in his world 
without the kind of assurances that philosophy often purports to seek out. He consumes 
himself in the events of the day despite not having the comfort and security of knowing 
who he is and what his existence means. The only way he can improve his lot is by 
returning to this place freely, choosing it for himself. This is where philosophy becomes 
so crucial to him. Philosophy becomes the means by which he elevates himself out of his 
original state so that ultimately he might return to it in a more perfect way: 
 That philosopher who would spend all or part of his life following reflective 
 philosophy into its endless divisions in order to annul it in its last ramifications 
 would, with this accomplishment (which should be respected as highly as any 
 other, even if it serves only to negate) have gained a place of highest honor for 
 himself, even if he were denied the pleasure of seeing philosophy in its 
 absolute form revive from reflection's rending it asunder."130 
Philosophy, for Schelling, is, thus, exclusively a means, "not an end".131 Insofar as its 
efforts to understand the nature of experience involve separating and dividing what are 
originally united in man's consciousness, it remains a constant threat to take "control of 
the whole person" and kill "the seed of his higher existence, the root of his spiritual 
life."132 This root of man's spiritual life, "which proceeds only from identity" is his 
potential to return freely to his original state, to reestablish the harmony of his 
consciousness after having annulled it.133 Philosophy dissects the world of appearances - 
separating the physical from the intellectual, and man from the external world - and it is 
by virtue of this that it gives us knowledge of how we come to have experiences; 
                                                          
130 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 170) 
131 "But this separation is only a means, not an end." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to 
the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
132 "Thus mere reflection is a mental disorder in man, and when it takes control of the whole person it kills 
the seed of his higher existence and the root of his spiritual life, which proceeds only from identity." (Ideas 
on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
133 The "identity" in question here is "ground." It  is the relation between ideas and things - subjectivity and 
objectivity - in which  neither subjectivity nor objectivity is reducible to the other. 
22 
 
however, it is also the reason why philosophy inherently carries with it some risk for 
man, for as soon as he  begins this process, he no longer acts with the whole of his being, 
but instead makes himself the object, thus "annull[ing] part of his activity in order to 
reflect on the rest of it."134 That is why Schelling articulates that "mere reflection is a 
mental disorder in man." It is not that philosophy is in itself deleterious to his condition - 
in fact, we could say the opposite insofar it has the power to lift him to a higher state of 
consciousness - but that it can become so if it is allowed to usurp the goal which it is 
intended to serve. Man's being lies in his activity, and the more he reflects, the less he 
acts. But the nature of his being is freedom, so while philosophy effectively drives a 
wedge between him and his original ignorance, he must philosophize if he is ultimately to 
reestablish freely the healthy equilibrium of forces constitutive of his consciousness. The 
man who is able to accomplish this final negation of philosophy is the one who becomes 
truly free. 
3 
Nature as Visible Spirit and Spirit as Invisible Nature:135 
 Now that we have a sense for the trajectory which Schelling has in store for his 
philosophy, it is time for us to take up the task of explaining how it is that we have 
experiences of external objects. In what follows, that is what I intend to accomplish, at 
                                                          
134 "Reflection is an evil that accompanies man throughout his life and destroys all his intuition, even for 
the baser objects of contemplation. Reflection not only rends asunder the world of appearances, but by 
separating the spiritual principle from this world, it fills the intellectual world with chimeras against which 
no battle can be done, since they lie beyond reason. Reflection makes the separation between man and the 
world permanent by viewing the latter as a thing-in-itself, attainable neither by intuition nor imagination, 
neither by understanding nor reason." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of 
This Science, pg. 169) 
135 "Nature shall be visible spirit, and spirit invisible nature. Here in the absolute identity of spirit within us 
and nature outside us the problem of how a nature outside is possible must be solved." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 202) 
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least on a fairly limited basis. We will restrict ourselves to the introduction of his 
philosophy of nature, focusing especially on his introduction to his Ideas on a Philosophy 
of Nature. Those interested in a more detailed account on this subject matter would be 
wise to read Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, which not only 
deals with Schelling's natural philosophy more comprehensively, but which also makes a 
compelling case for its enduring significance as a new beginning in the metaphysics of 
nature.136 Unfortunately, the constraints of this dissertation restrict us to only a passing 
glance at a wonderfully rich group of texts in Schelling's corpus.  
 What I am suggesting in this chapter is that Schelling's philosophy of nature 
operates in the same atmosphere as Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy insofar as 
it attempts to establish a more secure foundation  of our knowledge. Like Descartes, 
Schelling begins his reflections with what is indubitable to him, but whereas for his 
predecessor, this is the fact that he is a thinking thing, for Schelling, it is something 
considerably more concrete and more fundamental to how we exist within the world. It is 
the belief that we are able to have knowledge of our world, that our ideas correspond with 
the things outside us. Put differently, it is our experience that the world beyond us is 
rational, and thus, a place in which immaterial concepts become embodied in material 
things. This is the implicit "faith" underlying man's interactions with nature and which 
fuels his curiosity in probing its endowments, the kinship he feels between his ideas, 
which only have reality in relation to his understanding, and the material world external 
to him. In essence, Schelling is challenging the jumping off point of Descartes' 
                                                          
136 In particular, Grant argues that Schelling's natural philosophy results in the "unconditioning" of the 
metaphysics of nature, which is ironic given philosophy's numerous attempts to articulate the "conditioning 
and production" of appearances. In other words, he is arguing for a middle road between a metaphysics 
envisioned through the lens of Aristotelian categories and one which feels free to jettison metaphysics 
altogether. Grant, Iain Hamilton. Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. London: Continuum, 2008. 
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meditation. For Schelling, the true starting point is not the mere fact of our thinking, but 
rather, our experience of ideas corresponding with external objects. After all, how else 
can Descartes explain why it took him so long to undertake his crucial investigation of 
"ground?" It could not have been because he thought the inquiry was fruitless, but 
because he did not believe it was necessary at that time. Schelling believes that one must 
be confident that he can know before he throws himself into the process of acquiring 
knowledge. Correlatively, for Descartes to delay before he investigates the "ground" of 
his knowledge speaks to the intensity of the unity he experiences between his ideas and 
his environment. Thinking is indeed primary to us, but what is more primary is the 
ubiquity of experiences in which our thoughts appear to find expression in nature. That is 
why man is not originally compelled to question the "ground" of his knowledge and why 
"no one is a son of freedom from birth." His confidence that his ideas correspond with the 
external world is so essential to him, so natural to his way of life, that it is inconceivable 
to him at first how the situation could be any different. It is why the task of inquiring 
about  "ground"  seems so foreign to him and why it takes such a deliberate effort on his 
part to remove himself from his everyday way of being. In what follows, my objective is 
to elucidate how taking this step of removing ourselves from the everydayness of our 
experience, defined by the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, uncovers the distinctly 





Schelling's Meditations on Nature Part 1: The Critique of Realism 
 Since philosophy is entirely a work of freedom, Schelling argues that it 
necessarily lacks "a definite concept," a concept which we can treat analytically, 
presuming its soundness and drawing conclusions from it.137 As Schelling states in the 
introduction to his Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature, philosophy is only what "each 
person has made it for himself," and so, for this reason, "the idea of philosophy is only 
the result of philosophy itself", which, as a free science, is also an "infinite" one, meaning 
that it can take itself as its object.138 This explains why Schelling is so tepid in his 
articulation of philosophy as the activity through which man casts off "the fetters of 
nature and its provision and entrusts itself to the uncertain fate of its own strength..."139 
Because philosophy is always a product of our freedom, it does in fact lack secure 
ground. Schelling's articulation of philosophy, as the means by which freedom completes 
itself as freedom, bears the resemblance of an Aristotelian teleology insofar as 
philosophy is the process through which man becomes what, in some sense, he already is. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the identity which grounds philosophy is itself freedom, 
Schelling argues that philosophy's purposefulness never carries with it the certainty that 
                                                          
137 "What is a philosophy? This question will not yield a ready answer. If reaching agreement on a definite 
concept of philosophy were so simple, we would need only to analyze this concept in order to find 
ourselves in full possession of a universally valid philosophy. But the issue is this: philosophy is not 
something that originally and naturally resides within spirit with no effort on the part of spirit. It is entirely 
a work of freedom." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 
167) 
138 "[Philosophy] is entirely a work of freedom. Philosophy is only what each person has made it for 
himself; for this reason the idea of philosophy is only the result of philosophy itself, which, as an infinite 
science, is also the science of itself." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of 
This Science, pg. 167) 
139 "Indeed, how man ever left that state would be surely incomprehensible if we did not know that his 
spirit, whose element is freedom strives to make itself free. It must cast off the fetters of nature and its 
provision and entrust itself to the uncertain fate of its own strength in order to return one day as victor by its 
own merit to that state in which it spent the childhood of its reason in ignorance of itself." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 168) 
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its task will be completed. We are, in some sense, already aware of this, because, as we 
have discussed earlier, philosophy effects a separation in consciousness which disrupts its 
healthy equilibrium. But on a deeper, more significant level, Schelling believes we know 
this on account of philosophy's roots in freedom, for it is because philosophy is entirely 
the work of freedom that it too necessarily operates without a certain ground (i.e. a 
definite concept).  Thus, contrary to the claims made by Schelling's contemporary Hegel, 
for Schelling, the philosopher does not depart from the perch of his original ignorance 
like the Owl of Minerva - which flies only at dusk - confident that he will surely find the 
wisdom after which he seeks, but rather from a position of uncertainty, unsure what it 
will find and whether it will succeed.    
 Without a determinate answer to the question, "What is philosophy?", how does 
the philosopher proceed? "Since I must begin somewhere, I shall presume for the 
moment that a philosophy of nature should derive the possibility of a nature, i.e., of the 
whole world of experience, from principles."140 The first philosopher is the one who 
disturbs the equilibrium of his "original consciousness,"  but since philosophy is born out 
of freedom - and, thus, lacking a definite concept - we have to work from the "ground-
up," starting with nature herself and allowing her true concept "to arise before the eyes of 
reader."  For Schelling, this means that the appropriate place to begin is by examining the 
most rudimentary fact of our existence, namely, that we are constrained to believe we 
have knowledge of an external world: 
 This is more or less the way the study of nature comes to completion. But it is not 
 our task here to portray such a system, once it exists, but rather to find how such a 
 system could exist at all. The question is not whether or how this connection of 
                                                          
140 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 167) 
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 appearances and the sequence of causes and effects (that we call the course of 
 nature) has become actual outside us, but for us. The question is how this system 
 and this connection of appearances have found their way to our spirit, and how 
 they have acquired in our faculty of representation the necessity with which we 
 are constrained to think of them.141   
What is primary for us is the necessity with which we are constrained to think the 
correspondence of ideas and objects in our representations. I experience a multitude of 
appearances external to me, and these appearances operate in an orderly fashion, relative 
to various laws and principles; yet at no point am I ever led to believe that the orderliness 
I am privy to is a mere deception - that there are actually no objects external to me - but 
that that orderliness is constitutive of the objects themselves. On the one hand, this fact of 
our experience, this belief that we experience the external world as it really is, is so 
natural to us, so ingrained in our manner of inhabiting the world, that it is difficult for us 
to consider how our experiences could be any different. However, as Schelling is going to 
reveal to us in the subsequent investigation, it ultimately presupposes a ground which is 
decidedly paradoxical, a ground defined by its infinite potential and its infinite perplexity, 
a ground which Schelling will refer to as "freedom."  
 In the wake of Hume's skepticism and Kant's First Critique, it is important that 
we distance Schelling's "beginning" from any presupposition about our actual capacity to 
know. Ultimately, Schelling does indeed believe we can have knowledge, and that there 
is indeed an external world - although such a world is not completely external to us, 
otherwise we would not be able to experience it. However, we are not able to clarify 
these points at this juncture - on account of the fact that we need to have a clearer 
understanding of Schelling's concept of "ground" in order to do so - and more 
                                                          
141 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 181) 
28 
 
importantly, it is not the place from which Schelling's philosophy of nature actually 
begins. For him, what is incontestable is not that we have knowledge, but that we believe 
we have knowledge, that we are constrained to assume a correspondence between our 
ideas and the objects outsides us.142 In this way, Schelling's "beginning" very much 
anticipates what Husserl would later articulate in his notion of "the natural attitude." For 
Schelling, what is natural for us - so natural that we are rarely aware of it - is that we 
assume a consonance between our reflective reason and the objects outside us. This is not 
suggesting that we innately possess knowledge of our world, simply that we assume a 
consonance between ourselves and nature. The WA is about "ground," and as we are 
going to see, this "ground" makes room for a conception of truth which is not reducible to 
the principle of non-contradiction. Yet, in a most ironical fashion, it is simultaneously the 
condition which makes possible the most intense feeling that we live in a rational 
universe, that we live in a world which is not chaotic and foreign, but transparent and 
intentional in its design. In this way, Schelling's philosophy of nature challenges the basic 
assumption that being is either necessary or contingent, free or not free. In essence, this is 
what his philosophy of nature is intended to demonstrate, that the locus from which we 
begin to discern being's relation to transcendence, i.e., to the radical possibility from 
which it emerged and continues to emerge, is none other than the most intense 
compulsion of its necessity, which for us, is the consonance of our ideas with the world. 
                                                          
142 This is certainly a finer point in Schelling's philosophy, but nevertheless an important one. Why do we 
say that the starting point of Schelling's investigation is that we believe we have knowledge and not simply 
that we have knowledge? Because to say we have knowledge presumes that we already have a firm 
understanding of "ground," which is the goal of our investigation, not its assumption. Since we have not yet 
established what "ground" is, we are not allowed at this juncture to presume that we necessarily have 
knowledge, only that we believe we have knowledge.    
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 What does it mean to suggest that we must conceive of the succession of 
appearances in our faculty of representation as necessary? According to Schelling, that 
"appearances for us follow after another in a determined succession," and, conversely, 
that this "succession can continue only with these determined appearances." 143 We hear 
the clap of thunder after we see the bolt of lightning, and we see the apple fall to the 
ground once it has broken off from the tree. Nevertheless, as Schelling writes, we do not 
seek the ground of the succession of these events in ourselves, 144 but only in the "things 
themselves," for not one of us is the author of this succession.145 The ground of the 
succession must rest in the "things themselves," because we are constrained to think the 
succession is of them, "not merely of our representations of them." Worth noting is the 
relation between the succession's subjective necessity (i.e. that our appearances follow a 
determinate order) and its objective necessity (i.e. that the succession can proceed only 
with these determinate appearances). That the appearances in my representation follow a 
determinate succession presupposes that the succession can follow only these 
determinate appearances and no others. In my representations, I experience a 
determinate succession between the clap of thunder and the bolt of lightning; however, 
what makes this possible for me is that the "appearances themselves" - that is, the clap of 
                                                          
143 "First, what does it mean that we must conceive of a succession of appearances that is plainly necessary? 
Obviously this: these appearances can follow each other only in a determined succession, and conversely, 
this succession can continue only with these determined appearances." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as 
an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 181) 
144 "That our representations follow each other in this determined order....of such things we do not seek the 
ground in ourselves." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 
181) 
145 "How we allow the representations to succeed each other is not up to us. The ground must lie in the 
things, and we maintain that this determined succession is a succession of the things themselves, not merely 
of our representations of them." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 182) 
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thunder and the bolt of lightning - follow each other only in this manner, and no other.146 
To say, then, that the appearances follow a determined succession is to already imply that 
the succession itself is grounded by the appearances. This helps us explains why we are 
so inclined to search for the ground of the succession in the "things themselves." To the 
extent that the necessity of the succession is grounded in the objects of our 
representations (i.e. my appearances), there is an objective necessity constitutive of the 
representation, a necessity "of the things," so to speak, operating independently of own 
volition. 
 That the succession of appearances in my faculty of representation is only 
subjectively necessary insofar as it is also objectively leads Schelling to argue that "this 
determined succession cannot be separated from these determined appearances."147 As he 
writes, both the appearances and the succession must "arise simultaneously" with each 
other, and so they exist in a "reciprocal relationship in which "each is mutually necessary 
in relation to the other." Herein Schelling is preliminarily introducing the central theme 
of his philosophy of nature, specifically, the mutual presupposition of ideas and objects, 
                                                          
146 "As a point of clarification, Schelling appears to be drawing from Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" in the 
First Critique in which Kant argues that "all time-determination presupposes something persistent in 
perception." Thus, the succession of appearances is only subjectively necessary insofar as the appearances 
themselves are persistent. In the case of Schelling's example, the succession of appearances involving the 
bolt of lightning and the clap of thunder is subjectively necessary only insofar as the bolt of lightning and 
the clap of thunder are persistent appearances. This helps clarify what Schelling means by the term 
"objective necessity," for while it is possible that the observer is mistaken in believing that she is observing 
lightning and thunder, it is indubitable that she is watching the same appearances occur in the same order. 
According to Kant, "the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and 
not through the mere representation of a thing outside me." Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. 
Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. United States: Cambridge University of Press, 1998.   
147 "Only insofar as the appearances themselves follow each other in this and no other manner, are we 
constrained to represent them in this order; only because and insofar as this succession is objectively 
necessary is it also subjectively necessary." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the 
Study of This Science, pg. 182) 
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man and nature.148 At the risk of going ahead of the text - and, in turn, violating 
Schelling's rule to let nature's true concept "arise before the eyes of the reader" - we will 
temporarily forego delving into this claim further until Schelling himself has developed it 
completely; for now, it is enough that we acknowledge the remark as it relates to the 
necessary succession of appearances in our faculty of representation. That I experience a 
necessary succession of appearances entails that I experience a relation between ideas and 
things - myself and nature - and that this relation is one in which truly neither element 
can be said to logically precede the other. The appearances, for Schelling, presuppose the 
succession as much as the succession presupposes the appearances, and so neither the 
appearances nor the succession is the ground of my representation, but a positive third 
(i.e. "the absolute purposefulness of nature") in which both the succession and the 
appearances coexist. We will return to this positive third shortly, but for now, in order 
that we might come to understand why Schelling suggests as much, we will continue by 
investigating the other half of Schelling's claim about the mutual presupposition of the 
succession and its appearances, specifically, how it is that the objects of our 
representations presuppose the succession. After all, if the succession of appearances in 
my representation is only subjectively necessary insofar as it is also objective necessary, 
and this explains why, intuitively, I seek an explanation for the succession in "things 
themselves" and not in myself, what is to prevent us from concluding that the objective 
necessity of my representations causes their subjective necessity, that the appearances in 
my intuitive faculty cause the succession?  
                                                          
148 "For with this separation reflection first begins. Henceforth he separates what nature had forever united: 
object from intuition, concept from image, and finally, by becoming is own object, he separates himself 




 Schelling's answer arrives in the form of an argument against the existence of 
external objects, by which he means objects external to my representation. "How a 
succession (of representations) occurs within me, this I understand; but a succession that 
proceeds in the things themselves, independent of finite representations, is completely 
unintelligible to me."149 Here, Schelling is criticizing the notion that, in experience, 
Kantian "things-in-themselves" undergo succession, and that we ourselves are simply 
witnesses to it.150 Schelling argues that such a system is implausible on account of its 
disregard for the nature of "things-in-themselves," which, according to him, precludes 
them from undergoing succession altogether. "Things-in-themselves" stand outside of 
time and space, "embracing all of the present and the future in one intuition."151 
Correlatively, to suggest that in experience we are merely observing the succession that 
takes place in them is a mistake, for it implies a contradiction. Objects external to us 
cannot be the source of the determined succession of appearances in our 
representation.152 Conversely, since the appearances cannot arise prior to my 
representations, they must arise simultaneously with the succession, and not outside us, 
but within us. 153 
                                                          
149 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 183) 
150 "In this system the things-in-themselves [Dingen an sich] succeed one another, and we are mere 
observers; but how the representation of this succession has entered us is a question that lies far beyond this 
system;" (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 183) 
151 "For if we posit a being that is not finite, i.e., not bound to the succession of representations, but rather 
embraces all of the present and future in one intuition, then for a being of this sort there would be no 
succession in the things outside it, for there is succession only under the condition of the finitude of the 
faculty of representation. But if the succession were also based in the things-in-themselves independent of 
all representations, then there would have to be a succession for a being of the sort we assumed above, 
which is a contradiction [Widerspruch]." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study 
of This Science, pg. 183) 
152 "Here is the place to completely annihilate the principle that acts things act on us from the outside." 
(Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 184) 
153 "Now if neither the appearances can be separated from their succession, nor, conversely, the succession 
from its appearances, then only the following two cases are possible: Either succession and appearances 
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 The notion of "thing-in-themselves" is one which Schelling identifies as a deeply 
contentious development in the history of philosophy insofar as it "makes the separation 
between man and the world permanent," filling "the intellectual world with chimeras 
against which no battle can be done, since they lie beyond all reason."154 Suppose we 
were to consider what external things were independent of their appearance in our faculty 
of representation. Since they do not exist in space and time, they cannot undergo 
succession and they cannot be understood in terms of cause and effect. So what, then, are 
we talking about? To say they cannot be represented, for Schelling, is nothing more than 
an "evasion that is easily cut short."155  "If someone talks about something, he must have 
a representation of it, or else he is not speaking as he should."156 Even when we use the 
term "nothing", one can at least form a representation of it in terms of empty space.157 
But in the case of things-in-themselves, we cannot even do that, since they are exempt 
from extension and temporality altogether. Accordingly, what seems to remain is a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
both arise simultaneously and unseparated outside us; or succession and appearances both arise 
simultaneously and unseparated within us." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the 
Study of This Science, pg. 182) 
154 Reflection not only rends asunder the world of appearances, but by separating the spiritual principle 
from this world it fills the intellectual world with chimeras against which no battle can be done, since they 
lie beyond all reason. Reflection makes the separation between man and the world permanent by viewing 
the latter as a thing-in-itself, attainable neither by intuition nor imagination, neither by understanding nor 
reason." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 169) 
155 "Granted, no one has ever been willing to discuss which representation one would truly make oneself of 
such things. To say they cannot be represented amounts to an evasion that is easily cut short." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 184) 
156 "If someone talks about something, he must have a representation of it, or else he is not speaking as he 
should. One has a representation even of nothing; one can at least think of it as absolute emptiness, as 
something purely formal, etc. One might think that the representation of the thing-in-itself would be a 
similar representation. However, the representation of nothing can still be sensualized through the schema 
of empty space. The things-in-themselves, however, are expressly removed from time and space, since the 
later belong only to that manner of representing peculiar to finite beings. Thus all that is left is a 
representation that hovers midway between something and nothing, i.e., that does not even have the credit 
of being absolutely nothing. It is indeed incredible that such a preposterous composite of things that, 
robbed of all sensual determinations, but still having to act as sensual things, has ever entered the human 
mind." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 184) 
157 As a point of clarification, one cannot represent the emptiness itself, but can make inference of negation 
from some empty space. Moreover, the problem with things-in-themselves is that, beyond the problem of 
representing them, there is not even a representation - such as in the case of negation - from which one 
could draw an inference about them (or of them).  
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representation somewhere "between something and nothing, i.e., that does not even have 
the credit of being absolutely nothing." Schelling doubts that such kinds of things 
actually exist, much less that we can explain how we have representations of them. If we 
continue to believe in the existence of things-in-themselves, then it seems we must posit a 
mind which contains certain forms a priori that are projected onto the things-in-
themselves. Nevertheless, this concession does not resolve our original inquiry, for it 
does not establish how this correspondence between the object and ourselves is possible. 
Such a philosophy of nature renders experience inconceivable insofar as it defines it in 
terms of the unity of twin antipodes -  a priori ideas (i.e. ideas independent of objects) 
and things-in-themselves (i.e. objects independent of ideas) - and, thus, as a 
contradiction; subsequently, it fails in its primary objective insofar as it obscures the very 
fact it purports to explain, namely, how it is that we are compelled to conceive the 
consonance between our ideas and things. 
 The inference that a priori ideas are analogous to things-in-themselves will likely 
give the readers pause since it is likely that they believe in the existence of the former but 
not the latter. How do we address this issue? Is Schelling rejecting the existence of a 
priori ideas, and, thus, of a priori truth? To answer this question, we have to separate the 
reality of ideas from how they are known, since the fact that some ideas are known 
independently of experience does not necessitate that they exist as parts of things. This is 
the reason Schelling rejects the claim that ideas cause things; it conflates the fact that 
some ideas are known a priori with the notion that they must exist independent of the 
external world. Schelling's point in arguing that a priori ideas are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions of experience is to call attention to the fact that they are not fully 
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real lest they correspond with the knowledge gained through the physical sciences. Here 
Schelling's manner of talking about ideas as "presentiment" is especially helpful since it 
avoids the strict bifurcation which typically follows when we discuss something's 
"existence." For Schelling, things are not simply real or not real, rather, insofar as they 
are involved in the process of becoming, they can also exist in a nascent state, between 
nothingness and actuality, with the potential to evolve in either direction. We see this in 
the case of Schelling's understanding of the absolute, in which freedom and necessity are 
co-dependent in the creation of the real. Just as freedom is separate from necessity, and 
yet still dependent on it for its existence, the fact some ideas are known a priori does not 
contradict the fact that they exist only insofar as they correspond with external things. 
This explains our interest in a priori ideas in the first place, which follows  from the 
belief that logical truths contribute to understanding of the material universe. For if we 
did not have this belief, it would be strange for us to study them as intently as we do, 
since they would have the character of our ideas of imaginary objects, and, thus, would 
not be considered truth because they have no referent.158 Instead, a priori ideas are the 
relations of ideas necessary for truth which become real to that extent that they are 
represented in things. Ultimately, this is the point Schelling means to justify as it pertains 
to freedom, for in the same way that freedom minus necessity is not fully realized as 
                                                          
158 We care about a priori ideas to the degree that they correspond with, and help us understand, the 
external world. For instance, mathematical truths are relevant to us insofar as they are compatible with, and 
essential to, the natural sciences. Otherwise, it would be strange for us to show as much interest in 
mathematical truths as we do. On the contrary, statements like "2 + 2 = 4" would take on the form of 
statements like "all unicorns have a horn," statements which are true by way of the immanent necessity of 
the subject term - or, rather, are analytically true - but which are not especially crucial for one to know. 
Hence the reason why, in propositional logic, the statement "all unicorns have a horn" does not imply 
necessarily that the statement "some unicorns have a true" is also true. Indeed the former is a true 
statement, but by the fact that it's subject term has no referent, the significance of the statement is far less 
than if we were talking about something in the external world. 
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itself, a priori ideas are not fully realized as truth lest they stand in relation to the 
physical universe. 
 In essence, Schelling finds Kant's transcendental analytic problematic insofar as it 
fails to address adequately realism's questionable assumption that objects necessarily 
appear to us as they actually are. By "realism," I mean the belief that objects cause us to 
have experiences of them by imposing themselves on us.159 Schelling critiques Kant's 
insistence on retaining the fundamental principle of realism despite calling into question 
its most basic assumption. Admittedly, Schelling's association of Kant with realism is 
somewhat unusual. Kant is, after all, credited with the "Copernican Revolution" in 
epistemology - a revolution which inaugurated vast inquires into the subjective 
conditions of experience - and Kant himself  wrote the First Critique out of deep 
concerns concerning realism's presumption that objects necessarily reveal themselves to 
us as they actually are. Yet despite this reputation, by claiming that there are indeed 
objects external to our representations, Kant continues to operate under the assumption 
that the "ground" of my experience lies in the objects themselves, which, as Schelling 
acknowledges, ultimately makes impossible the necessity with which I am constrained to 
                                                          
159 Similar to Schelling's treatment of Hume, those familiar with Kant will likely take issue with Schelling's 
interpretation of the First Critique on the grounds that Kant's concerns are primarily epistemological 
whereas Schelling's are metaphysical. While I am sympathetic to this concern, I would argue that Schelling 
himself would not agree that we can so easily separate those two spheres of thought. Schelling himself is 
not attempting to refute Kant and Hume so much as he is attempting to build a metaphysics which supports 
their epistemological claims. Indeed, knowledge has a metaphysical ground (i.e. knowledge is not its own 
ground) which is why Schelling positions both thinkers on this terrain. To say that one has knowledge of 
the external world presupposes a universe with a certain metaphysical constitution, namely, one produced 
from "ground" - i.e. where subject and object are both identical and non-identical etc. In challenging Kant's 
account of experience, Schelling is attempting to prove that there are risks in doing epistemology without 
taking into account the metaphysical assumptions which support it. For even though Kant himself, when 
discussing experience, is doing so from the standpoint of epistemology, the metaphysics it implies is such 




assume the correspondence between myself and nature.  In other words, where Kant's 
transcendental idealism falters, for Schelling, is in its inability to make sense of the 
necessity with which I am constrained to assume the consonance between my ideas and 
things. In Kant's system, experience amounts to the mapping on of a priori categories to 
make representations objects outside me. However, insofar as these objects remain the 
"ground" of my representation, and , thus, exist prior to the determinations they receive in 
my representation, it becomes inconceivable how they could appear to us at all insofar as 
they essentially defy categorization. 160 Thus, Kant's transcendental analytic falls victim 
to a form of dualism in which the relation of subject and object, ideas and things, 
becomes untenable.  With respect to the history of philosophy, recognition of this 
problem within Kant's system led to the development of a more distilled form of 
idealism, which locates the "ground' of experience - and the correspondence of ideas with 
things - completely in the a priori of the subject. Schelling rejects this "purer" form of 
                                                          
160 Readers of the First Critique will likely object that Kant's concerns are primarily epistemological, 
meaning that, when Kant discusses "things-in-themselves," he is not, in fact, arguing that objects in the 
external world  cause our experience. While I do agree Kant's aims are epistemological in nature, I also 
believe that Schelling himself would find it doubtful that Kant's epistemological claims do not have any 
metaphysical implications. Hence the reason why Schelling criticizes Kant's notion of "things-in-
themselves." The very notion of "things-in-themselves" rejects the possibility that our experience of the 
external world is reducible to our subjectivity. The problem, however, is that articulates objectivity as if it 
were a cause of experience, emphasizing its opposition with the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Indeed, this is the problem with describing "things-in-themselves" as "persistent" things that defy 
categorization. In the same way that a cause preexists its effect, for Kant, the persistency of external objects 
preexists the subject's categorization of them and vice versa. The issue here lies in discussing subjectivity 
and objectivity in such a way that fails to acknowledge their interdependency. Subjectivity and objectivity 
support each other, meaning that each  becomes real only in conjunction with the other. However, in Kant's 
epistemology, no such unity seems possible. Instead, we have the categories and we have uncategorized 
objects, a situation which implicitly begs the question concerning how the two are capable of coming 
together in experience. Schelling's criticism of Kant, then, has less to do with the intention behind Kant's 
insights than with the manner in which they are presented, for to imply that both subjectivity and 
objectivity cause experience, and, thus, each other, is ultimately to contradict the notion of causality itself, 
which is a one -way relation. Instead, for Schelling, a better way to discuss the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity is to them in terms of "ground," which emphasizes mutual reciprocity. Doing 
this avoids giving the impression that experience is the product of either subjectivity or objectivity - a false 
dichotomy in its own right.  
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idealism and its  emphatic proclamations of triumph over the naivety of realism. 
However, as we are going to observe, he does not reject it in order to once again reassert 
realism, but rather to offer an alternative which navigates a middle road between them.  
 In addition to Kant, the problem of "things-in-themselves" is one which Schelling 
locates in also Hume's skepticism, specifically in Hume's analysis of our causal 
explanations concerning matters of fact. Hume does not go so far as to affirm the 
existence of objects external to our representation.161 Nevertheless, according to 
Schelling, he does indeed claim that we are deceived when we take the succession of our 
appearances to be necessary.162 Schelling's concerns follow from Hume's explanation 
concerning the source of this deception.163 Hume says it was inherited through the habit 
of anticipating the same order in nature; Adam infers a necessary connection between 
going underwater and suffocation because every time he goes underwater he cannot 
breathe. Nevertheless, as Schelling points out, this exposition is circular, for it already 
presupposes the determined succession of appearances in representation.164 One cannot 
argue that we are deceived when we conceive of the succession of appearances as 
necessary by assuming a determined succession of appearances in our representation. But 
                                                          
161 "Hume (remaining faithful to his principles) leaves the question of whether things outside us correspond 
to our representations completely undecided." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the 
Study of This Science, pg. 185) 
162 "He must assume in any case that the succession of appearances occurs only in our representations; but 
that we consider precisely this determined succession to be necessary, he declares is a mere deception." 
(Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 185) 
163 "Yet we can rightly require of Hume that he at least explain the origin of this deception." For he cannot 
deny that we actually think of the succession of cause and effect as necessary, and that upon this rest all our 
empirical sciences, natural science, and history (of which Hume himself was such a great master)." (Ideas 
on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 185) 
164 "Whence this deception? Hume replies: 'Out of habit: since appearances have always succeeded one 
another in this order, the imagination acquired the habit of expecting the same order in the future, and 
finally this expectation has become a second nature to us, as does every longstanding habit.' But this 
explanation is circular. For he was supposed to explain why things have always succeeded one another in 
this order (that this is so Hume does not deny)." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the 
Study of This Science, pg. 185) 
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this is exactly the fallacy that Hume commits, for the source of our "deception," that is, 
our habit of inferring a causal link between two events, rests upon a repeated conjunction 
of events. As such, it already rests upon a determined succession of appearances in our 
intuitive faculty. Thus, Hume's explanation fails insofar as it does not explain "why 
things have always succeeded one another in this order." In this way, Hume's larger 
concerns about our inability to discern accurately matters of fact falls victim to similar 
problems Schelling locates in his successor, Kant. While Hume does not go so far as to 
suggest that there are indeed things-in-themselves, his insistence according to Schelling 
that we are being deceived implies their existence, for that is the only way one could 
possibly maintain that we are being deceived when we experience such a succession. The 
notion that we are being deceived does not in any way challenge the content of our 
experience (i.e. the necessary succession of appearances), so either we must be the cause 
of the succession in our experience, or the objects external to us. Since Hume is not 
willing to concede that there is no external world, then we fall back on the problem of 
objects external to our representations of them - beyond space and time - somehow being 
represented to us. To this end, Hume's skepticism, for Schelling, seems inevitably fated to 
end up with the difficulty of explaining how we experience objects beyond time and 
space.     
 When Schelling introduces other figures in his philosophy of nature, I believe it is 
helpful to remember that his concerns are primarily metaphysical. For instance, with 
respect to Schelling's comments in the previous paragraph, one might object that the 
force of Hume's concerns are primarily epistemological and that Schelling does violence 
to Hume's skepticism by criticizing it on metaphysical grounds. However, I do not 
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believe we have to go this far in criticizing Schelling, since it is evident that Schelling's 
aim is not to repudiate Hume's skepticism, so much as it is to build a metaphysics which 
supports it. That is why Schelling references his work in his philosophy of nature, for that 
experience which Hume articulates so clearly of believing we can have knowledge of the 
external world, while also being partially uncertain about what the future holds, is 
precisely the experience which Schelling believes is inseparable from our experience of 
time, that what it means to be in time is to experience both its conservative and 
progressive natures, that life in the world is always the same and yet still always 
changing. This explains why Schelling is so interested in a metaphysics of time in the 
first place, because our basic intuitions about time and our ways of dealing with it reflect 
beliefs that admit of no readily accessible, unifying principle. Schelling's goal is to 
consider if there is a metaphysics which can support these beliefs while simultaneously 
clarifying the manner in which time operates.  
 Schelling's respective critiques of Kant and Hume - of which, only Hume he 
mentions by name - I believe helps us to understand his reasons for suggesting that the 
determined succession and its determined appearances must arise simultaneously. Earlier, 
I mentioned that Schelling places a great deal of emphasis on starting his investigation 
from below not above - not "presupposing an arbitrary concept of philosophy in general," 
and then proceeding to break down its parts, but instead starting from our experiences 
within nature and allowing the true concept of the philosophy of nature " to arise before 
the eyes of the reader." That is what he intends to accomplish through this preliminary 
critique of Kant and Hume, which, in essence, is a critique against a strictly efficient 
causal account of our representations. I experience a determined succession of 
41 
 
appearances in my representation which, operating independently of me, leads me to 
search for its ground in the appearances themselves . Nevertheless, despite this objective 
necessity that grounds the subjective necessity of my representations, I can in no way 
assume that the objective necessity causes the subjective necessity without making the 
impossible claim that there are indeed objects beyond my representations of them - that 
is, objects devoid of succession - which contradictorily undergo succession for me.  This 
is the problem Schelling locates in Kant and Hume's respective analyses: in suggesting 
the existence of objects external to our representations of them - or, in Hume's case, 
clearly implying them - they assume a relationship of cause and effect between the 
succession and the appearances, ideas and objects, and, in doing so, ultimately drive a 
wedge between them such that it is inconceivable how the two could possibly come 
together - which they clearly do for us in experience.  
 From a historical perspective, Schelling is drawing us into a line of inquiry 
concerning the relation of ideas and objects which has its roots in Aristotle's critique of 
Plato's Theory of Forms, and which is decidedly opposed to the one-sidedness internal to 
the notion of causality. We cannot say that either ideas or objects causes the other 
because doing so necessarily results in the claim that ideas exist without objects - as is 
Aristotle's charge against Plato - or that objects exist without ideas - as is the case in Kant 
and Hume. While such claims are problematic in their own right insofar as they run the 
risk of gratuitously inflating the ontology - and this is especially true for us when we 
consider that the forms for Plato, and things-in-themselves for Kant, exist outside of our 
experience - they become especially so when we consider how they give birth to their 
effects, for if ideas are originally divorced from objects, or objects from ideas, how then 
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can we say that these ideas cause objects and vice versa? In Plato, this is the issue of how 
particulars participate in forms, and in Kant, how the things-in-themselves undergo 
succession in time and space. Together, they demonstrate the inability of the philosopher 
to reduce experience entirely to the experience of objects or ideas. Objects and ideas 
ground each other, and so, they cannot exist separately from each other, but only 
together. 
 But we are getting ahead of ourselves. We have entertained the possibility of 
whether or not objects can cause ideas, but have not yet done so yet with the converse.  
What about the possibility of ideas causing physical objects? Kant's transcendental 
analytic argues for the substantial role human subjectivity plays in organizing perception, 
challenging the long-standing assumption that the "ground" of experience existed in 
external things. But what about the possibility that "ground" is indeed our subjectivity, 
that the external world and all of its physical qualities are mere products of mind? That is 
the question we seek to answer in part two.   
5 
Schelling's Meditations on Nature Part 2: The Critique of Idealism 
 If it is unsafe for us to assume that objects cause our representations of them, i.e., 
that the objective necessity of the succession cause its subjective necessity, then where 
does this leave us in terms of Schelling's question of "ground?" More specifically, where 
does it leave us in terms of explaining the necessity with which we are constrained to 
believe we have knowledge of an external world? Since it is inconceivable that we can 
experience directly things-in-themselves, much less in their correspondence with our 
ideas, we can be sure that the objects of our representations do not exist outside these 
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representations. But this still does not rule out the possibility that we are  being deceived, 
for if the objects of our representations do not exist outside our representations, what is to 
prevent us from concluding that these objects are the effects of our own subjectivity? Put 
differently, if the objects exist only for me, what is to prevent me from concluding that 
they exist only as a result of me, as the projection of my spirit?165 The foundation for this 
line of inquiry, as we intimated in the previous section, has its roots in Kant and Hume's 
respective critiques of realism, which attempt to explain the correspondence of ideas and 
things as the result of the objects themselves. Kant questions realism's basic assumption 
that objects necessarily appear to us as they actually are, arguing instead that there are 
indeed subjective conditions which make experience possible. However, by continuing to 
advocate for the existence of things-in-themselves, he falls back on realism's main 
principle that objects ultimately cause us to have experiences of them, and in doing so, 
renders the fact that we necessarily experience a correspondence of ideas and things 
unintelligible. Historically speaking, this is the fulcrum on which pivots the shift in 
epistemology from realism to a more distilled, ideologically purer form of idealism. 
Where Kant's transcendental analytic goes astray is in its attempt to retain the notion - 
albeit in a modified form - that the "ground" of experience lies in external objects. 
Accordingly, given that there are indeed subjective conditions which make experience 
possible, the seemingly natural progression in our inquiry is to search for this "ground" of 
our experience in the essence of subjectivity itself, which Schelling refers to as spirit. Put 
                                                          
165 I recognize that this word "spirit" has an extremely long and complicated history, much of which was 
cultivated during the time Schelling was most active. Schelling himself associates "spirit" with subjectivity 
(i.e. mind), and as both identical and non-identical with objectivity - which Schelling refers to as "nature." 
Hence the reason Schelling suggests that spirit is invisible nature and nature is visible spirit. The two are 
both the same and not the same simultaneously. The difference between them, the distinction between what 
is visible and invisible, will be discussed at greater length when we begin Die Weltalter where Schelling 
gives it more attention. 
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differently, the natural progression in our investigation is to inquire whether or not the 
subjective necessity of the succession is itself the cause of its objective necessity.  
 What is it that a subject understands about an object, that spirit gleans from 
nature? The subjective necessity of the succession is the representation of appearances 
according to a determinate order, but this determinate order is not linear, but circular. 
Many who try to explain the existence of external things do so in terms of cause and 
effect. For Schelling, though, this is implausible because "every organic product exists 
for itself," meaning that it exists independently of other existences, and seeks only to 
"return to itself into infinity."166 Schelling refers to this quality of organic products as 
their "purposefulness." Causality presupposes a bifurcation between a cause and its 
effect, but in the sphere of organic nature, this is precisely what we do not find, since 
every organic nature "produces itself, arising from itself."167 In other words, Schelling 
conceives of every organic nature as simultaneously its own cause and effect, bearing 
"the ground of its existence within itself."168 Schelling here is arguing for the 
"organization" [Organisation]169 constitutive of each organic [organischen] product's 
"purposefulness" [Zweckmäßigkeit], an organization which is decidedly objective, and 
                                                          
166 "For as soon as we step into the sphere of organic nature every mechanical connection between cause 
and effects ceases for us. Every organic product exists for itself, its existence is dependent upon no other 
existence." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 190) 
167 "Now the cause is never the same as the effect; only between completely different things is a relation of 
cause and effect possible. But the organization produces itself, arises from itself; each particular plant is but 
a product of an individual of its own kind, and so each particular organization produces and reproduces 
only its own species into infinity." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 190) 
168 "Every organic product bears the ground of its existence within itself, for it is its own cause and effect." 
(Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 190)  
169 "Accordingly, an organization as such is neither the cause nor the effect of a thing outside itself; it in no 
way engages in the connection of the mechanism." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to 
the Study of This Science, pg. 190) 
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which joins together the product's parts with its whole.170 All objects in nature are 
comprised of parts, and these parts come together to produce a whole, but the whole and 
its parts mutually presuppose each other, and because of this, the unity between the two 
cannot be reduced to either one, but instead, must be established through a positive third. 
This positive third is what Schelling refers to as the object's "concept."171 The concept of 
the object is the objective relationship between its parts and its whole, 172 and, insofar as 
it dwells within the organization of the object, makes the object's existence purposeful 
[zweckmäßig].173 As the self-perpetuating ground of organic things, "purposefulness" is 
their paradoxical nature as simultaneously cause and effect, producer and product, creator 
and creation. The plant, as an objective relation of parts and a whole, strives to sustain its 
organization by taking in water, nutrients, and sunlight. The irony, however, is that in 
order for this to be possible, the plant must already be organized, which, in turn, is only 
true insofar as this organization is already being sustained. Thus, organization only begets 
itself, and so the very fact of its existence implies that it is self-sustaining. This explains 
why the parts and whole of organic objects are inseparable: inasmuch as each of them 
arises out of a self-grounding "organization," it is impossible for either to exist outside 
                                                          
170 "Thus if the purposefulness [Zweckmäßigkeit]of organic products is to be explained, the dogmatician 
finds himself totally abandoned by his system. Here it is of no use to separate concept and object, form and 
matter, as we please. For here, at least, both are originally and necessarily united, not in our faculty of 
representation, but in the object itself. I wish that one of those who considers philosophy to be a game with 
concepts, and phantasms of things to be actual things would venture to meet us here on this ground." (Ideas 
on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 191) 
171 " No single part could arise except in this whole, and this whole exists only in the interaction of the 
parts. In every other object the parts are arbitrary, they exist only insofar as I divide, Only in an organized 
being are they real; they are there with no effort on my part, because there is an objective relationship 
between them and the whole." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 190) 
172 "Thus every organization is based on a concept; for wherever there is a necessary relation of the whole 
to the parts, and of the parts to the whole, there is a concept." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 190-191) 
173 "[The organization] organizes itself, and is not simply a work of art whose concept is present outside 
itself in the understanding of the artist. Not its form alone, but its existence is purposeful." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 190-191) 
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the other. The relation between the parts and a whole is what is primary, not each in their 
own right, so while it is possible for us to distinguish between the two, it is impossible 
that they can exist separately of each other - that these determined parts can exist 
separately from this determined whole.174   
 The purposefulness of organic products in our representations raises a familiar 
question about the objective necessity of our experiences. As Schelling inquires, "how is 
that that an idea that obviously can exist only within you and that can have reality only in 
relation to you, still must be intuited and represented as something actual outside 
ourselves?"175 Purposefulness is a unity of the concept, so it cannot be explained on the 
basis of matter, but only in relation to "an intuiting and reflecting being," -  specifically 
one which can make "judgments," one which "reciprocally relates the part and the whole, 
form and matter, each to the other"176 - and yet, despite this, we are no less constrained to 
concede that this concept dwells in the "things themselves." How is this possible? How is 
it that this idea, which can only be attributed to things in relation to my understanding, is 
nonetheless represented to me as actual and necessary outside myself?  Here again we are 
confronted with objective necessity with which we are constrained to conceive the 
purposefulness of organic things. Among the variety of concepts in my understanding, 
some I can distinguish as clearly arbitrary - for example, when I classify a group of 
                                                          
174 In other words, it is just as inconceivable that the digestive, endocrine, and reproductive systems of a 
human being exist in a fish - i.e. for the parts of a human being to exist outside of their whole - as it is for a 
human being to have gills - for a whole to exist without its parts.  
175 "Now you are required to answer this question: how is it that an idea that obviously can exist only 
within you and that can have reality only in relation to you, still must be intuited and represented as 
something actual outside yourselves?" (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of 
This Science, pg. 192) 
176 "[Purposefulness] is a unity of the concept; this unity exists only in relation to an intuiting and reflecting 
being. For this is a judgment: that absolute individuality is in an organization, that its parts are possibly 
only through the whole, and that the whole is possible, not by assembling parts, but through their 
interaction;" (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 191) 
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spatially segregated objects into a single unit (such as when I call this sandwich, apple, 
and potato chips "my lunch") Schelling argues that I "act completely freely," for I am 
projecting a unity onto the things which in no way is grounded in "the things 
themselves".177 But others I can clearly distinguish as necessary, such as the 
purposefulness of organic things, and it is because of this that we describe their existence 
as purposeful. For even if I suppose that I can project ideas onto the things in my 
representations, why is it that when it comes to the concept of purposefulness, I project 
this idea "only onto certain things, but not all," that I am not free to attribute this idea to 
any object I wish? 178 
 What does Schelling mean when he argues that the purposefulness with which we 
conceive of the world is attributable to things "only in relation to a spirit?"179 
Specifically, that the necessity with which I am constrained to conceive of nature's 
purposefulness implies that nature herself is identical with spirit. Schelling defends this 
claim through a refutation of the suggestion that the purposefulness of objects has its 
origins outside the objects themselves, specifically in a "higher, divine understanding 
which planned its creations with ideals and produced nature in accordance with these 
                                                          
177 "For you can certainly differentiate between what is arbitrary and what is necessary in the connections 
among your concepts. As often as you subsume things that are spatially separated under a single number, 
you act completely freely. The unity that you give them is simply projected from your thoughts onto them; 
in the things themselves there is no ground that compels you to think of them as one." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 192) 
178 "Or if it is your volition that decides whether the idea of purposefulness is projected onto things outside 
you or not, how is it that you project this idea only onto certain things, but not all; furthermore, that you 
feel not free but altogether constrained to represent these purposeful products? You cannot give a reason 
for either, except that to certain things outside yourselves this purposeful form simply is attributed 
originally and with no effort on the part of your volition." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 193) 
179 "Thus you must concede that organization is possible only in relation to a spirit." (Ideas on a Philosophy 
of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 191) 
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ideals."180 Schelling finds this hypothesis problematic insofar it divides what in our 
experience arises simultaneously and indivisibly, namely, "the actual and the ideal" (i.e. 
objects external to us and their purposefulness). In my experience, organic things are 
purposeful "through themselves," their purposefulness constitutive of their very 
existence, independent of my volition.  But that this is so for us becomes inconceivable if 
purposefulness is given to objects by a "higher, divine understanding," for such an entity 
- in whom concepts are prior to act - can press the stamp of understanding only on matter 
that already exists and is outside of itself, and so, can only do so accidentally relative to 
the object, and not the way in which it appears to us, which is "originally and 
necessarily."181 Supplemented with his previously articulated claims about the 
impossibility of Kantian "things-in-themselves" (i.e. objects existing outside our 
representations causing our representations of them), this argument leads Schelling to 
draw the conclusion that the purposefulness we observe in natural things must "pertain 
only to [our] understanding,"182 that it must follow from a being (i.e. spirit) "to whose 
nature this determined system of the representations of external objects belongs."183 The 
key issue at stake here is the necessity with which we are constrained to conceive the 
purposefulness of external things. Such necessity implies that the purposefulness of 
                                                          
180 "In order to comprehend this union of concept and matter, you assume a higher, divine understanding 
which planned its creations with ideals and produced nature in accordance with these ideals." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 193) 
181 "But a being in whom concepts precede the deed, and the plan its execution, cannot produce, but can 
only shape and form matter that already exists, can only press the stamp of understanding and 
purposefulness upon matter from the outside; what it produces is not purposeful within itself, but only 
accidentally, only in relation to the artist's understanding, not originally and necessarily." (Ideas on a 
Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 193) 
182 "For as soon as you view natural things as actual outside yourselves, and thus as the work of a creator, 
purposefulness cannot dwell within them, since purposefulness pertains only to your understandings?"(pg. 
194) 
183 "Spirit is the absolute self-ground of its being and knowledge, and simply by being, it is what it is, i.e., a 
being to whose nature this determined system of the representations of external objects belongs. 
Philosophy is nothing other than a natural science of our spirit." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 189) 
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external things is not up to us. However, by the same token, it also means that the 
"ground" of our representations is, at least in part, ourselves, for the necessary ideas we 
have of things can only arise from ourselves. It is helpful to think of necessity in this 
context as a form of "immediacy."184 That external things are necessarily purposeful for 
me implies that I have immediate access to them. But I can only have immediate access 
to myself, so while the appearances in my representation are not up to me, they also must 
have arisen as a result of me. Thus, the fact that in experience I believe I have immediate 
access to external things - that I perceive things as they really - necessarily implies that 
external things are identical with me.185 Without jumping too far ahead of the text, we 
can foreshadow the question motivating Schelling's critique of idealism. If we can only 
know ourselves, how is that we are constrained to believe we can know the things 
external to us?  
 The revelation that the concept of purposefulness is attributable to things only in 
relation to spirit constitutes a rather surprising turn in Schelling's investigation. Initially, 
the fact that the object's existence was purposeful - that it was purposeful independent of 
ourselves -  led us to believe that the object itself was purposeful, a belief which, in turn, 
compelled us to claim the existence of objects external to our representations of them. 
When this claim was shown to be problematic insofar as it became inconceivable how 
                                                          
184 "But how do I come to project being, life, etc., onto things outside myself? For as soon as this happens, 
my immediate knowledge of becomes mediate. But I maintain that only immediate knowledge of being and 
life is possible, and that whatever is and lives only is and lives to the extent that it exists first and foremost 
for itself, becoming conscious of its life only through its own life." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 199) 
185 "As long as I am identical to nature I understand what a living nature is as well as I understand my own 
life, I comprehend how general life in nature reveals itself in the most manifold forms, in hierarchical 
developments, gradually approximating freedom. But as soon as I separate myself from nature, and with 
myself all of the ideal, I am left with nothing but a dead object, and I cease to comprehend how life is 
possible outside myself." (pg. 196) 
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such objects, which originally existed outside our representations, entered into our 
representations, we then investigated the possibility that objects received their 
purposefulness from a divine understanding. Now, after having shown this hypothesis 
inadequate, specifically in its failure to explain how the objects in our representations are 
necessarily purposeful for us, we are compelled to draw the conclusion that these objects' 
purposefulness, though belonging to existence, is "accidental" insofar as it exists only for 
me.186 This is the paradox grounding the problem of how we come to have 
representations of external objects. That I am constrained to believe there are purposeful 
objects external to me is the direct result of the fact that objects appear that way to me 
necessarily, that is, independent of how I wish them to appear. Nevertheless, that objects 
are represented to me in this way is only possible through me, and so the fact that I have 
such representations means that they are grounded in that which is of me and yet not 
subject to my will, my essence, i.e., spirit. 
 Does this mean that the entirety of the system of nature is traceable to our spirit? 
Are we now forced to concede that the long-standing debate between realism and 
idealism has been won in favor of the latter? Is "ground," simply stated, spirit? Certainly 
not, for Schelling, for though it is impossible for us to conceive of the purposefulness of 
objects as necessary unless the idea has its origins within us, this still does not explain 
how such a concept is represented as outside ourselves. As Schelling argues, it does not 
                                                          
186 "The whole enchantment that surrounds the problem of the origin of organized bodies rests on the 
intimate unity of necessity [Notwendigkeit] and accident in these things: necessity, because their existence 
and only their form (as in works of art) is purposeful: accident, because this purposefulness is actual only 
for an intuiting, reflecting being." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 195) 
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articulate "how I come to project being, life, etc., onto things outside myself."187 To the 
extent that my conception of things follows from my spirit, it does so necessarily, so what 
I know of them I know immediately - hence, Schelling's emphasis that only "immediate 
knowledge of being and life is possible." Yet as soon we assume that spirit is the solitary 
source of our representations, we run into the difficulty of how we could have any 
conviction that there are indeed objects external to us, for if spirit can only produce what 
is immediate, it seems impossible that we could genuinely conceive of mediate objects, 
objects that are external to us. Suppose an organized, free-moving body were to appear in 
our representation. If we assume that this appearance follows from spirit, then we would 
say that it is due solely to the "necessary characteristics of your faculty of representation," 
and that, correspondingly, it does not enter me from the outside.188 But if this so, how, 
then, is it possible for me to be convinced that there is indeed something external to me? 
If the concept of purposefulness in me is solely the product of my spirit, how then, can I 
have any significant conviction that this concept dwells within the object, that the object's 
existence is purposeful? The problem with suggesting that objects themselves cause the 
concept of  purposefulness in us is that it presupposes the existence of objects outside our 
representations of them, which, in turn, raises the problem of how such objects are 
represented to us as they actually are - as well as how they are represented to us at all. 
Conversely, the problem with suggesting that the concept of purposefulness is caused in 
                                                          
187 "But how do I come to project being, life, etc., onto things outside myself? For as soon as this happens, 
my immediate knowledge of becomes mediate. But I maintain that only immediate knowledge of being and 
life is possible, and that whatever is and lives only is and lives to the extent that it exists first and foremost 
for itself, becoming conscious of its life only through its own life." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 199) 
188 "Supposing that an organized, free-moving being enters my intuition; then I am well aware that this 
being exists, that it exists for me, but not that it exists for itself and in itself. For life can no more 
represented outside life than consciousness outside consciousness. Thus an empirical conviction of 
something living outside me is also altogether impossible." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an 
Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 199) 
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us through the necessary characteristics of our representation is that it presupposes the 
existence of ideas outside their relation to objects, which in, turn, raises the issue of how 
an idea, which originates in us, could possibly become actual outside us. In this way, we 
appear to have reached a crossroads in our investigation. Neither spirit nor nature is the 
cause of the other, so while neither can exist apart from the other, the unity they 
constitute in my experience cannot be reduced to either one, but necessarily through a 
positive third which simultaneously unifies the two while also acknowledging their 
differences. This positive third is Schelling's concept of "ground." 
 That we cannot deduce the entirety of our representations from spirit now brings 
our investigation full circle. To remind ourselves of our original question: how do the 
representations of purposeful objects outside myself enter into me, and "how I am 
constrained to think of this purposefulness as something actual and necessary outside 
myself, although it is attributed to things only in relation to my understanding?"  The fact 
that I am constrained to conceive the existence of external objects as purposeful 
originally led me to conclude that the objects themselves caused my representations of 
them. Thereafter, I discovered that this was impossible, since no necessary idea could 
arise in me except from myself  (i.e. spirit), and so I concluded that spirit itself must be 
the source of my representations. But when I did this, I recognized afterwards that it was 
inconceivable how I could have any representations external to me whatsoever, and so I 
returned to the fact that it was impossible for me to have representations of external 
objects without external objects. Since we have not been able to locate the "ground" of 
our experiences in either ideas or external things, it appears we have not made any 
significance progress on this front, so what, then, does this inquiry mean for Schelling? 
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Specifically, that the objective relationship between parts and a whole that we witness in 
external objects (i.e. their purposefulness) is the same relation between subject and 
object, spirit and nature, ourselves and the external world. To be clear, in this context, 
subject and object are "parts," and my representations, in which subject and object 
correspond, is the "whole." My representations, insofar as I am constrained to conceive of 
the concept of purposefulness as actual and necessary outside myself, embody a unity of 
subject and object. Yet the very fact that I cannot derive this unity from either spirit or 
nature means that while spirit and nature are not reducible to each other, they do not arise 
apart from each other, and neither one is reducible to the unity in which they reside. And 
so once again we are confronted with an objective relationship between parts and a 
whole. Without spirit and nature, subject and object, there is no experience, and without 
the unity embodied in my representations, there is no spirit and nature, yet spirit and 
nature are not identical with my representations, and spirit and nature are not identical 
with each other. This objective relationship between spirit, nature, and their synthetic 
principle Schelling refers to as the "absolute purposefulness of nature": 
 If we gather nature together as a whole, then mechanism, i.e., a descending 
 sequence of causes and effects, stands in opposition to purposefulness i.e., 
 independence from mechanism, simultaneity of causes and effects. By uniting 
 both extremes the idea of a purposefulness of the whole arises in us, nature 
 becomes a circle that returns to itself, a system closed within itself. The sequence 
 of causes and effects ceases altogether and a  reciprocal relationship of means and 
 ends arises; the particular cannot become actual without the whole, nor the whole 
 without the particular.189 
As the objective relationship between parts and a whole, the absolute purposefulness of 
nature is an idea that we are constrained to think of necessarily, not arbitrarily.190 Our 
                                                          
189 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 201) 
190 "This absolute purposefulness of the whole of nature is an idea that we think of not arbitrarily, but 
necessarily." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 201) 
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representations are consistently filled with external objects, and yet I am always 
constrained to think that the object is indeed purposeful. As Schelling writes, "we feel 
ourselves compelled to relate every particular to such a purposefulness of the whole."191 
On the rare occasion that I do indeed encounter an object which appears purposeless to 
me, I do not stop until that purposelessness is resolved into a form of purposefulness.192 
And so, despite the fact that the object is external to myself, prior to my encounter with it, 
I always assume that it has some connection with my "reflective reason," and, 
correspondingly, that my "reflective reason has some connection with the object. This 
"necessary maxim," like any assumption, is one we are initially unaware we are making, 
yet, as Schelling describes, "we obey it so steadfastly, so unabashedly, that we evidently 
presuppose that nature will freely meet us half way, as it were, in our endeavor to 
discover absolute purposefulness within her." 
 The "absolute purposefulness" of nature speaks to Schelling's distinctly organic 
understanding of existence, one in which the universe itself is likened to a single 
organism, constituted through a multitude of divergent parts working in harmony with 
each other. Why does man feel his kinship with nature? Why is it that he naturally 
assumes a consonance between his ideas and the external world, and how is it that his 
experiences confirm this attitude? Since we cannot deduce this kinship from subject and 
                                                          
191 "We feel ourselves compelled to relate every particular to such a purposefulness of the whole." (Ideas 
on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 201) 
192 "When we find something in nature that seems to be purposeless or even at odds with purposefulness, 
then we believe that the whole connection of things has been torn asunder, or we do not rest until even this 
apparent anti-purposefulness has become purposefulness again in a new context. Thus, it is a necessary 
maxim of the reflective reason that connection always be presumed to follow purpose and means in nature. 
And although we do not immediately transform this maxim into a constitutive law, yet we obey it so 
steadfastly, so unabashedly, that we evidently presuppose that nature will feely meet us half way, as it 
were, in our endeavor to discover absolute purposefulness within her." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as 
an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 201) 
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object individually, its possibility must lay in a "ground" in which the difference and 
identity of subject and object are simultaneously affirmed: "the true system can only be 
the one that establishes the unity of unity and opposition, i.e. the one that shows how 
unity can coexist with opposition and opposition with unity, and how the one is indeed 
necessary for the benefit of the other."193 The absolute purposefulness of nature is the 
necessity of "ground," but unless this necessity follows from a deeply paradoxical 
"ground" in which opposition and unity coexist - meaning that they are unified, but not in 
such way that allows one to gain the upper hand over the other - it is inconceivable how 
we could be so necessarily constrained to conceive the correspondence of ideas and 
things. I can only have knowledge of myself, for Schelling, and yet, paradoxically, I can 
also only have knowledge of what is external to me, so while I, as spirit, must be identical 
with nature, I must also be separate from it in order to have any knowledge whatsoever. It 
follows, then, that the kinship I feel with nature, i.e., the experience that nature is 
intelligible to me, must follow from a "living ground,"194 the same indivisible, self-
perpetuating organization constitutive of every living thing.   
6 
Closing Remarks: "Ground" and its Transcendence 
 Having superficially identified "ground" in its paradoxicality,  it is much clearer 
why Schelling begins his philosophy of nature from "below," not "above." Schelling says 
that there is "no definite concept" of philosophy, however, it is very easy to misinterpret 
                                                          
193 (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This Science, pg. 210) 
194 "All new European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does 
not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground." Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von. Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters. Found in Ernst Behler's 
anthology, Philosophy of German Idealism. New York: Continuum, 1987. (pg. 236) 
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what he means by this statement. For him, it is not that there is no concept, no first 
principle, no "ground," but rather that the indefinable itself is indefinable.195 That is what 
becomes reflected in the analysis of nature and which follows his line of questioning 
regarding the nature of "ground." After all, what is "ground?" There is no purely 
affirmative answer to this question, only one that it is both affirmative and negative.196 
"Ground" is indeed subject, but not in such a way that it could not also be object, and it is 
indeed object, but not in such way that it could not also be subject. Is "ground," then, 
definitively, the unity of subject and object? No, for while it is indeed this unity, it is not 
so in such a way that it could also not be this unity. We cannot even say definitively that 
"ground" is not the unity of subject and object, for while this is true, "ground" is so in 
such way that it could also be the unity of subject and object. As Schelling will state in 
his essay On the Nature of Philosophy as Science this is what gives "ground" its quality 
of being "indefinable": at the same time as it proceeds through everything, it never does 
so in such way that it could not also be anything else.197 Etymologically speaking, the 
word "definition" means to confine within certain limits. Nevertheless, as Schelling 
articulates, this is precisely what we cannot do with "ground" since by its nature, it does 
not have any limitations. It is so limitless, in fact, that it even transcends the limitation of 
                                                          
195 "What then is the system's principle, the one subject that proceeds through everything and does not 
remain in anything?...The answer: the indefinable itself, the aspect of the subject cannot be defined, has to 
be made the definition." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 216) 
196 "What I require, then, is that it be more precisely determined, I require that its concept be paraphrased 
within fixed limits, that it be defined. If one requires a definition, then one wants to know what the subject 
definitely is, and not merely what it is in such a way that it could also be something else , or even the 
opposite of it. This is the case here. I can neither say for certain A is B, nor that it is not B. It is B as well as 
not B, and it is neither B nor not B. It is not in such a way B that it would not also be not B, and it is not in 
such a way not B that it can in no way and by no means also be B." (On the Nature of Philosophy as 
Science, pg. 216) 
197 "But this one subject must proceed through everything and cannot remain in anything. For wherever it 
would remain, life and evolution would be inhibited. Proceeding through everything and not being 
anything, namely not being anything such that it could not also be something else - this is the requirement." 
(On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 215) 
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being "indefinable," for it is indefinable in such a way that it could  also become 
definable, taking on finitude. This is what prevents "ground" from becoming an entirely 
negative concept and which ultimately makes possible the process through which 
"ground" gives birth to being as a means of becoming conscious of its own freedom. We 
could go much further into this particular strand of Schelling's thought - and in large part 
we will insofar as it is the main topic of Schelling's entire corpus - however, our interest 
in the WA precludes us from advancing beyond this particular step at this moment. 
Instead, what is crucial for us at this specific juncture is that we acknowledge the 
necessity that our beliefs in an intelligible world have their origins in a transcendent 
"ground".198 It is to recognize that the concept of "ground" for Schelling is not a 
refutation of reason or of metaphysics, but rather an attempt to establish the possibility of 
a "higher" metaphysics, a metaphysics which affirms reason while simultaneously 










                                                          
198 "Everything, then, calls upon man to give up his knowledge, to make this separation through which he 
would first of all see himself in complete freedom, but also see, opposite him, the antecedent freedom in its 




Chapter 2: God's A Priori Hell - The Divine Madness 
Grounding the Divine Revelation 
"Since there is nothing before or outside of this primordial life by which it might be 
determined, it can only develop (to the extent that it does develop) freely, purely from 
itself, alone out of its own drive and volition. It does not, for that matter, develop 
lawlessly; rather, development proceeds strictly according to law. There is nothing 
capricious in this primordial life; it is a nature in the fullest sense of the term, just as man 
is a nature regardless of freedom, even because of it."199 
 
Introduction 
 In the preceding passage from the 1813 draft of the WA, Schelling acknowledges 
the fundamental paradox situated at the center of "ground." As the primordial life, it  
proceeds directly out of itself, and thus, freely, while simultaneously doing so "strictly 
according to law." In our brief survey of Schelling's philosophy of nature, we were 
introduced to the paradoxical nature of Schelling's key concept as the unity of identity 
and difference. Here, in the WA, this paradox is conveyed in terms of the unity of 
freedom and necessity.200 Schelling's philosophy is a philosophy of beginnings, 
specifically, the beginning - or perhaps most succinctly, a perpetually recurring 
beginning;201 correspondingly, where we find ourselves in the opening of the WA is with 
the primordial life prior to its commencing, more colloquially, with God prior to the 
                                                          
199 (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 113) 
200 "God is the oldest of being - so Thales of Miletus is already purported to have judged. But the concept 
of God is of great, nay, of the very greatest, range, and is not to be expressed with a single word. Necessity 
and freedom are in God. Necessity is already recognized when a necessary existence is ascribed to God. To 
speak naturally, there is necessity insofar as it is before freedom, because a being must first exist before it 
could act freely. Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest, 
insofar as such a distinction can take place in god, which will have to be cleared up through further 
consideration. Even though the God who is necessary is the God who is free, both are still one and the 
same." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 5) 
201 "Certainly, therefore, something that is eternal without beginning can be thought as not actual but never 
as actual. But now we are speaking of a necessarily actual God. Therefore, this God has no beginning only 
insofar as it has no beginning of its beginning. The beginning is an eternal beginning, that is, a beginning 
that was, as such, from all eternity and still always is and one that never ceases to be a beginning." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 17) 
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creation of the world.202 The question, then, naturally follows: what is it that finally leads 
God to create the world, to emerge from his own non-existence in order to step into 
time?203 That God is able to create the world - i.e. posit himself -  suggests that he is free 
to do so, that he can choose whether or not he exists.204 Nevertheless, as Schelling warns 
us, this capacity alone does not imply that  his existence is a foregone conclusion. 
Potency is not, by definition, actualized, nor is it - again, by definition - necessitated to 
become so; consequently, we cannot assume that God will take advantage of his power to 
be simply by virtue of his having it.205 That the divine essence contains the ground of its 
own existence within itself does not necessitate that it will actually posit itself. 
Subsequently, for God to have created the world, we must acknowledge his having been 
led out by some necessity, some rule of law encouraging him to do so.206 
 By "necessity," in this context, we are not talking about a form of coercion, a 
forceful dragging out of the divine from its concealment, but rather an existential crisis 
                                                          
202 "In the highest science what is living can be only what is primordially alive: the essence preceded by no 
other, which is thus the first or oldest of essences." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 113) 
203 "Now the great riddle of all times originates precisely here, the riddle of how anything could have come 
from what is neither externally active nor is anything in itself." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 135) 
204 "Everyone recognizes that God would not able to create beings outside of itself from a blind necessity in 
God's nature, but rather with the highest voluntarism. To speak even more exactly, if it were left to the 
mere capacity of God's necessity, then there would be no creatures because necessity refers only to God's 
existence as God's own existence. Therefore, in creation, God overcomes the necessity through freedom 
and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that comes above freedom." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 5) 
205 "However, there is no transition from the absolutely undetermined to the determined. The statement that 
intelligible essence should determine itself from pure, utter indetermination without any basis, leads back to 
the above-mentioned system of the impartiality of volition." (Freedom Essay, pg. 258) By "impartial" in 
this context, Schelling is referring to the fact that freedom qua freedom does not necessitate act since, by 
definition, it is free from all desire.  
206 In his article, Philosophical Religion and the Quest for Authenticity, Joseph Lawrence articulates just 
how radical Schelling's project is in comparison with the modern, scientific worldview, pioneered by 
Hegel, which decidedly overlooks the question of how everything began: "If one assumes that the 
materialistic worldview of science, within which this project is framed, is the last rational (and thus 
discussible) option, then Schelling's philosophy can indeed be declared dead. But several considerations 
speak against making this move. The first concerns the inherent limit of science. Its very adeptness at 
mapping out what there is in the world brings so much light to reality that something else remains totally 
concealed, namely, science's colossal failure to account for the fact the world exists in the first place." (the 
WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 15) 
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[chrisis] in which God himself becomes sensitive to his own non-being as problematic.207 
Schelling is anticipating what Heidegger would later refer to in Being and Time as the 
"call of conscience." Just as the call awakens Dasein to its possibility of becoming 
authentic, existence calls God as that to which he already belongs.208 God already is the 
world inasmuch as it is possible for him to create it; correlatively, that he chooses to 
realize this potential implies an analogous moment of self-consciousness in which he 
finds positing himself attractive and irresistible.209 For Schelling, this moment is none 
other than the instance of God's greatest suffering, when he experiences his own non-
existence as a form of hell. Dialectically, we see how this is possible for him, for if 
existence is that towards which God is "called," then the "ground" of God's emergence 
into time must be his anxiety before the "calling," or more succinctly, the moment God 
finds his own non-existence unbearable. In the WA, Schelling discusses this necessity in 
terms of "the vortex of drives" rotating ceaselessly in God's heart. The drives lack  an "I-
hood" to dominate them, producing in God a sensitivity to his not having himself;210 as a 
                                                          
207 "Darkness and concealment are dominant characteristics of the primordial time. All life first becomes 
and develops in the night; for this reason, the ancients called night the fertile mother of things and indeed, 
together with chaos, the oldest of beings [Wesen]." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 179) 
208 "If you wish to form an image - albeit a vague and distant one - of what occurs, imagine the moment of 
a sudden need: you have fallen unexpectedly into danger, and, without understanding or deliberation, 
divine inspiration takes hold and you do the only thing that could save you. Alternatively, to connect this 
with higher matters - indeed, the only genuinely comparable situation - ask yourself this: did you honestly 
take factors into consideration, engage in deliberation and reach a decision, when you grasped yourself for 
the first time and expressed yourself as who you are?" (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 175) 
209 "The fear of life itself drives man out of the center in which we was created; for this center is, as the 
purest essence of all will, a consuming fire for every particular will; in order to be able to live in it man 
must be mortified in all his ownhood, for which reason he must almost necessarily attempt to step out of it 
and into the periphery, in order to seek rest there for his selfhood. Hence the general necessity of sin and 
death as the actual mortification of ownhood, through which all humanity must pass as through a fire in 
order to be purified." (Freedom Essay, pg. 256). Schelling, here, seems to anticipate Heidegger's claim that 
inauthenticity becomes the basis for Dasein's authentic being-towards-death. 
210 "There, all forces are indeed present and in natural interaction amongst themselves, excited by gentle 
interplay; but no character, no I-hood, no one has yet stepped forth to dominate and control them." (the WA, 
1813 edition, , pg. 146) 
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result, they produce in him the desire to exist inasmuch they generate his longing to be 
outside himself, to be outside his own divine madness. 
 The goal of this chapter is to establish the context for understanding why 
Schelling believes this divine madness is so crucial to the creation of the world. In 
essence, we are attempting to analyze the most interior mechanism of the unconditioned, 
namely, how it posits itself from itself. This means, first of all, that we must understand 
how the fact that God contains the ground of his own existence within himself does not 
necessitate his emergence into time - a problem which Schelling associates with God's 
freedom. God's status as the unconditioned implies that he contains the power to create 
himself, meaning he is free to decide whether or not he comes into existence. So why, 
then, is it not safe for us to assume that God would eventually choose to exist versus 
remaining in eternity? As we are going to observe in this chapter, it is because unless he 
experiences his own non-existence as a form of loss, then he will desire nothing outside 
himself, and thus, have no inclination whatsoever to step into time.211 He would be 
"perfect" in the etymological sense of the term, "made through," finished and complete, 
and so would not need anything, much less to be outside himself.212 It follows, then, that 
the fact there is a world, for Schelling, implies that God must have suffered profoundly 
from a deep, existential yearning, that in his own non-existence, he found himself to be 
                                                          
211 "But the power of a beginning is only in wanting in general. For that which is wanted and therefore that 
which should actually be in accord with the intention is posited as that which does not have being precisely 
because it is that which is wanted. But all beginning is founded on that which is not, on what actually 
should be (that which in itself has being). Since a being that has nothing outside of itself can want nothing 
other than simply itself, the unconditioned and absolutely first beginning can lie only in self-wanting. But 
wanting oneself and negating oneself as having being is one and the same. Therefore, the first beginning 
can only be in negating oneself as that which has being." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
212 "Modern philosophy names God the most unlimited being (ens illimitatissimum), without thinking that 
the impossibility of any limit outside of God cannot sublimate that there be something in God through 
which God cuts itself off from itself, in a way making itself finite (to an object) for itself. Being infinite is 
for itself not a perfection. It is rather the marker of that which is imperfect. The perfect is precisely the in 
itself full, concluded, finished." (the WA, 1815 edition,  pg. 7) 
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imperfect. This yearning precipitates in God the decision to finally step out into time, 
however, the main objective of this chapter is not to make sense of the decision - we will 
treat this issue in greater detail in chapter 3 - but instead, to understand how this 
interaction of freedom and necessity produces in God the crisis which grounds the 
decision.213 Inasmuch as we are focusing primarily on God's past, the a priori of time, we 
will be analyzing Schelling's systematic approach as it pertains to the question of the 
beginning.214 Nevertheless, it is crucial for us to keep in mind that Schelling does not see 
this past - what he refers to as "The Past"215 - as a past from which we are infinitely 
divorced, but rather as an eternal beginning, a beginning which is continually reproducing 
itself in time.216 The unconditioned for Schelling is time itself, and so the moment it 
begins positing itself is simultaneously the moment time begins.217 What this means for 
us is that the interaction of freedom and necessity we witness in the absolute is itself the 
                                                          
213 "How is a decision possible here, even only with respect to the What? A decision is hampered by the 
absolute parity (equipollence) of both wills, by the fact that neither has more of a claim to be active than the 
other..." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 172) 
214 "Science [Wissenschaft], according to the very meaning of the word, is history [Historie]. It was not able 
to be history as long as it was intended as a mere succession or development of one's own thoughts or ideas. 
It is a merit of our times that the essence has been returned to science; indeed, this essence has been 
returned in such a manner as to assure us that science will not easily be able to lose it again. From now on, 
science will present the development of an actual, living essence." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 113) 
Science is historical insofar as it articulates how difference is produced. In this case, Schelling is arguing 
against an understanding of science which merely recounts each new development of thought without 
paying attention to that mechanism which generates these changes. 
215Herein I am preserving the manner in which Schelling refers to this first book of the WA. By "the Past" I 
am referring to "ground," i.e., the a priori which is itself self-expression and which makes self-expression 
possible in all living things.   
216 Alternatively, "ground" is the decision, motivated by self-consciousness, which generates becoming. 
Thus, time is becoming, and becoming (i.e. the self-conscious decision) is the condition for the possibility 
of time. 
217 "Because this essence holds time enveloped, it serves as a link that enables man to make an immediate 
connection with the most ancient past as well as with the most distant future. Man often sees himself 
transported into such wonderful relations and inner connections through precisely this innermost essence, 
such as when he encounters a moment in the present as one long past, or a distant event as if he himself 
were witness to it!" (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 114) 
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same conflict which becomes reproduced in time within us.218 Nothing for Schelling is 
sublated [aufgehoben], and so the contradiction which brings time to life is also the 
contradiction within which we find ourselves in existence. Unfortunately, the constraints 
of this dissertation limit our capacity to draw out this connection extensively in this 
chapter, however, it nonetheless bears acknowledging inasmuch as it helps keep our feet 
planted firmly on the ground as we enter into the dense woods of Schelling's 
metaphysics. 
 Before we commence our investigation of the WA, a word first about Schelling's 
decision to situate this discussion within the framework of the Christian tradition. Some, 
such as Andrew Bowie, argue that Schelling's work presupposes a theological basis, as if 
to say that that a metaphysics of "ground" necessarily implies certain theological 
commitments. However, I do not believe we have to go this far. Indeed, Schelling's use of 
religious language is inseparable from his analysis in the WA - which is why I have 
chosen to incorporate it in this dissertation. However, I do not believe that this means we 
do violence to his work by interpreting it in more secular terms. On the contrary, I argue 
that the reason Schelling speaks of "ground" in these terms is because the Christian 
tradition contains a language for talking about the absolute in terms of personhood, which 
Schelling himself views as a close analogue to the life of "ground."219 Of course, 
Schelling could have achieved a similar effect by choosing another religious tradition, but 
                                                          
218 "Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he alone, of all creatures, 
retrace the long path of developments from the present back into the deepest night of the past, how could he 
alone rise up to the beginning of things unless there were in him an essence from the beginning of times? 
Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is eternal of the soul has a con-science/con-sciousness 
[Mitt-Wissenschaft] of creation." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 114) 
219 "God is a life, not merely a being. But all life has a fate and is subject to suffering and becoming. To 
this, too, God has subjugated himself freely, ever since he separated the world of light from the world of 
darkness in order to become personal. Being becomes sensitive to itself only in becoming." (Freedom 
Essay, pg. 66) 
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most likely, he chose Christianity due to his own familiarity with its customs and 
mythology. Moreover, this notion of personhood captures much of what Schelling means 
when he describes "ground" in the Freedom Essay as "living."220 Indeed, "ground" is 
potency, but it is still "living" in the sense that it retains a modicum of sensitivity to itself, 
which, as Schelling will demonstrate in his discussion of God's self-consciousness - 
which we will cover in chapter 3 - is also a sensitivity to what is other. This is the sense 
of the word "living" we use to distinguish ourselves from robots and other machines that 
move and think like we do. We are "living" in the sense that we exhibit a capacity to feel, 
that we do more than just reason and move through our environment, but also love, 
desire, and experience the full range of human emotion. Now this emphasis on a 
primordial sensitivity will likely appear to the reader that Schelling is merely exhibiting 
his affinity for romanticism, but for Schelling, that is the point, since for so long 
metaphysics has privileged our capacity for knowledge at the expense of our feelings - 
and, in turn, denied the fact that we are more than just our thoughts and our bodies. For 
Schelling's predecessors, it was commonplace to adopt the hierarchy of the Platonic soul 
- which emphasizes the superiority of the rational to the appetitive221 - which is why 
Schelling himself is keen on introducing this concept of "ground." His goal is to return 
philosophy to that primordial moment before the creation of the world, when thought and 
being were merely embryonic, and all that existed was the absolute's sensitivity to its own 
existential desire. He seeks to bring philosophy in line with the truth of "ground," which 
                                                          
220 "All new European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does 
not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground. Thus Spinoza's realism is as abstract as the idealism of 
Leibnitz. Idealism is the soul of philosophy, realism is its body; only both together constitute a living 
whole." (Freedom Essay, pg. 236) 
221 For more on the Platonic view of the soul, see Schelling's Freedom Essay, where he discusses this issue 
as part of a larger discussion on the problem of evil. (Freedom Essay, pg.248) 
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is that the most powerful force in the universe, the one strong enough to rouse the 
absolute from its eternal slumber, incorporates thought and being while transcending both 
of them,  marrying the former's capacity for understanding with the latter's desire for 
what is outside itself. For Schelling, this power is the source of becoming that resides in 
all living things, a power which, as the positive third that affirms the unity and difference 
of thought and being, has the character of feeling, intuition, love, and, above all, freedom.         
 Looking forward, our objective in the following section is to begin transitioning 
from Schelling's philosophy of nature, constitutive of his early work, to the philosophy of 
his middle period, characterized by his emphasis on freedom and its relation to time. We 
have already identified the unconditioned essence servicing as the ground of our belief 
that we have knowledge of the external world, and we did this with an eye towards 
highlighting this essence's paradoxicality. Now, our emphasis is to understand more 
specifically how this dark "ground" operates, how it continually produces itself in time. 
For Schelling, this "how" is effectively the beginning of the beginning, the origin from 
which God posits himself and gives birth to existence. We will be starting with a brief 
exposition of Schelling's philosophy of time as it appears in the opening of the WA and 
proceed from there to show its origins in the same "ground" which founds all living 
things. We are following Schelling's lead to be sure, however, orienting ourselves in this 
manner will make our transition to the intensely abstract nature of the WA easier 
inasmuch as it will help establish the continuity between his philosophy of nature - 
centered on the concept "ground" - and his philosophy of freedom - centered on the 
stirrings of God's heart prior to his creation of the world. On the whole, this is the 
transition which Schelling seeks to make in his metaphysics, from a philosophy of the 
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pure, transparent concept, to a philosophy of the transcendent "ground," a "ground" 
which exceeds both the real and the ideal, things and ideas. 
1 
The Organic Nature of Time: "Ground" as the a priori Link Between Past and Present 
 For Schelling, the concept of "ground" - that is, the relation of identity and 
difference - is the condition for the possibility of our experience of time. In the 
philosophy of nature, "ground" serves as the condition for the possibility of our necessary 
belief that we have knowledge of an external world. In the context of the WA, it is the 
condition for the possibility of our necessary belief that time is indeed real, that things 
genuinely progress, mature, and develop over the course of history. As Schelling 
articulates in the opening pages of the WA, "everything is only the work of time, and it is 
only through time that each thing receives its particular character and meaning."222 
Writing in the aftermath of the First Critique, Schelling is acutely aware of the trend 
within his own era to treat time as a form of intuition, as a "mere gear in our thoughts that 
would stop if we no longer counted days and hours."223 But just like his philosophy of 
nature, in which he criticizes the attempt to articulate experience exclusively in terms of 
ideas or things, Schelling finds the attempt to reduce our experience of time to a form of 
intuition unproductive insofar as it fails to account for our necessary belief that we 
                                                          
222 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 122) 
223 "It is easy to say - and is now a universally accepted opinion - that time is not real, that it is not 
independent of our mode of representation. Additionally, a false representation of the concept of time has 
permitted so much that is illusory and partially false to creep into the concept that it is almost pardonable to 
look upon it as a mere gear in our thoughts that would stop if we no longer counted days and hours." (the 
WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 122). For Schelling, the notion of time as a purely subjective phenomenon connotes 
that time  is not real, when, in fact,  it is the defining characteristic of all living things. Hence Schelling 
believes there is no substantive distinction between calling something real and saying it exists in time. To 




inhabit a world that is continually evolving - that the world is always in the process of 
becoming. Schelling briefly articulates what he intends by this experience of time in the 
opening pages of the WA:   
 Everything that surrounds us points back to a past of incredible grandeur. The 
 oldest formations of the earth bear such a foreign aspect that we are hardly in a 
 position to form a concept of their time of origin or of the forces that were then at 
 work. We find the greatest part of them collapsed in ruins, witnesses to a savage 
 devastation. More tranquil eras followed, but they were interrupted by storms as 
 well, and lie buried with their creations beneath those of a new era. In a series 
 from time immemorial, each era has always obscured its predecessor, so that it 
 hardly betrays any sign of an origin; an abundance of strata - the work of 
 thousands of years - must be stripped away to come at last to the foundation, to 
 the ground.224  
One cannot help but be struck at how Schelling's prose anticipates the work of modern 
science as it continues to peel back the layers of the earth's surface, revealing the 
seemingly infinite number of epochs through which it has already passed. Like Darwin 
studying the turtles in the Galapagos, or a modern-day climatologist dating ice cores from 
the Antarctic, Schelling speaks of a world that is incredibly old and which has endured 
countless trials over the course of many years. He talks of a world that has survived its 
fair share of turbulence and which carries the scars of that history in the "abundance of 
strata" buried beneath its surface. Schelling here is not speaking merely in a rhetorical 
fashion; he is raising our awareness to the inextricable relation between human 
experience and time: "Everyone experiences without contradiction the essential nature of 
time in [his or her] own actions and affections; time can affirm its formidable reality even 
to those who loudly proclaim its nothingness."225 Like our belief that the external world is 
accessible, this fact of our experience is so intuitive, so natural to our way of being that it 
                                                          
224 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 121) 
225 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 122) 
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is difficult for us to call it into question seriously. And yet, Schelling himself is distinctly 
aware of just how strange it is that we have such an experience of time, for in order to see 
the progress in things, the world itself must be a unity of identity and difference. This 
thesis will become clearer as we continue to work through the WA with an eye towards 
understanding why Schelling was unable to provide an exclusively systematic 
explanation for our experience of time. However, even at this early stage of the text, 
Schelling himself is attempting to cultivate in us an appreciation for the strangeness of 
the fact that we believe things are the work of history. The identity of things is forged 
through their development through time; I cannot understand them in isolation from 
where they have come.226 Yet what makes this possible for me is the fact that I testify to 
in the object its genuine past, a past which is concealed in the object, yet nonetheless 
constitutive of it. That is what Schelling observes in the world's "abundance of strata," 
pieces of the world which the present has negated, but not sublated. By "past" in this 
context, Schelling is not referring to a "past-present," a past that was once present but 
now is not, but rather an eternal-past - a past that is always already past - which stands in 
opposition to the present, all the while grounding it: "The past clearly cannot be a present 
at the same time as the present; but as past, it is certainly simultaneous with the present, 
and it is easy to see that the same holds true with the future." A man is conscious only of 
                                                          
226 "If the world that lies before us has come down through so many intervening eras to finally become our 
own, how will we even be able to recognize the present era without a science of the past? Even the 
particularities of a distinguished human individuality are often unintelligible to us before we learn about the 
distinctive circumstances under which the individual developed and formed. And yet we think that we can 
so easily discern the grounds of nature! A great work of the ancient world stands before us as an 
incomprehensible whole until we find traces of its manner of growth and gradual development. How much 
more must this be the case with such a multifariously assembled individual as the earth! What entirely 
different intricacies and folds must take place here! Even the smallest grain of sand must contain 
determinations within itself that we cannot exhaust until we have laid out the entire course of creative 
nature leading up to it." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 121 -122) 
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his present inasmuch as he is conscious of "having put something put behind him;"227 
consequently, unless he separates himself from himself and actively opposes what has 
happened to him, he cannot "savor a true present."228 In his article, Creating the Past: 
Schelling's Ages of the World, Alistair Welchman argues that the past and present for 
Schelling occupy "different planes of existence," which I believe is a helpful distinction 
for our purposes inasmuch as it highlights the emphasis Schelling places on the 
qualitative difference between times.229 Past and present for Schelling are not identical 
time-parts, but instead legitimately different "times" which together produce our 
experience of becoming.230  
 What Schelling unearths through this brief reflection is what he himself refers to 
as the "the organic nature of time," a nature which, like the one he locates in all living 
things, is constituted by a unity of parts and a whole in which neither side is allowed to 
gain the upper hand. Recalling our discussion about the necessity with which we are 
constrained to believe we have knowledge of external things, Schelling concludes that 
this inclination is rooted in a unity comprised of legitimately divergent components - 
                                                          
227 "The man who cannot separate himself from himself, who cannot break loose from everything that 
happens to him and actively oppose it - such a man has no past, or more likely he never emerges from it, 
but lives in it continually. It is advantageous and beneficial for a man to be conscious of having put 
something behind him, as it were - that is, of be having posited it as past." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120) 
228 "Only the man with the strength to rise above himself is able to create a true past; he alone can savor a 
true present." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120) 
229 "God's decision to exist had the effect of splitting eternity up into the dimensions of time (And the 
decision itself occurs as the interstices between eternity and time.) The past was placed at the ground of the 
present; in a sense, the past and present were created simultaneously...What this means is that the past and 
present occupy different planes of existence, as it were. Schelling rejects the notion, almost universally held 
since Aristotle, that the past is a past present - something that used to be a 'now' but no longer is. For 
Schelling, the past was never a present or a 'now,' it is has always been the past, it is always already past."  
Welchman Alistair. "Creating the Past: Schelling's Ages of the World." Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 4 (2010): 23-43. (pg. 37) 
230 "The past - a lofty concept, common to all and understood by only a few! Most know only of that [past] 
which grows within each moment through precisely that moment, and which is itself only becoming, not 
being." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120) Emphasis is my own 
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subject and object - and so is necessary for us only insofar as subject and object - ideas 
and things - are joined together by a third term - "ground" - in which their sameness and 
difference are simultaneously affirmed. With respect to time, Schelling observes the same 
relation between the past and the present. Our belief that the world is marked by its 
progress through time implies that the world itself - and every living thing in it - is a unity 
comprised of legitimately different "times" - past and present - and so is necessary for us 
only insofar as past and present are joined together by a "ground" in which their 
sameness and difference are simultaneously affirmed. This indeed is the elegant 
congruency between Schelling's philosophy of nature and his philosophy of time. Just 
like subject and object - ideas and things - the past and the present "ground" each other 
for Schelling, and so exist in a relationship such that neither one is reducible to the other, 
nor exist apart from the other. 
 Schelling's understanding of time is an attempt to address the problems he 
associates with similar accounts grounded in a metaphysics of determinism. "If, as a few 
supposed sages have claimed, the world were a chain of causes and effects that ran 
backward and forward to infinity, then there would in truth be neither past nor future. But 
this nonsensical thought should rightly have vanished along with the mechanistic system 
to which alone it belongs."231 Determinism overlooks the necessity of the opposition 
between past and present as the condition for the possibility of our experience of time. It 
privileges the continuity the two - which is also necessary for time - but to such a degree 
that eliminates the potential for growth and development. For if the world were indeed 
only a chain of causes and effects that stretched backwards and forwards infinitely, there 
                                                          
231 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120) 
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would not be many times but only one, in which case this one time could not rightly be 
called "time" since it would not allow for becoming. All that is happening would be 
precisely what has already happened, and what has already happened would be also what 
is going to happen, so the world would not have a genuine past or future, only  a pseudo-
present in which there was no change, no progress, no evolution.232 I say "pseudo-
present" because for Schelling a true past is reserved for someone who is "conscious of 
having put something behind him."233 But in this case that is inconceivable for man, since 
there is nothing for him to be conscious of having actively opposed. All that currently is 
is exactly as it has been and ever will be, so everything in him always remains the same. 
In this way, a deterministic understanding of time  is inconsistent with our own 
experience of time inasmuch we do indeed bear witness to changes in the world - and in 
ourselves - over the course of history; as such, we cannot reduce time to a strict logical 
binary of being versus non-being in which the only conceivable time is a single, 
unchangeable, now. 
 The revelation of time's a priori in the same "ground" which serves as the a priori 
of knowledge brings Schelling to the primary question of the WA, namely, how it is that 
time and existence began. The "beginning" in question here is an eternal one, for though 
existence is indeed the divine essence once it has stepped into time, "ground" is the 
condition of its possibility, and, thus, still higher. It is the unconditioned itself, producing 
                                                          
232 "Nevertheless, if the old saying - that there is nothing new under the sun - were in some sense to prove 
true; and if the question 'what is it that has happened?' were always correctly to be answered: 'just what will 
one day happen'; and if the question ' what is that will happen?' were always correctly to be answered: 'just 
that which has happened before' - then it would certainly follow that the world has in itself no past and no 
future. This would entail that everything that has happened in it from the beginning and everything that will 
happen up to the end belongs to a single overarching time..." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120 -121)  
233 "The man who cannot separate himself from himself, who cannot break loose from everything that 
happens to him and actively oppose it - such a man has no past, or more likely he never emerges from it, 
but lives in it continually." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 120) 
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itself from itself, and so does not posit itself temporarily, but permanently, always and 
perpetually.234 The question, then, is how "ground" "grounds," so to speak, how it posits 
itself from itself eternally.235 The emphasis on "how" is especially integral to Schelling, 
for as he suggests throughout the WA, it is not enough simply to articulate the foundation 
of time as the "self-sustaining essence." For if we do not understand how "ground" begets 
time, we fail to understand why the eternal essence posits itself, which is problematic 
inasmuch as it returns us to the difficulty of why God would ever leave his blissful non-
being to emerge into existence. Thus, we must understand how "ground" begets time in 
order to make sense of reality on the whole (i.e. the world). Schelling, here, is drawing 
our attention to the fact that it is not readily apparent to us how "ground" operates. The 
phenomenalization of time and being is not immanently inferable from its nature as 
unconditioned. Conversely, for us to understand how time and being [Wesen] come into 
existence means we have to undertake the task of investigating "ground" qua its status as 
their a priori, i.e. what Schelling refers to as "The Past," God's life before he stepped into 
existence.236 Schelling's conception of time intimates how it is possible for divinity to 
have a "past." Time begins when God is conscious of having put something behind 
                                                          
234 "It is a founding and principle rule of science (though few know it) that what is posited once is posited 
forever and cannot be sublated again, since otherwise it might just as well not have been posited at all. If 
one does not remain steadfastly by what one has posited, then everything will become fluid as it progresses, 
and everything will wear away again, so that in the end nothing really was posited. True progress, which is 
equivalent to an elevation, takes place only when something is posited permanently and immutably and 
becomes the ground of elevation and progression." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 135) 
235 One might rephrase the question in the following manner: "how does 'ground' ground something else? 
236 To be clear, I am holding onto the distinction Schelling makes between "The Past," which is God's life 
prior to his positing himself, and the created past, which is this same a priori after God has revealed 
himself and posited it as a genuine past. Nothing for Schelling is sublated, and so the a priori of time 
becomes the negated - but not sublated - ground of the created present. (I mean "negated but not sublated" 
in the sense that, when God emerges into exists, he affirms his negativity as the condition for the possibility 
of his outgrowing that negativity - i.e. in the biblical sense, God must take on sin and death in order to 
emerge victorious over them.) Hence, the reason why Schelling refers to the created past as an eternal past. 
He is arguing that there is an aspect of the divine essence which is always already past, and thus, which 
eternally grounds God's emergence into existence. 
73 
 
himself, meaning past and present are created simultaneously.237 More importantly, 
though, it suggests that this created past, what God "puts behind himself," was once not 
behind him at all, but rather very much the world he inhabited.238 The question, then, is 
what such a world was like for God, what his non-existence was like before he decided to 
abandon it. As we will learn, it is not a world which perhaps we are expecting, a world 
made of "pure love and goodness," but rather a world defined by confusion, longing, and 
suffering, a world, in other words, defined by crisis. 
2 
Preliminary Objections: The Absence of Concrete Examples 
 Consistent with many of his other works, Schelling offers little in terms of 
concrete examples to illustrate how this conception of time applies to individual 
organisms. Why does he do this? If his goal is to explain becoming, why, then, does he 
not offer examples which illustrate his points? Schelling's attention in the WA is directed 
clearly on the metaphysical conditions of existence, which explains, in part, the intensely 
abstract nature of the text. However, this does not take away from the perfectly 
reasonable request by the reader that Schelling offer specific instances which illustrate 
how "ground" operates, both in us, and in other things. While I am sympathetic to this 
                                                          
237 "Only the man with the strength to rise above himself is able to create a true past; he alone can savor a 
true present, just as he alone looks forward to a genuine future; these considerations already seem to reveal 
that the contrast between times is founded on an increase and is not produced by time-parts flowing 
continuously into each other." (the WA, 1813 edition,  pg. 120). The "increase" in question refers to the fact 
that neither the past nor present is reducible to the other. Instead, time is "organic" insofar as it is comprised 
of different time parts (i.e. freedom and necessity) each of which plays a distinct role in the generation of 
the decision which "grounds" time.  
238 "For even when it arrives at the last visible thing, spirit still finds a presupposition that is not grounded 
in itself, a presupposition that indicates a time when there was nothing but the one, inscrutable self-
sustaining essence, from whose depths all has come forth. Furthermore, if this is considered in the proper 
spirit [recht im Geiste], new abysses would be discovered in it as well. It would not be without a kind of 
horror that spirit would finally recognize that even in the primordial essence itself something had to be 
posited as a past before the present time became possible, and that is precisely this past that is borne by the 
present creation, and that still remains fundamentally concealed." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 122) 
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concern, I also believe there is good reason not to jump to the conclusion that this is a 
blind spot in Schelling's analysis. First, there is the issue of the WA's incompleteness; 
based on Schelling's ambitious plans for the WA, it is unclear whether or not he intended 
to discuss becoming more concretely in the other books - one could imagine he was 
saving this discussion for the second book, "The Present." Furthermore, there is the 
nature of becoming itself, which, as Schelling believes, has the character of 
individualizing the subject beyond what is objectively intelligible (i.e. what is intelligible 
to other organisms). Indeed, all becoming has the character of self-affirmation through 
the positing of difference, but since that difference varies from organism to organism, the 
organism's becoming is intelligible only by tracing its specific history. This condition is 
especially problematic for historians insofar as it presupposes their capacity to recreate 
the organism's past lived experience, by which I mean not only the ability to create the 
moments leading up to the organism's transformation, but also the ability to experience 
those moments first-hand, from the perspective of the organism undergoing the 
change.239 Of course, this is impossible for the historian, which explains why Schelling's 
example of the plant from his philosophy of nature - and which makes a brief appearance 
in the opening pages of the WA -  is so generic, since to understand why the plant 
becomes any particular kind of plant would be to understand, from the perspective of the 
plant, all the different forms of difference it has interacted with over the course of its 
existence. Thus, when compared with all other living things, Schelling argues that each 
organism holds the strongest potential of understanding its own history, an insight which 
                                                          
239 In his unpublished manuscript on the WA, "Schelling and the Crisis of History," Jay Lampert raises the 
following point. "If historical events are to transcend their origins nature, we humans are going to have to 
do the work. Humans must separate themselves from their natural past in order to have histories they can 
call their own, and from now on, the historian's task is to re-live these separations." (pg. 11) 
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surely anticipates Kierkegaard's portrait of the knight of faith. In the same way that only 
Abraham understands why he attempted to sacrifice Isaac, for Schelling, only God 
understands why he created the world. Indeed, each subject is best suited to understand 
why he acted because each is the one that lived that moment he acted. However, we have 
to be careful, since even to say that Abraham or God understands why he acted is a 
stretch, since no one understands completely the ultimate "ground" of his actions. 
Instead, as it pertains to the original act of creation, we have to imagine what God was 
feeling in those moments before he acted, what insight he had become privy to which was 
indeed groundless, yet nonetheless compelling enough to prompt his emergence into 
existence.240   
 When it comes to the lack of concrete examples, a similar point is implied in 
Schelling's claim that the past shrouds itself in "dark night."241 Herein Schelling is 
referring to the past before it becomes real as past, by which he means the past before it 
becomes real as the ground of the present. Indeed, the past is what is known, however, it 
only becomes known as past after it gives birth to difference. In the meantime, before 
this happens, before the decision, its future as ground is only intimated.242 For Schelling, 
                                                          
240 Undoubtedly, it will sound strange to treat non-human organisms in time as having a cognition that 
motivates that their activity, and, to be sure, Schelling himself is not arguing that non-human organisms 
share in our capacity to reason. For that reason, it is crucial that we keep in mind that "ground" refers to the 
intermediary between thought and being, what I am referring to as a primordial feeling or sensitivity. To 
say that non-human organisms share in this sensitivity is not only more consistent with Schelling's 
metaphysics, but less controversial, since it coincides with our belief in non-human organisms as having a 
certain dignity, since the fact that these are beings which can feel like us is indeed part of the reason why 
we extend them certain rights.         
241 "As with the coming time, God shrouds the point of departure for the past beginning in dark night." (the 
WA, 1815 edition, pg. 3) 
242 "The past is known, the present is discerned, the future is intimated." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxv). 
God's past has a future in the sense that it serves as the condition for the possibility of God's self-
consciousness. In enduring the difficulties brought on by the vortex of the drives, God's confusion, rooted 
in his desire to exist - of which he is only vaguely conscious - gives way to the self-knowledge that God 
himself desires to distinguish him from the chaos of the drives. In other words, by enduring a time in which 
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this puts the historian at a disadvantage when it comes to understanding the past, for, if in 
the moment before the past becomes real as ground, the historian can intimate only that it 
will become so, then after the past becomes real as ground, he can know only that it is the 
ground of the present, and not why it became real as ground. In other words, because 
becoming is always a result of freedom, there is a contingent element carried through the 
process which remains inscrutable even after the past is fully realized as ground.243 Thus, 
the departure of things remains in "dark night" because the decision to actualize the past 
is intelligible only to the subject who was free to make the decision in the first place.244 
For the historian, this means that there is a clear limit to his understanding of history, 
since he can understand only those past events that he himself lived through. This does 
not mean, of course, that he cannot have knowledge of others' pasts, simply that he 
cannot understand others' past events in terms of their "ground" since it is not objectively 
expressed. Combined with the fact that Schelling believes the process of becoming is the 
absolute itself, and, thus, eternal, it is easy to understand why he offers so little in terms 
of historical examples. Because becoming generates itself from itself, its purpose, and, 
thus, its meaning, is strictly internal to itself, meaning that its justification is not 
universally accessible. The result is that the WA is an attempt to shift the discourse on 
time away from the historical approach of trying to explain why events in the past have 
happened to an investigation of how each of us, as individual subjects, matures in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
he was his own negativity, it becomes clear to God that he wishes to distinguish himself from that 
negativity.    
243 This is an issue which Jay Lampert addresses in his unpublished manuscript on the WA, "Schelling and 
the Crisis of History." He writes: "But as yet we have no explanation of how history can both contract and 
expand, other than that these two moments alternate. As Persia fades, Greece prepares to shine. As Greece 
shines and fades, Rome prepares to shine. Where it will all end? What is the point of history, and what is 
the point of being a historian? Small wonder that Schelling does not bother with examples. What good 
would it do to bring a single date in history to light, if it's before and after remain dark?" (pg. 10) 
244 By "departure" in this instance, we are referring to the "ground" of the absolute's self-consciousness 
which simultaneously motivates the absolute's decision to exist. 
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right way. Put differently, it is an attempt to reformulate questions about time as 
questions about meaning, which clearly draws Schelling in dialogue with the 
existentialists. To focus on specific examples from the past is to approach time as if it has 
a ground beyond itself, as if to say its meaning is simply a means to an end. While on the 
contrary, to acknowledge time as "ground" is to see the process of becoming as itself 
meaningful, apart from whether or not it achieves a particular, final end.    
3 
"Ground" as the Unity of Essence and Existence 
 Understanding how "ground" operates as the producer of time means 
acknowledging its status as the link between essence and existence. I am reminded of 
Saint Anselm's famous ontological proof for God's existence in which he argues for the 
reality of God based on the idea of him as "that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-
conceived." Kant famously repudiates this argument on the basis that "essence does not 
imply existence" - to which Schelling himself would most definitely concur.245 However, 
whereas Kant appears to want to jettison Anselm's proof altogether, Schelling's notion of 
the unconditioned seeks a middle ground between the two in which God's existence is 
neither reducible to his essence nor totally unrelated to it. For him, the truth in the 
dialogue between Anselm and Kant lays somewhere between Anselm's assertion of the 
logical necessity of God's existence and Kant's acknowledgment concerning the 
impossibility of ideas qua ideas to condition things. God himself must step into time per 
his status as the unconditioned, and yet, for Schelling, the necessity which grounds this 
                                                          
245 To be charitable to Kant, Schelling acknowledges his (i.e. Kant's) notion that the intelligible essence of 
things must be expressed in order to be understood.  However, this returns us to the difficulty Schelling 
identifies in his philosophy of nature regarding the First Critique. How are undetermined essences (i.e. 
things-in-themselves)  represented to us as determined? (Freedom Essay, pg. 258) 
78 
 
event is not a logical one - that is, a necessity grounded solely in God's essence - but 
rather a distinctly "higher" one in which God's essence and his existence (i.e. what he is 
actu) coincide. This is the reason why Anselm's proof leaves Kant so dissatisfied. While 
conceptually, it correctly identifies the necessity eliciting God's positing himself, it fails 
to explain how God actually comes into existence. God's existence is not deducible from 
his essence; conversely, to understand his beginning is to acknowledge the synthetic 
principle in which God's essence and existence, his freedom and necessity, are already 
combined. In the context of the WA, this synthetic principle determines Schelling's 
philosophy of time. It is the third term in which time and the essence of eternity, i.e. the 
motion of becoming and the stillness of forever,  are dynamically pitted against each 
other. 
 Consistent with his notion of time as the product of different "times," Schelling 
argues that time reveals itself to us as a contradiction, as a unity of twin forces that are 
equally active, but mutually opposed: "whoever takes time only as it presents itself feels a 
conflict of two principles in it; one strives forward, driving toward development, and one 
holds back, inhibiting [hemmend] and striving against development."246 Minus either 
principle - or in the event that one principle overcomes the other - our experience of time 
is inconceivable. Without a principle of expansion, the world would never emerge from 
eternal rest, and without a principle of contraction, the development we witness 
gradually, over successive moments, would occur uninterrupted in a single flash - so the 
principles must be equally active in one and the same essence.247 For Schelling, this 
                                                          
246 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 123) 
247 "If this other principle were to provide no resistance, then there would be no time, because development 
would occur in an uninterrupted flash rather than successively; yet if the other principle were not constantly 
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means that antithesis "is not only possible but in fact necessary," and that the principles 
which constitute the opposition double as the authentic inner principles of all living 
things.248 Schelling also articulates this antithesis with respect to the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Just as time is produced through the interaction of 
contracting and expanding forces [Kraft], everything that is, he says, "wants to be in itself 
and out of itself at the same time."249 It wants to be in itself inasmuch as it seeks to posit 
and collect itself as subject, and it wants to be out of itself inasmuch as it "desires to be 
what it is in itself once more, and hence externally." 250 These are Schelling's definitions 
for the terms "subject" and "object," what is translated in the second draft of the WA as 
"what-is" [als Seyendes] and "being" [Seyn] respectively. "Being" and "what-is" are 
Schelling's terms for the real and the ideal respectively, and his description of them in 
terms of the forces of contraction and expansion gives us insight into how each of them 
supports the other. Subjectivity - or the ideal - is something's essence, and so is the 
principle of contraction inasmuch as it constitutes an organism's striving to collect itself 
into an undifferentiated whole, whereas objectivity - or the real - is something's desire to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
overcome by the first, there would be absolute rest, death, standstill and hence there would again be no 
time. But if we consider both of these principles to be equally active in one and the same essence, we will 
have contradiction straight away." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 123) 
248 "Thus, the principles we perceive in time are the authentic inner principles of all life, and contradiction 
is not only possible but in fact necessary." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 124) 
249 "It is necessary to conceive of these principles in everything that is - indeed, in being [Seyn] itself. Every 
entity, everything that is, wants to be in itself and out of itself at the same time." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 
123) 
250 "It wants to be in itself inasmuch as it posits or collects itself together as what-is [als Seyendes], as a 
subject; to this extent it opposes development and expansion. It wants to be out of itself inasmuch as it 
desires to be what it is in itself once more, and hence externally. In the first case it is something withdrawn 
by itself, which sets itself in opposition to what is outside of itself; but it sets itself in opposition only in 
order to reveal and declare itself against this outside as what it is in itself. It cannot, therefore, remain in 
this withdrawn condition. Likewise with being. For considered purely as such, being is selfless and 
completely immersed in itself. But on precisely this account, being draws its opposite into itself and is a 
constant thirst for essence [Wesenheit], a yearning to attract what-is, or to attract a subject [Subjekt], so that 
by means of this subject it might step forth from a state of mere potentiality into activity. But when being is 
considered as already active [wirkendes], as a being that is also again by itself, then it is necessarily already 
accompanied by a thing-that-is [ein Seyendes]; and this conflicts with the being, with what is based entirely 
in itself." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 123-124)  
80 
 
externalize itself, and so is a form of expansion inasmuch as it constitutes the organism's 
striving to express itself.251 "Essence" and the "desire for externalization," these are 
highly abstract concepts in their own right, and thus, not immediately revelatory of 
Schelling's fundamental insight; correlatively, I think the key to understanding this 
section of the text is to keep in mind the reference point to which the entirety of 
Schelling's philosophy continually returns, namely, the organic nature of reality, or, more 
specifically, the reality of living things. 252 What is real, for Schelling, are organisms - 
unities of subject and object - not subjectivity and objectivity independently, so while 
both are constitutive of the real, each only becomes real in conjunction with the other. 
That is what we observed in our survey of Schelling's philosophy of nature, and it is what 
we observe now in his conception of time. Without the principle of contraction providing 
resistance, holding back the principle of expansion from exponential growth, the 
principle of expansion would not be real for us, and likewise, if the principle expansion 
did not continually overcome the recalcitrance of its antipode, the principle of contraction 
would not be real for us. Correspondingly, the two become real only inasmuch as they are 
joined together in the unity constitutive of each successive moment. Schelling believes 
the same can be said about "being," and "what-is." Without "being" (i.e. the desire for 
externalization), essence would never break free to express itself, and without "what-is" 
                                                          
251 As Judith Norman writes in the introduction to her translation of the Weltalter, "Schelling uses the 
dichotomy between being and what-is to denote the opposing forces in all existence. We might (with some 
qualifications) associate the term "being" with the real, or, alternatively, with the notion of objectivity; 
'what-is' would then be paired with the ideal, or, alternatively, subjectivity. But it would be far more 
accurate to say that being and what-is relate to each other as real and ideal under certain circumstances. 
Schelling also discusses the being/what-is dichotomy in terms of negative and positive forces, where the 
negating force can, under certain circumstances, come to ground the positive force. It is essential to keep in 
mind that being and what-is are not separable; they are more like two aspects of the same thing." (the WA, 
1813 edition, , pg. 109-110)  
252 The desire for externalization is God's "existence" contained in him prior to the decision insofar as it is 
the condition for the possibility of the revelation of his essence. 
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(i.e. essence), objectivity would have nothing of its own to express. As a result, the two 
become real only to the extent that they are joined together in the unity constitutive of 
each living thing - an "essence" which is externalized. 
 Implicit in this notion of time is the notion of eternity as its ground, for though 
time is composed of antipodes, that this opposition is real is for us is possible only 
inasmuch as they occur in the same locus.253 That is what Schelling means when he 
argues that contraction and expansion - what-is and being - become real only through 
each other. Each force grounds the other, and so the fact that they are real for us 
presupposes that they already stand in relation - and, thus, points to a "ground" in which 
they are already operative. Schelling provides a logical account of this grounded relation. 
That time is a contradiction allows us to claim that "subject is object" and" object is 
subject." But what is the copula in this judgment? Not what we might think initially, says 
Schelling, for "the link (the 'is') in the judgment is not merely a component part of the 
judgment, but lies at the ground of all the other parts."254 Judgments affirm the oneness 
[Einerleyheit] of the connector, not the elements which it connects (i.e. "what-is" and 
"being"), so when we say that "subject is object" or "object is subject" we are not saying 
that objectivity and subjectivity are themselves identical - as if to suggest that no 
difference exists between them -  but rather that "that which is subject" is one with "that 
which is object," that the one which expresses itself as "what-is" is also the one which 
                                                          
253 For Schelling, this locus is the absolute subject i.e. God. 
254 "There are those who understand the proposition: 'one and the same thing is both what-is as well as 
being' in reverse, as if what-is and being were themselves one thing. Such people show themselves ignorant 
of the first laws of all judging. Even the careless locution 'the subject is the object and the object is the 
subject' may not be understood in reverse. For no judgment at all, not even a proposition that is merely 
repeated, will affirm a oneness of the expressed (the connected) as such. Rather, it will only affirm the 
oneness of what expresses (connects) them, regardless of whether this actually becomes evident as such, or 
is hidden, or is in fact only imagined." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 129) 
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expresses itself as "being."255 In other words, we are demonstrating the presupposition of 
a third term - (i.e. "ground") - in which subject and object are already united. This third 
term is the mediator concealed in the copula of the judgment, which functions as the 
condition for its possibility. Schelling explores this truth in terms of the transitive 
property in logic.256 What enables me to say that "A = -A" is precisely the existence of 
some "C" in which A and -A are already united. Likewise, for us to say that time is a 
contradiction - and, thus, that "being is what-is" -  relies on the existence of a ground in 
which being and what-is are already combined. That is what Schelling intends when he 
argues that judgments are shorthand versions of syllogistic arguments,257 for my ability to 
claim that "A= -A" necessarily presupposes the truthfulness of two other statements, "A = 
C" and "-A = C," and so, by extension, a ground in which A and -A are already united. It 
follows, then, that when we are discussing time as a contradiction, we have three terms, 
"that which expresses itself as what-is," "that which expresses itself as being," and their 
unity - "that which expresses itself as both being and what-is" - which grounds the 
existence of the other two.  
 In terms of our experience, this ground manifests itself as the "presentiment" of 
eternity towards which all motion in time is directed.258 By "presentiment" in this 
                                                          
255 "The true sense of each judgment - for example, that 'A is B' - can only be the following: That which is 
= A IS THAT which is = B, or: THAT which is A and THAT which B are as one." (Emphasis is 
Schelling's, the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 129) 
256 "The proposition cited above ["A is B"] in fact contains three propositions: first, A is = X; second B is = 
X; and only from these follows a third, A and B are the same - to wit, both are the same X." (the WA, 1813 
edition, pg. 130) 
257 "From this it follows further that the judgment is already performed in the simple concept and the 
syllogism is already contained in the judgment; consequently, a concept is only a wrapped-up judgment and 
a syllogism is an unfolded judgment." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 130) 
258 "But since contradiction appears to be necessary, why is it so intolerable to all life such that nothing 
wants to persist in it but immediately strives to tear itself away? In truth, this would be unintelligible if non-
contradiction were not behind all life like a permanent background, as it were, and if all living things were 
not attended by an immediate presentiment of this background, driving them to demand a return into it. 
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context, Schelling means the background of time towards which all living things are 
striving to return.259 Schelling testifies to this relation in man inasmuch as the antithesis 
of time leaves him feeling anxious and desperate to stave it off: "Men seem to abhor 
nothing quite so much as contradiction...when the contradictory nature of their situation 
can finally be concealed no longer, they still seek to cover it over and are blindly driven 
to delay the moment when action is demanded as a matter of life and death."260 
Everything seeks the consistency and the restfulness of eternity, so when faced with the 
contradiction of his situation, man takes every means necessary to avoid dealing with it 
directly. It is as if the notion is so counterintuitive to him, so unnatural to his self-
concept, that the prospect that it might be true necessarily prompts a reaction from him, a 
reaction to explain away what could only be a conflation of the truth. Schelling associates 
this attitude with our desire for knowledge on the whole, and especially with science's 
insistence on (the law of) non-contradiction.261 Such a decree is itself contradictory 
inasmuch as it purports to convey a universal truth about something that is supposedly 
not real. As Schelling himself questions, "how could that axiom hold good - that is, prove 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Indeed, unless such a unity of contradiction and non-contradiction were acting through all things, 
contradiction itself would be unintelligible." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 125) 
259 "If we recognize contradiction, then we also recognize non-contradiction. If the former is motion in 
time, then non-contradiction is the essence of eternity. Indeed, if all of life is truly only a movement to raise 
itself up from contradiction, then time itself is nothing but a constant yearning for eternity. And if non-
contradiction persists forever behind all contradiction, then it follows that something always persists behind 
and above all time that is not itself in time." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 125) 
260 "Men seem to abhor nothing quite so much as contradiction, when it is revealed to them and compels 
them to action. When the contradictory nature of their situation can finally be concealed no longer, they 
still seek to cover it over and are blindly driven to delay the moment when action is demanded as a matter 
of life and death." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 124) 
261 "Just as men will want to stave off contradiction as much as possible in life, they seek an equal degree of 




itself true - when contradiction was indeed nowhere to be found?"262 I cannot speak 
axiomatically about something that is not; correlatively, for science to insist on holding 
on to such a law speaks not to the fact that contradiction is indeed nothing, but rather, that 
it is something real for us, something that we are continually forced to confront and 
acknowledge - otherwise, why would anyone feel the need to address the issue in the first 
place? In other words, such an inclination points to the fact that contradiction constantly 
surrounds us and that we find it intolerable. As Schelling writes, "contradiction is in fact 
the venom of all life, and all vital motion is nothing but the attempt to overcome this 
poisoning. Therein lies the reason why, as an old book says, all works that are done under 
the sun are full of vexation, the sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, only to rise up 
and go down again, and all things are full of labor yet do not tire, and all forces 
ceaselessly labor and struggle against each other."263 This notion, namely, that the 
antithetical nature of time in us drives us to take action, is one which we will observe 
repeatedly in the WA, particularly with respect to God inasmuch as it drives him to create 
the world. However, at this specific juncture, we are not in a position to articulate that 
insight in great depth. Instead, what is crucial at this point - and what Schelling seeks to 
convey in these early pages of the WA - is that our experience of time, though 
contradictory, has eternity as its permanent background, and so is defined as a larger 
unity comprised of contradiction and non-contradiction. 
 That our situation is indeed a unity of contradiction and non-contradiction - the 
former being motion in time, the latter, the essence of eternity - immediately raises the 
                                                          
262 "But how could a law be laid down concerning something that could never in any way be real? Or, how 
could that axiom hold good - that is, prove itself true - when contradiction was indeed nowhere to be 
found?" (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 124) 
263 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 124) 
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question as to their true relation. How is that time and eternity are connected? Are we to 
assume that eternity, as the permanent background of time, is its cause, and thus, the 
higher of the two? We have reason to be suspicion of this conception inasmuch as it fails 
to address how time, as the antithesis of subject and object, is produced from the 
reconciliation of these components.264 For eternity is essentially the identity of subject 
and object, not their antithesis, and even though subject and object are indeed opposites 
of each other, this opposition is not real unless the two are expressed. But eternity cannot 
express this opposition unless we admit that it is not, strictly speaking, the identity of 
subject and object - thus, seemingly implying a contradiction - and so we must admit the 
possibility of a third-term which joins together the essence of eternity and time (i.e. non-
contradiction and contradiction), lest our experience of time becomes inconceivable. For 
how could the essence of eternity (i.e. that it is both being and what-is) qua its essence 
cause the difference we perceive in time between the forces of expansion and 
contraction? Would this not, in fact, result in a contradiction? This is the problem we 
articulated earlier with respect to the divine essence stepping into time. The non-
contradictory essence of eternity prohibits any causation of difference, and so prohibits 
the causation of contradiction that is elemental to our experience of time. Consequently, 
the only plausible explanation for the existence of time, and thus the emergence of the 
divine essence into existence is a "ground" in which these two elements - contradiction 
and non-contradiction - are already united.  
                                                          
264 "According to the first concept, it is thus what-is, and it is being, but it is not that which is both; or, to 
say the same thing, it is not as that which is both. It can only be as that which is both to the extent that it 
posits itself as the expressing of both - that is, to the extent that it actually expresses them. But if it posits 
itself as the expressing of both, does it actually express them? This is in no way entailed by the first 
concept." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 126) 
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 This rejoinder between the opposition in time and the essence of eternity is none 
other than the living unity of God himself, what Schelling alternatively refers to as the 
"unconditioned." As he defines it, the unconditioned is "the essence that is from itself and 
comes out of itself, whose nature consists in an eternal positing-of-self or affirming."265 
In other words, the unconditioned causes itself, and so is not a cause per se, but rather 
both cause and effect simultaneously - or, both cause and effect equally.266 We have 
already observed this relation in Schelling's philosophy of nature through his exposition 
of the concept of "ground." All organisms are comprised of parts, and these parts come 
together to produce a whole, but the whole and its parts mutually presuppose each other, 
so the unity between the two cannot be reduced to either one, but instead, must be 
established through a positive third. This positive third, in which the whole and its parts 
are presuppositionally combined, forms the a priori ground of the organism (i.e. the 
concept of its organization); however, this a priori is sustained only by its externalization 
in the organism, so the very fact of its reality implies that it is always in the process of 
                                                          
265 "Indeed, the Highest even seems necessarily to be both a thing-that-is and a being. For the Eternal must 
at the same time be the unconditioned. But what is the unconditioned? It is the essence that is from itself 
and comes out of itself, whose nature consists in an eternal positing-of-self or affirming. Accordingly, it 
can only be thought as what posits and what is posted at the same time, as what-is, and as being from itself 
alone. How is this contradiction to be resolved?" (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 125) 
266 "The unconditioned is thus what-is, and it is being, although before now without its will. Moreover, 
there is nothing that would awaken its will actually to be both, to express itself as the one of both; for what-
is differs quite distinctly from being, although the two are not outside of each other. Or, since the 
unconditioned is at the same time what posits and what is posited by itself, should we perhaps imagine that 
one part of it is what posits, and another part is what is posited? It is impossible that one part of it be 
exclusively what posits; for then it would, as what posits, not itself be posited. It is just as impossible that 
another part be exclusively what is posited; for then it would, as such, not be what posits - in other words, it 
would be conditioned in one part and hence would not be the absolutely unconditioned. Thus, no option 
remains but that it is both of these in a whole and undivided manner, and what, as what-is and as being, it is 
not two different essence, but rather only one essence in two different forms. If the opposites are joined 
together, and there is nothing able to separate them out into an active duality, then this is not the sort of 
opposition that sets unity in motion, and therefore does not permit itself to be actually explained as such." 
(the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 126-127) 
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reproducing itself (i.e. causing itself). 267 That is what we observed previously in 
Schelling's example of the plant. The plant, as an objective relation of parts and a whole, 
strives to sustain its organization by taking in water, nutrients, and sunlight. However, in 
order for this to be possible, the plant must already be organized, which, in turn, is only 
true insofar as this organization is already being sustained. Thus, organization begets only 
itself, and so the very fact of its existence implies that it is indivisible and self-sustaining. 
With respect to our own discussion of time, this notion of the "unconditioned" helps 
clarify Schelling's position on how time itself began by establishing that its "ground" is 
one in which the unity and opposition of being and what-is is already combined. For 
though the contradiction of what-is and being necessarily presupposes the essence of 
eternity as its ground, and thus, the unity of being and what-is, it is just as inconceivable 
for this unity - manifest as the presentiment of non-contradiction - to cause the opposition 
between being and what-is - expansion and contraction - as it is for the latter to cause the 
former, and so the fact that both are real for us, necessarily presupposes a "ground" in 
which they are already united.  
4 
The Godhead: The Eternal Bliss of Freedom  
 Our experience of time as contradiction is inconceivable without the non-
contradiction of eternity as its backdrop, and yet it is impossible for non-contradiction 
qua non-contradiction to generate contradiction; so how, then, do the two stand in 
                                                          
267 "Now the cause is never the same as the effect; only between completely different things is a relation of 
cause and effect possible. But the organization produces itself, arises from itself; each particular plant is but 
a product of an individual of its own kind, and so each particular organization produces and reproduces 
only its own species into infinity." (Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature as an Introduction to the Study of This 
Science, pg. 190) 
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relation to each other? The answer, Schelling believes, follows from a reimagining of the 
nature of eternity itself, specifically in its capacity to express opposition. Borrowing from 
the work of Leibniz, Schelling acknowledges the fact that the principle of contradiction 
"only states that the expressing [das Aussprechende] (the essence of the copulas as one 
would have to say in the language of logic) can only be one..." but that this "does not 
prevent the expressed [das Ausgesprochene] from being Two that are opposed."268 The 
key term in this analysis is the "expressing" by which Schelling means the unconditioned. 
In the same way that one and the same thing is both form and matter - or in Leibniz's 
case, one and the same human being is both soul and body - one and the same "X" is both 
what-is and being, subject and object.269 To the extent that it actually expresses them, this 
"X" is both subject and object, "but to the extent that it is only their expressing - without 
taking into account the fact that it actually does express them - it is neither the one nor the 
other."270 In other words, the fact that time exists, and thus, so do subject and object, in 
no way implies a contradiction within eternity itself. Eternity, as the expressing of time, 
remains one even though what it expresses is indeed two. To be sure, this clarification of 
the principle of non-contradiction does indeed open the possibility for an understanding 
                                                          
268 "We wish to investigate this now, because it will help to clarify things further and is not unimportant for 
what follows. Properly understood, the principle of contradiction only states that the expressing (the 
essence of the copula, as one would have to say in the language of logic) can only be one. However, this 
does not prevent the expressed from being Two that are opposed." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 127)  
269 "Leibniz, following the Scholastics, had already remarked on the falsity of a rule that is nonetheless 
repeated to this day; [the rule states that] disparate things can neither be predicated of each other nor of a 
third thing. For, Leibniz claimed, could one not directly counter that the soul is a body and the body a soul? 
They are indeed the same, for what in one respect is body is in another respect soul. One = X is soul and 
body, which is to say one is the expressing of both, and to the extent that it actually expresses  them, it is 
actually both as well. But to the extent that it is only their expressing - without taking into account the fact 
that it actually does express them - it is neither the one or the other. The same holds true here. One and the 
same = X is the expressing of both, of what -is, and of being. As such, it is neither the one nor the other; it 
is therefore simply one. But if it actually expresses them both then it is both, though not as the expressing 
but rather with respect to the expressed, just as it was both before as well, not as the expressing but with 
respect to the expressible [dem Aussprechlichen]." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 127-128) 
270 See previous note. 
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of eternity that "grounds" time, but only under the added condition that, even though 
eternity is the unity of subject and object, it is not a unity in which their difference is 
sublated [aufhoeben]. This is possible for us inasmuch as we keep in mind that eternity is 
the "expressing" of time, and thus, that of which subject and object is "expressible" [das 
Aussprechliche].271 Herein Schelling makes a crucial distinction regarding the extent to 
which opposites can be asserted of something, reminding us that, though it is impossible 
for the same thing to both be and not be in the same respect simultaneously, it is not 
impossible for opposites to be simultaneously "expressible" of the same thing.272 We 
consistently observe this reality in ourselves, for though I cannot say that in one and the 
same deed I am both good and evil, and I can indeed say that right now I have the 
possibilities either to be good or evil. Contradiction ensues only when opposing elements 
are "equally active" in the same thing; accordingly, there is no contradiction in suggesting 
that I currently have the potential either to do good or evil because we are not referring to 
equally active elements within me, but rather elements which are both inert. As Schelling 
writes, "since we are removing the actual opposition, the misunderstanding might set in 
from the other side, as if we are sublating [aufhoeben] all duality, and that being and 
what-is were as one [einerley], not merely according to the expressing but entirely on 
their own. But two are always two, even when they are not posited explicitly as two."273 
                                                          
271 "Accordingly, there is no contradiction in the expressing as such. Would there still be contradiction in 
the expressible? (for we have not been speaking about the expressed). We do not wish to leave this matter 
uninvestigated either." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 128) 
272 "It is no doubt possible to conceive of contradiction in the expressed, but only when the contradictory 
elements are equally active...In the unity - presently under consideration - being and what-is, it is not even 
the case that one of these two is inactive; rather, both are inactive, for this is an inert opposition, or one in 
which the opposites are indifferent to each other. They are present only as expressible, not even as actually 
expressed. For this reason, the principle of contradiction does not come into question; its application begins 
only when this unity comes to an end." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 128-129) 
273 Continued: "We can think of an eye, which in all respects is both the power of seeing and the instrument 
for seeing, both active and passive. Here are two things - power and instrument - that are nonetheless not as 
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This is the case with respect to the "ground" of time. As "ground" it is indeed both 
subject and object, and yet, as their expressing, subject and object are "expressible" of it, 
so their difference is not eliminated, just latent.274    
 This "ground," which makes possible the emergence of the divine essence into 
time, is none other than God's eternal freedom, his ability to choose between whether or 
not he comes into existence. The original question guiding this section - and the 
beginning of the WA as a whole - is the relation of time to eternity, but at its root, it is a 
question about metaphysics, in particular, the fundamental contingency of existence. 
"The essence of eternity" and "the contradiction of time," these are alternative terms for 
"nothingness" and "being" respectively, so in asking how the two relate, we are 
simultaneously asking about the relation of being and nothingness - how God could have 
ever abandoned the blissfulness of his own non-being to come into existence.275 Therein 
lies the true personhood of divinity, what Schelling means by the "unconditioned."276 
                                                                                                                                                                             
two, because they cannot be separated from each other or placed with each other in active opposition. Yet 
power and instrument are not themselves as one, but rather are eternally two. The present case is the same. 
We have what-is, and we have being, but the unity of the two is merely passive because the one that could 
express the unity does not actually express it and is itself not active. Thus, what-is and being are clearly not 
as two, although they are not for that matter as one; rather they are two by nature."(the WA, 1813 edition, 
pg. 129) 
274 "In the unity - presently under consideration - of being and what-is, it is not even the case that one of 
these two is inactive; rather, both are inactive, for this is an inert opposition, or one in which the opposites 
are indifferent to each other. They are present only as expressible, not even as actually expressed. For this 
reason, the principle of contradiction does not come into question; its application begins only when this 
unity comes to an end." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 129) 
275 "A thing that is free, not either to be something or not to be it, but rather to exist or not to exist - such a 
thing, by itself and with respect to its essence, can only be will. For only pure will is free to become active 
(that is, to exist) or to remain inactive (that is, not to exist). It alone is allowed to stand in the middle as it 
were, between being and non-being. Thus, that expressing which is free (with respect to its essence) to 
attend to or not to attend to opposition, to affirm or not to affirm itself as what-is and as being - this can 
only be pure, unmitigated will." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
276 "Just as the unconditioned is indeed both being and what-is, but not as that which is both being and 
what-is, likewise, the opposites are not opposites as such; they are, but not again as that which they are. 
They could only be opposites as such to the extent that they are expressed as such by that which is their 
expressing and their strength [i.e. "ground"], and which alone moves them to action." (the WA, 1813 
edition, pg. 127) 
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What we need, then, is an intermediate term between being and nothingness, for it is just 
as inconceivable how God could have emerged from the nirvana of his indivisible 
essence as it is to think that being has no ground. Thus, Schelling's understanding of the 
"unconditioned" is an admixture of two principles, the principle of sufficient reason and 
the principle of identity. By the principle of sufficient reason in this context, I mean the 
principle which holds that everything has a cause or reason for why it is the way it is - the 
German term for this principle is "the principle of ground" [der Satz vom Grund]. The 
ground of something necessarily has different properties from what it is the ground of, so 
when we talk about God as causa sui - and, thus, containing the ground of his own 
existence within himself, we mean that God necessarily contains a part of himself which 
is not himself actu (i.e. what he is once he steps in time, the opposition of subject and 
object). This "part" is the purity of his divine essence - his "nothingness" so to speak. It 
follows, then, that the real identity of God - and, thus, of the "unconditioned" - is the 
unity of being and non-being, a unity which bridges together the opposition between  
nothingness and actuality.277  
 Schematically, Schelling gives us the blueprint for this freedom constitutive of 
God's nature as "unconditioned." As the "expressing" of being and what-is, God is both 
being and what-is and yet still not being and what-is.278 He is both inasmuch as they are 
"expressible" of him, and yet still not inasmuch as he does not actually express them. In 
this way, God's nature as free belays a "ground" in which identity and difference are 
united, for though subject and object are "expressible" of him, and thus, necessarily 
                                                          
277 In this context, the divine essence is the unity of being and what-is while God himself actu is the 
opposition between being and what-is. 
278 "We can therefore say of this - which is supposed to express the opposition but does not - that it both is 
what-is as well as being, and yet is not [what-is and being]." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 131) 
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united, this unity per se is not expressed; and though their opposition must be within him 
insofar as he could express them, this opposition per se is only real inasmuch as he 
actually expresses them - and, thus, not real within him a priori, only latently.279 It 
follows, then, that the true nature of the divine is the unity which combines these two 
facets of God, which joins together the non-contradictory essence of eternity with the 
contradiction of time. For Schelling, this rejoinder can only be the enduring "ground" of 
God's freedom, his capacity to either express himself - and, thus, make real the opposition 
between what-is and being - or not express himself - and, thus, remain in his 
unadulterated unity. "The unconditioned can express itself as what-is and as being, and it 
can refrain from expressing itself as both; in other words, it can be both, or it can let both 
alone. Free will is just this ability to be something along with the ability to not-be it."280 
God contains all the conditions for existence within himself; the question is whether or 
not he chooses to act on them.281 We must keep in mind the systematic nature of 
Schelling's philosophy, which emphasizes the fact that "everything is in everything" so to 
speak, for though God is indeed both what-is and being, he is so in such a way that their 
opposition is not eliminated, and so God's essential choice is between "what-eternally-is" 
and "eternal being," his subjectivity and objectivity. To be sure, this claim seems 
counterintuitive given what Schelling himself says with respect to God's capacity to 
choose whether or not to express himself as both subject and object. But what are subject 
                                                          
279 "It [the unconditioned] is what-is and it is being, because there is a thing-that-is and there is being, and it 
could express these; or: it is what-is and it is being, with respect to the expressible, to the possible. it is not 
what-is, nor is it being with respect to itself or in deed, because it does not attend to the opposition. But if 
something does not attend to what it is, it is not actual. It can therefore be said without contradiction that 
the unconditioned is not what-is and it is not being, and yet it is not what-is-not, and it is not nonbeing." 
(the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 131) 
280 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
281 "Put most succinctly: the Highest can exist, and it can also not-exist; this is to say that it has all 
conditions of existence in itself, but what matters is whether or not it draws upon these conditions, whether 
it uses them as conditions." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
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and object? They are God's powers of negation and affirmation respectively, so together 
they constitute the choice God makes regarding whether or not to express himself. For 
God to choose what-eternally-is, his subjectivity, is for him to choose the nothingness of 
eternity, to negate himself - in other words, to be what he already in some sense is, 
namely, non-existent. Conversely, for him to choose eternal being, his objectivity, is for 
him to choose the contradiction of time, to affirm himself as unconditionally free - and, 
thus, as that which affirms and negates, as both subject and object. This is the in-between 
status where we find God "before" time, dwelling in the unconditioned possibility of his 
own choice to be or not to be. 
 Again, I recognize that this notion of a time "before" time is deeply 
counterintuitive. Especially for those who are familiar with Aristotle's argument about the 
logical impossibility of speaking in these terms, Schelling's articulation of a past in which 
the absolute preexists itself will seem all too difficult to digest. For that reason, I believe 
it is important to remember that time, for Schelling, is also the unconditioned, meaning it 
is not only created, but also that which creates, implying that it is always in the process of 
generating itself. Strictu sensu, then, no such time before time exists, since there was 
never a time when the absolute was not generating itself - nor a time when it will cease. 
Thus, when it comes to "The Past," it is more beneficial for us to think of this absolute as 
an eternally self-activating potency, with Schelling's intention  to understand conditions 
through which this potency eternally reignites itself to break through its own internal 
inertia directed towards non-being.     
 Though God's unconditioned freedom to decide whether or not he exists does 
provide us some context for understanding the beginning of time, it does not fully explain 
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how God actually came into existence. This is a difficulty of which Schelling himself is 
acutely aware, and which motivates much of the remainder of this portion of  the WA. 
God, as the freedom to choose whether or not he expresses himself is indeed will - for 
only the will "is allowed to stand in the middle as it were, between being and non-
being"282 - but a priori, that is, before he steps into time, he is tranquil will, 283 for he is 
the "expressing" of what-is and being, and thus, a priori does not attend to the opposition 
within himself. Dialectically, we see how this is true of God, for though the difference 
between subject and object is retained in him, a priori it is inert inasmuch subject and 
object are not equally active in him. It is the neutralization of this opposition which 
concerns Schelling, for while it does not gainsay the possibility of opposition in God - 
that God is an unadulterated unity, and, thus, could not express subject and object if he 
wanted to - it does indeed suggest that it is not real for him a priori. In the text, Schelling 
refers to this phenomenon as God's absolute indifference [Gleichgueltigkeit];284 God is 
indifferent to his own freedom, that he has the power to choose - and, in a certain sense, 
is always choosing - whether or not he exists.285 Subject and object are inactive for him, 
meaning there is no contradiction, and without contradiction, the choice to exist does not 
                                                          
282 "A thing that is free, not either to be something or not to be it, but rather to exist or not to exist - such a 
thing, by itself and with respect to its essence, can only be will. For only pure will is free to become active 
(that is, to exist) or to remain inactive (that is, not to exist). It alone is allowed to stand in the middle as it 
were, between being and non-being. Thus, that expressing which is free (with respect to its essence) to 
attend to or not to attend to opposition, to affirm or not to affirm itself as what-is and as being - this can 
only be pure, unmitigated will." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
283 "But to the extent that it refrains from opposition and does not actually express itself as what-is and as 
being - to that extent, it is not absolute will. But it certainly is will to the extent that it does not actually 
will, or is the tranquil will." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
284 "The opposition of what-is and being is thus present; but what could express it does not actually express 
it. The expressing is present as well, but it does not attend to the opposition; it is indifferent toward it. This 
indifference [Gleichgueltigkeit] that we have also considered elsewhere under the name of absolute 
Indifferenz [absolute Indifferenz] of subject and object, we call the absolutely First [das schlechthin 
Erste]." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 131) 
285 As a point of clarification, God is always choosing to exist or not exist, even when he is not yet 
conscious of his own desire and capacity to exist. Once God becomes aware of his capacity to choose to 
exist, then his choice to exist or not exist takes on the form of a decision insofar as it is made resolutely. 
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appear available to him. "Without contradiction there would be no life, no movement, no 
progress; a deadly slumber of all forces. Only contradiction drives us - indeed, forces us - 
to action."286 Schelling, here, is talking specifically about man, however, what he says is 
just as applicable with respect to God's unconditioned freedom. Without active 
opposition, and, thus, contradiction, it is inconceivable how God could become sensitive 
of his own power to be. I use the word "sensitive" in this context, because God, strictly 
speaking, does not yet exist.287 Thought, rationality, and consciousness, these are traits 
we associate with living things; however, at this juncture, we are talking about God as 
"unconditioned," - and, thus, what he "is" prior to himself actu - so these traits are not yet 
applicable to him. In any case, the inactivity of the opposition between subject and object 
remains a persistent problem for Schelling inasmuch God appears to suffer the fate of 
"Buridan's Donkey," which starved to death from its inability to discern the difference 
between equidistant, identical piles of hay.288 The lack of active opposition conceals from 
God the freedom constitutive of his power; but just like in the case of the donkey, a non-
decision is still a decision - God cannot not make a decision, even if he is unconscious of 
the choice he makes - and so, the "absence of a decision" from him results in his 
continued non-existence. In this way, according to Schelling, the absence of contradiction 
in God reduces him to a static, resting will, a will, in other words, "that wills nothing," 
                                                          
286 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 124) 
287 I am foreshadowing a claim of Schelling's which we will dive into more extensively in  chapter 3, 
namely, that the a priori of consciousness is the feeling of necessity or sensation. As John Watson writes in 
his 1882 commentary, Schelling's Transcendental Idealism, "[Schelling] begins at the point to which we 
have now come, by showing that the simplest form of consciousness must be the perception of a limit; and 
having done so, he draws attention to the fact that the immediate consciousness of a limit is identical with 
that stage of knowledge known as sensation." Watson, John. Schelling's Transcendental Idealism: A 
Critical Exposition. Chicago, IL: Forgotten Books, 2012  (pg. 115) 
288 "To be able to decide for A or - A without any motivating grounds would, to tell the truth, be but the 
prerogative to act entirely irrationally, and certainly would not distinguish man outstandingly from 
Buridan's famous beast, which, according to the opinion held by the defenders of this concept of volition, 
would have to starve between two equidistant haystacks of equal size and kind (because it does not have 
this prerogative of volition.)" (Freedom Essay, pg. 257)  
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despite retaining the option to do otherwise.289 To be sure, this will is necessarily "the 
Highest"290- what Schelling alternatively refers to as "the First" and "the Last"291 - for 
movement "never occurs for its own sake" and "requires rest as nourishment in order to 
sustain itself."292 However, by the same token,  it is also necessarily incapable of birthing 
time on its own, for though it has the conditions for existence within itself, it has no 
desire to express them. This is what Schelling means when he argues that such a will 
wills nothing; it "neither desires to become active nor craves any actuality,"293 and so 
negates what is external to it - i.e. what the will is not - in affirmation that it, as freedom, 
is complete and lacking nothing.294 We see how this is possible dialectically, for though 
God himself does indeed contain the opposition necessary for him to step into existence, 
this opposition is inactive, and so a priori is not real for him - not even as a lack to which 
                                                          
289 "Thus, we will now say that the unconditioned, the expressing of all essence, of everything that is and of 
all being - considered exclusively in itself - is pure will in general. But this same thing, with respect to its 
indifference toward what-is and toward being (or, to say the same thing, toward existence), this is precisely 
that [state of] non-contradiction for which we have been looking; it is the will that wills nothing." 
[Schelling's emphasis] (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 132) 
290 "To the common man who has never felt true freedom, the Highest always seems to be a thing-that-is or 
a subject. Thus, when he hears that what expresses the divine is neither a thing-that-is nor being, he asks: 
what could be thought above all being and everything that is? To this he answers: nothing, or something 
similar." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 133) 
291 "It is thus not the case, as if often said (as befits the restless essence of the time), that a deed, an 
unconditioned activity or action is the First. For the absolutely First can only be that which the absolutely 
Last can be as well. Only an immovable, divine - indeed, we would do better to say supradivine - 
indifference is absolutely First; it is the beginning that is also at the same time the end." (the WA, 1813 
edition, pg. 132) 
292 "If activity in general, or a particular deed or action were the First, then contradiction would be eternal. 
But movement never occurs for its own sake; all movement is only for the sake of rest. If all acting did not 
have the calm and restful will in the background, it would annihilate itself; for all movement seeks only 
rest, and rest is its nourishment or that from which alone it takes its power and sustains itself." (the WA, 
1813 edition, pg. 133) 
293 "It is indeed nothing, but in the say that pure freedom is nothing. It is nothing in the same way as the 
will that wills nothing, that desires no object, to which all things are equal, and which is therefore moved 
by none. Such a will is nothing, and yet it is everything. It is nothing to the extent that it neither desires to 
become active nor craves any actuality. It is everything, because all strength comes from it alone as the 
eternal freedom; because it has all things under it, and because it rules all things and is ruled by none." (the 
WA, 1813 edition, pg. 133) 
294 "Negation generally means very different things, depending on whether it is referred to the inside or the 
outside. For the highest negation in the last [i.e., outer] sense must be one with the highest affirmation in 
the first [inner sense]. What [has] everything in itself can for precisely that reason not have it at the same 
externally." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 133) 
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he desires to satisfy. Thus, while God does indeed have the conditions of existence 
insofar as he could will to exist, it is as if he does not have them at all inasmuch he does 
not attend to them - and, thus, exhibits no desire to take advantage of them.  
 The impossibility of freedom qua freedom to express time throws us back on 
Schelling's original question regarding how the divine essence steps into existence.295 
God is the "expressing" of the opposition between being and what-is and so necessarily 
retains that opposition within himself. Nevertheless, though this necessarily makes him 
free to choose whether or not he comes into existence, it in no way implies that he will 
actually do so. In fact, if we are discussing freedom in isolation - that is, divorced from 
necessity - it implies that God will never choose to exist, for though he has the conditions 
of existence within himself, he is not conscious of them a priori - and, thus, will never 
take advantage of them despite always retaining the right to do so. In this way, 
Schelling's discussion of God's freedom is analogous to his discussion about the essence 
of eternity. In the same way that eternity qua its essence cannot relinquish its status as 
non-contradiction to give birth to contradiction, freedom qua freedom cannot relinquish 
its status as satiated will to give birth to God's existence - as if it were in fact lacking 
something. If we remind ourselves that Schelling conceives of time and all living things 
as the product of being and what-is, a possible solution to his problem begins to emerge: 
being and what-is are opposing forces for him, meaning that their opposition is 
                                                          
295 "Now the great riddle of all times originates precisely here, the riddle of how anything could have come 
from what is neither externally active nor is anything in itself. And yet life did not remain in that state of 
immobility, and time is just as certain as eternity. Indeed, to the casual glance the latter even seems driven 
out by the former; a world full of movement, full of conflict and strain of all forces seems to have taken 
over the place where the highest indifference, eternal rest, and universal satiation once dwelt." (the WA, 
1813 edition, pg. 135) 
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simultaneously the source of their attraction.296 Schelling describes this relationship in 
terms of separated poles of a magnet, which exist "in a state of constant, unconscious 
longing, by virtue of which they strive to come to each other and would eagerly seize 
hold of any means available to reach each other."297 We see how such a paradigm is 
applicable to God's freedom inasmuch as God himself necessarily retains the potential to 
come into existence despite never actualizing it. To this effect, the conditions of God's 
existence are negated without being sublated, allowing them to become the source of 
God's deep, unconscious longing to express himself. This indeed is another reason why 
Schelling says that God qua freedom has the conditions of existence without having 
them. He has them, but in the sense of a lack to which he stands in relation, which is 
desire. Schelling is decidedly clear that freedom's longing at this juncture is very, very 
deep, so deep in fact that freedom itself is unconscious of it.298 Nevertheless, establishing 
it now gives us some context for what is about to come. The relationship between what-is 
and being which Schelling articulates as the contradiction of time is none other than the 
relationship within God between his freedom and necessity. Freedom is "what-eternally-
                                                          
296 "What-is does not oppose itself to being and does not recognize itself in being. Being is, for its part, 
perfectly indifferent toward what-is. But the more this composure is profoundly deep and intrinsically full 
of bliss, the sooner must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity, without eternity either helping or 
knowing. This is a longing to come to itself, to find and savor itself; it is an urge to become conscious of 
which Eternity itself does not become conscious." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 136) 
297 "We can imagine the separated poles of a magnet to be in a state of constant, unconscious longing, by 
virtue of which they strive to come to each other and would eagerly seize hold of any means available to 
reach each other. Similarly, we may imagine the eternal opposition [of being and what-is] to be in a state of 
mutual, unconscious longing and yearning for each other, although they do not know each other." (the WA, 
1813 edition, pg. 136) 
298 "We understand eternity to mean the whole: what-eternally-is [das ewige Seyende] and being, as well as 
the (still-concealed) expressing of both; as such, eternity is not conscious of itself. The opposites therefore 
cannot separate from each other, and for this reason cannot approach each other either. What-is does not 
oppose itself to being and does not recognize itself in being. Being is, for its part, perfectly indifferent 
toward what-is. But the more this composure is profoundly deep and intrinsically full of bliss, the sooner 
must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity, without either helping or knowing. This is a longing to come 
to itself, to find and savor itself; it is an urge to become conscious of which Eternity itself does not become 
conscious." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 136) 
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is," God's will not to exist, and yet it is a will which always carries with it the seed of 
attraction for its antipode. It is inactive by nature, but not permanently, for once it is 
brought in proximity with its opposite - God's necessity, his "eternal being," his will to 
exist - it will be awakened to the possibility of the world which he himself can fashion. 
The question that follows is what this antipode to God's freedom looks like and how it 
rouses freedom from its seemingly interminable slumber.   
5 
God's Necessity: The Torment of the Drives 
 If God's freedom is his will that wills nothing, his necessity is his will to become 
conscious of himself. Freedom qua freedom is indifferent to the opposition through which 
God can emerge into existence, however, the fact that there is indeed time means that 
God could have not remained in his blissful naiveté forever, so while God qua his 
freedom cannot produce time, simultaneously, he must still step into existence. This 
implies that God must always have been called to express himself, even if only on a 
subconscious level.299 Schelling describes this subconscious yearning in terms of our own 
experience of time in which we are routinely drawn back into the particular affairs of the 
everyday amidst even the most intense moments of contentment: 
 Who can unveil the secret birthplace of existence [Existenz]? Think! - have you 
 ever enjoyed those rare moments of such blissful and perfect fulfillment, when the 
 heart desires nothing, when you could wish these moments to remain eternally as 
 they are, and when they actually are like an eternity to you? Think of this and try 
 to remember how, in just such moments, a will is already at work producing itself, 
 although unbeknownst to you and without your effort - indeed, you could not 
 prevent this production. This will soon pulls you back to yourself; it tears you 
                                                          
299 "Since eternity is unconsciously impelled to seek itself, a self-sufficient will produces itself in eternity. 
Eternity is not conscious of this will, [whose production occurs] independently of it, and in a manner 
unintelligible to it." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg 137) 
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 way, back into the activities of life. Remember this, and you will have an 
 approximate picture of what we are presently undertaking to describe.300  
Recalling our previous discussion about God's freedom, eternity is that which has the 
conditions of existence within itself without actually having them - God's "I" before "it 
finds itself and feels itself."301 For Schelling, everything that is something (i.e. a "what-
is") without actually being it must by nature seek itself; accordingly, inasmuch as eternity 
satisfies this criteria, it too must contain within itself the desire to express itself. This 
desire is eternity's unconscious will through which it seeks itself.302 Schelling is 
particularly careful at this juncture to reassure us that a such a will is not produced by 
God's freedom - thus, implying that God's necessity is not reducible to his freedom. He 
says that this eternal will is independent from "what-eternally-is," producing itself, not 
"out" of eternity - and, thus, from some previous state of affairs - but rather, "in" eternity 
- and, thus, simultaneous with God's choice to be or not to be.303 God does not make this 
will, but finds it, and only once he finds it does it serve as a means for him "to externalize 
what lies innermost within him."  
 Admittedly, it still seems strange to talk about the absolute in such 
anthropomorphic tones, as if to suggest that the absolute had certain feelings which led to 
the creation of the world. But then again, for Schelling, that is the point, since the 
                                                          
300 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 136) 
301 "We simply cannot think about this in terms of becoming or beginning out of some preceding state of 
affairs, since before the will produced itself eternity was as nothing and hence could not actively precede 
anything else nor be the beginning of anything. Eternity was, but it was what your "I" was before it found 
itself and felt itself; it was, but as if it were not." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 137-138) 
302 According to Andrew Bowie, this is where Schelling most stridently distinguishes himself from Fichte. 
For Schelling, the free, conscious "I" is not the true beginning but instead the "unconscious activity" which 
precedes it. (pg. 57) 
303 "[This will] produces itself not out of eternity, but rather in eternity (which is no different from how a 
will unconsciously produces itself in a man's mind without his effort, a will that he does not make but only 
finds, and that only when found becomes a means for him to externalize what lies innermost within him.)" 
Emphasis is Schelling's (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 137) 
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immanent necessity of ideas makes a purely theoretical understanding of time 
inconceivable. For if we take seriously our intuition that becoming is real, then we have 
to begin thinking of time as the creation of a free subject, and not as the natural deduction 
of the eternal idea. This is the context in which I believe Schelling's argument about 
feelings is most compelling. To those who are inclined to believe that Schelling is 
speaking merely in a rhetorical fashion, or worse, that his language renders his 
metaphysics somehow less rigorous, I urge them to reconsider the extent to which 
thought alone motivates our actions. While it is sufficiently clear that thought plays a 
crucial role in our decision making, I venture to say that no one has ever been called to 
action by the pure concepts of logic. Everyone believes that "A = A" is true, but never 
has the possession of such knowledge motivated someone to go to war or fall in the 
love.304 A priori concepts or propositions, then, are unsuitable candidates for thinking 
about time because they do not ground becoming. On the contrary, the kind of 
deliberation which motivates us to act focuses on the world inside ourselves, which 
includes our goals and aspirations. Just as God must reflect on the world inside himself, 
so too are our decisions motivated by an understanding of our existential desires. Who do 
I want to become? That is the essential question of life, the one which gives it its 
meaning; and yet it has no rationally intelligible answer because it presupposes the 
contradiction that freedom yields to fate. For how could eternal freedom, in its infinite 
satiety and limitless potential, yield to a life constrained by the parameters of want? 
Certainly, it cannot do this on its own, which is why the ground of its actions resides 
                                                          
304 "For however highly we may value reason, we still do not believe, for example, that someone can be 
virtuous, or a hero, or a great man at all, by means of pure reason, nor even that the human race, as the 
well-known saying goes, will be propagated by it. Only in personality is there life; and all personality rests 
upon a dark ground, which, to be sure, must also be the ground of knowledge." (Freedom Essay, pg. 282) 
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beyond itself, since what "ground" enables is reason's yielding to unreason, prompting it 
to assume the fate which it has inherited, but which it is nonetheless free to reject. Thus, 
it is irrational for God to create the world, but in the same sense that it is irrational for one 
to marry a particular person, choose a career, or do anything else that has meaning. 
People make these commitments for "no reason" in the sense that the ground of their 
actions runs deeper than her rational justifications for doing so. This is not to say that 
there is no rational justification for their actions, simply that the "ground" of their 
decision runs deeper than those justifications. This is the case for God insofar as the idea 
of him is insufficient to guarantee his existence. For what this means for Schelling is that 
God's knowledge is not enough to guarantee the creation of the world, regardless of how 
perfect it is. On the contrary, for God to step into existence, his power to create must be 
prompted by another force which, metaphorically, is more "guttural" in nature, a force 
internal to him but nevertheless opposed to his understanding. This force, which 
Schelling refers to as the eternal will, makes possible God's decision to exist by arousing 
in him a desire to create which he does not fully comprehend.             
 God's necessity, his eternal will, is the beginning that "starts up the great process 
of the whole."305 In the 1815 draft of the WA, Schelling says that God "contracts" 
existence; the term "contracts" in this instance has a double meaning.306 God "contracts" 
existence in the same way that one contracts a disease, spontaneously, and not of his own 
                                                          
305 "The eternal will alone provides the initial point that starts up the great process of the whole. It posits 
itself as the mere willing of eternity, and to that extent as negated." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 138) 
306 "There is therefore no doubt that if a succession takes place among the primordial powers of life, only 
the power that contracts and represses the being can be the initiating power. What is first in God after the 
decision or, because we must assume that as having happened since all eternity (and as still always 
happening), what is altogether first in God, in the living God, the eternal beginning of itself in itself, is that 
God restricts, denies itself, withdraws its essence from the outside and retreats into itself." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 17) 
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choosing.307 However, he also "contracts" it in the sense that his process of stepping into 
existence starts with his desiring of eternity, and so begins, not with the affirmation of 
eternity, but with its negation.308 The key concept at work here is Schelling's notion of 
"beginnings," which stipulates that the beginning of something lays in its expressed 
negation and not some inactive point of departure: "precisely that which negates all 
revelation must be made the ground of revelation."309 A point, for example, is the 
beginning of a line, not because the point itself is extended, but because the point is the 
negation of all extension. Likewise, one is the beginning of all number, "not so much 
because it itself is a number but because it is the negation of all number, of all 
multiplicity."310 Something must recoil in order to grow further. Correlatively, for the 
divine essence to step into existence presupposes a ground in which this essence is 
negated, but not sublated - what Schelling frequently refers to as God's will toward 
eternity. Such a will is self-negating inasmuch as it posits itself as what-is-not and thus, 
as a yearning for essence, but by the same token, it also "generates" essence, for by 
recognizing itself as empty and in need of what-is, it simultaneously posits what-is 
outside itself, independent to itself and opposed to its nature.311 In other words, the self-
negation of God's will to eternity functions as  a line of demarcation which, in the 
                                                          
307 "However, because the essence of the ground can never engender true and perfect unity by itself, the 
time comes when all this glory dissolves, the beautiful body of the previous world decays as from a terrible 
disease, and finally chaos enters again." (Freedom Essay, pg. 254) 
308 "But the power of a beginning is only in wanting in general. For that which is wanted and therefore that 
which should actually be in accord with the intention is posited as that which does not have being precisely 
because it is that which is wanted...But wanting oneself and negating oneself as having being is one and the 
same thing." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
309 (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
310 "One is the beginning of all number, not so much because it itself is a number but because it is the 
negation of all number, of all multiplicity." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
311 "The will generates essence in the authentic sense of the term because essence was not essence as such 
before the will, and because the will does not posit essence within itself but rather outside of itself, as an 
essence distinct from it, free of it, indeed foreign and opposed to its nature. Since the will recognizes itself 
as not being what-is, and to that extent as what-is-not, it recognizes, by contrast, the essence, what affirms, 
as what - (authentically and in-itself) - is." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 139) 
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moment it posits the will as "what- (through itself)-is-not," simultaneously affirms what 
is outside the will as "what-(through itself)-is," as the "eternal good itself, as that which 
alone deserves to have being in itself."312 As a point of clarification, by "what-is-not," 
Schelling does not mean that the eternal will is indeed nothing, but rather that it is "what-
subjectively-is-not," and thus, "what-nonsubjectively-is."313 The eternal will contains 
what-is, but unlike what-subjectively-is, what-is is not its external aspect, and so while 
"what-subjectively-is-not" (i.e. God's objectivity) is indeed what-is, compared to "what-
subjectively-is, it is the contrary.   
 The contraction of eternity is the means which the eternal will sustains itself. By 
"eternity" in this context, Schelling means that the eternal will seeks God's freedom, 
specifically his absolute indifference.314 In the case of "what-eternally-is," God is both 
the identity and difference of being and what-is, leaving God with the choice of whether 
or not to exist; however, the opposition between God's will to affirm himself and his will 
not to affirm himself is negated without being sublated, and so while God retains the 
power to be, he is unconscious of that capability, thus rendering it inconceivable how he 
ever actualized it. An analogous, yet opposing set of circumstances unfolds here in the 
case of the eternal will. The eternal will is both the unity and difference of being and 
                                                          
312 "The will that produces itself through itself without the knowledge of eternity - this will is the first 
distant beginning toward a revelation [Offernbarung]. Without deliberation, driven by dark presentiment 
and longing, it posits itself as negated, as not being what-is. But it negates itself only in order to reach 
essence. In negating, it is thus immediately an eternal seeking and desiring of essence; and precisely in so 
desiring, it posits essence as in itself independent of it, as the eternal good itself, as that which alone 
deserves to have being in itself." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 143) 
313 "For how could that which is being and the force of being itself, be the nothing? Being, after all, must be 
itself. There is no mere being, nothing that is purely, vacuously objective in which there is nothing 
subjective. What-is-not is specifically what-subjectively-is-not; yet it is in fact what-nonsubjectively-is. It 
is only what-is-not in contrast to what-subjectively-is, since this latter has priority in terms of what-is;" (the 
WA, 1813 edition, pg. 142) 
314 "But the will seeks indifference [God's freedom] - or rather it longs for indifference with a presentiment 
that is not knowledge." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 143) 
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what-is, but whereas in the case of God's freedom the union of these components (i.e. the 
unity and difference of being and what-is) is privileged at the expense of their opposition, 
for the eternal will the opposition is privileged at the expense of their identity. 315 
Schelling articulates this state of affairs in terms of a self-sustaining vortex of drives in 
which God remains in a perpetual state of desire. Eternity negates itself, and in doing so, 
posits essence outside itself; however, what enables this antithesis to persist, and thus, the 
positing of these divergent "potencies" [Potenz],316 is the fact that each of them already 
stands in relation to the other. The eternal will desires essence inasmuch as it negates the 
latter, and essence is "that which has being such that it has being" only inasmuch as it 
represses the negating force within itself.317 Correlatively, though each potency is the 
opposite of the other, each is so only inasmuch as it is an inversion of the forces in its 
opposite. 318 This explains why Schelling suggests that these two potencies are "infinitely 
far from each other and infinitely near."319 They are far insofar as what is "affirmed and 
                                                          
315 "The contradiction is solved as follows. The opposites are one, which is to say that a unity of both is 
posited; here = A^3. But in spite of this, they are supposed to be actively opposed, or equally active as 
opposed. Since they cannot be opposed to the extent that they are in unity, they must at the same time be 
out of unity - that is, separated and each for itself. In other words, there is opposition as well as unity; 
opposition is free with respect to unity, and unity with respect to opposition; or unity and opposition are 
themselves in opposition. There is nothing contradictory here, for opposition in and of itself is not a 
contradiction. But if the unity of unity and opposition were posited, then contradiction would incontestably 
be found." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 146) 
316 (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 144) 
317 "In the first potency (in A = B), there was also something that had being (A). But this was posited here 
as not having being (as passive, as object). In accordance with the presupposition, that which is begot by it 
is posited as that which has being such that it has being [das Seyende als Seyendes]. It can in this way be 
called that which has being to the second power (we indicate it by A^2 in which now the negating power, 
B, disappears.)" Emphasis is Schelling's (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 18) 
318 "The primordial antithesis is given with these two potencies. yet the antithesis is not such that it is based 
on a completely reciprocal exclusion, but only as such that is based on an opposed relationship, on, so to 
speak, an inverted position of those first life forces." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 18) 
319 "What in the proceeding potency was the exterior, contracting, and negating, is itself, in the successive 
potency, the inner, contracted, and self-negated. And conversely, what was there inhibited is what is here 
free. They are infinitely far from each other and infinitely near. Far, because what is affirmed and manifest 
in one of them is posited in the other as negated and in the dark. near, because it only requires an inversion, 
a turning out of what was concealed an turning into what is manifest, in order to transpose and, so to speak, 
transform, the one into the other." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 18) 
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manifest" in one is negated in the other, but near "because it only requires an inversion, a 
turning out of what was concealed and a turning into what is manifest, in order to 
transpose and, so to speak, transform, the one into the other." The fact that each potency 
contains its opposite negated within itself returns us to Schelling's earlier claim about the 
opposition between God's subjectivity and objectivity simultaneously serving as the 
means of their attraction, for insofar as each potency contains its opposite negated within 
itself, the two are necessarily inclined toward unity, which the two produce as the third 
potency.320 And so, from the original negation (i.e. the negation of eternity) we have three 
potencies, being, what-is, and their unity.  
 Though the original negation of eternity results in an inexorable progression 
through which being, what-is, and their unity are produced, the progression itself 
becomes self-sustaining insofar as no character, no "I-hood," steps forth to dominate 
them all.321 Schelling sometimes describes this phenomenon in terms of the "existential 
parity" of the potencies [die existentielle Gleichheit], by which he means the potencies' 
equivalence with "regards to that which is as what has being."322 The potencies together 
                                                          
320 "But now the unity of the being thus seems torn and hence, each of the opposites stand for and in itself 
as its own being. Yet they incline themselves toward unity, or they come together in one and the same 
because the negating force can only feel itself as negating when there is a disclosing being and the latter 
can only be active as affirming insofar as it liberates the negating and repressing force. It is also impossible 
that the unity of the being could be sublimated. Hence, facilitated by eternal necessity through the force of 
the indissoluble life, they posit outside and above themselves a third, which is the unity." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 19) 
321 "Now this would be the most excellent and perfect unity, since the conflicting elements are free and yet 
at the same time one, and free movement neither cancels unity nor does unity cancel free movement. Even 
when this type of unity presents itself on perhaps a lower level, it still deserves to be kept in mind and 
indeed comprehended. If we wanted to find something similar, the most fitting comparison would probably 
be with the unity of forces of which one becomes aware in the innocence of youth. There, all forces are 
indeed present and in natural interaction amongst themselves, excited by gentle interplay; but no character, 
no I-hood, no one has yet stepped forth to dominate and control them." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 146) 
322 "Yet having arrived at its peak, the movement of itself retreats back into its beginning; for each of the 
three has an equal right to be that which has being. The former differentiation and the subordination that 
followed from it is only a differentiation of the being, it is not able to sublimate the equivalence with regard 
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produce an annular, rotary motion323 insofar as every time the progression reaches its 
peak in the positing of the unity of being and what-is it immediately sinks back to its 
beginning - and, thus, the reestablishing of the opposition.324 This is true for Schelling  
insofar as the positing of the unity  presupposes the negation of its antipode, and thus, can 
only sustain itself - or, rather, reassert itself - by subsequently negating itself and 
reproducing the ground from which it came (i.e. the opposition).  The unity is a one 
produced from two, and so must produce the two again - thus, negating itself - in order to 
sustain itself; conversely, the opposition is a two produced out of one, and so must 
produce the one again - thus, negating itself  - in order to do likewise. The opposition and 
identity of being and what-is occur in the same - although this higher unity, i.e., the unity 
of identity and difference, is not posited - so only the unity or the opposition can be 
posited at any given time; however, since the positing of one is necessarily the negation 
of the other, and, thus, its "beginning," what we are left with is an unremitting wheel of 
motion with no veritable beginning or end.325  
 If God's freedom is the will that wills nothing, a will with unfettered access to 
express itself but no interest in doing so, his necessity is the will that wills something - 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to that which is as what has being. In a nutshell, it is not able to sublimate the existential parity [die 
existentielle Gleichheit]." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 19) 
323 "There is only an unremitting wheel, a rotary, movement that never comes to a standstill and in which 
there is no differentiation." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 20) 
324 "Just as the original negation is the eternal beginning,  this third is the eternal end. There is an 
inexorable progression, a necessary concatenation, from the first potency to the third. When the first 
potency is posited, the second is also necessarily posited, and both of these produce the third with the same 
necessity. Thereby the goal is achieved. There is nothing higher to be produced in this course." (the WA, 
1815, pg. 19) 
325 "A true beginning is that which is the ground of a steady progression, not of an alternating advancing 
and retreating movement. Likewise, there is only a veritable end in which a being persists that does not 
need to retreat from itself back to the beginning. Hence we can also explain this first blind life as one that 
can find neither its beginning nor its end. In this respect we can say that it is without beginning and without 
end." (1815, pg. 20) 
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although it does not "know that it wills"326 - a will with an infinite desire to be made 
manifest but with no recourse to satisfy its hunger. This is the enduring ground of the 
vortex of the drives, which, inasmuch as they lack a dominant principle (i.e. the unity and 
difference of being and what-is) to discipline them and resolve their existential parity, are 
doomed in perpetuity to a vicious cycle. The eternal will, as being, seeks what-is, and, 
thus, to be expressed, to be outside itself; however, in the very moment it accomplishes 
this feat - producing the third potency, the unity of being and what-is - it annuls the very 
alterity (i.e. what-is) which it seeks, and so, by extension, paradoxically recommences its 
desire anew. In this way, the vortex of drives is itself not a true beginning, but a failed 
one, a beginning which continually aborts itself at the moment it is about to take off. 
Schematically, this point is made clearer by the fact that the opposition of what-is and 
being is God himself actu, and thus, a priori,  his will to affirm himself, while the 
identity is the purity of his essence, and thus, a priori, his will not to exist.327 The vortex 
of drives is defined by the alternating positing of the identity and difference of being and 
what-is;  correspondingly, what we observe in God is an unremitting systole and diastole 
of his struggling against himself to emerge from eternity, his own private hell in which, 
                                                          
326 It is important to keep in mind, that at this stage, God's yearning to be outside himself is one which is 
decidedly object-free, and thus, not a yearning which God himself truly understands. In his book, The 
Conspiracy of Life, Jason Wirth discusses this theme in terms of Schelling's use of the word "Sehnsucht," 
which, according to him, indicates Schelling's belief that God's desire is "for an unknown, nameless Good." 
We will talk about this discussion in Wirth's book more extensively in  the following chapter when we talk 
about God's decision to step into time. Wirth, Jason M. The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling 
and His Time. Albany, NY: State U of New York, 2003. 
 
327 "This progressive generation can be represented as an increase. If one posits the affirming principle as 
such = A and the negating principle as such = B, then the first active will is indeed in itself what-is, but it 
also negates itself as such. It is thus an A that acts as such = B; that is = (A = B). This is the beginning, and 
hence the first potency [Potenz]. But this A posits itself by itself as negated only in order to posit the true 
essence as free active, and independent of it; now to the extent that this acts as what-is of a thing-that-is 
[das Seyende eines Seyenden] = (A = B), it can be consider as what-is of the second potency = A^2. 
Finally, unity or spirit, as the common affirming of both A and B, can be seen only as what affirms the 
third potency = A^3. Thus, all generation is completed in three potencies, and through three stages the 
productive force achieves spirit." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 144) 
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try as he might, he is unable to break free. 328 The interior nature of this struggle, 
specifically the fact that Schelling is talking about God prior to his existence, lends itself 
to the depiction Žižek gives us of a God who is "psychotic," driven mad by a struggle 
which he does not understand and which he cannot win.329 As Žižek writes, what reduces 
God to this state is precisely his inability to resolve the tension within himself, either in 
favor of his will to affirm himself or his will not to. He cannot withdraw fully into 
himself and return to the nirvana of eternity, nor can he externalize himself, and thus, 
tolerate something outside himself. As result, he remains perpetually caught up in the 
middle so to speak, never finding rest, but instead deadlocked in a state of constant 
yearning.330 In this way, the vortex becomes an alternative expression of God's egoity 
                                                          
328 "Hence, there is not a persisting life here but, moreover, a constant alternating of expansion and 
contraction. And the above indicated unity (the whole of this moment) is nothing but the first pulsation, the, 
so to speak, beating heart of the Godhead, which, in incessant systole and diastole, seeks rest, but does not 
find it. There is anew a spontaneous movement that happens again and again automatically and which 
cannot cease by itself. For through each contraction, the forces again become active and the contracting 
will gives way to their desire for expansion. But scarcely does the will feel the cision and the commencing 
inefficacy when it is scared and fears that it would lose existence and hence, contracts anew." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 90)  
329 "This rotary motion is horrible because it is no longer impersonal: God already exists as One, as the 
Subject who suffers and endures the antagonism of drives. Schelling provides here a precise definition of 
anxiety: anxiety arises when a subject experiences simultaneously the impossibility of closing itself up, of 
withdrawing fully into itself, and the impossibility of opening itself up, of admitting an Otherness, so that it 
is caught in a vicious cycle of pulsation. Every attempt at creation - expansion - externalization collapses 
back into itself." Žižek, Slavoj, and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling. The Abyss of Freedom/Ages 
of the World. Trans. Judith Norman. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan, 1997. (Žižek, pg. 17) 
330 Drawing from Žižek, Bjorge argues that Schelling's notion of the drives points to the fact each of us 
inherits self-destructive tendencies which we are fated to repeat endlessly. According to him, this is the 
crucial problem with Schelling's system, since the vortex implies an impossible situation whereby the 
condition for the subject to become free is the very thing which also keeps it from fully realizing that 
freedom. Although the constraints of this dissertation prevent me from responding to this claim in full, I 
would argue that Schelling's understanding of the drives is considerably less fatalistic insofar as it reveals 
that the self-destruction constitutive of the vortex is a product of each driving attempting to dominate the 
other. The cycle perpetuates itself when one drive attempts to eliminate the negativity between itself and its 
antipode. However, as we will see, Schelling ultimately believes that this self-destruction can be overcome 
if the subject chooses to posit its own negativity as the ground of its becoming, meaning that, by yielding to 
the other, the subject actualizes itself as an individual, free subject. Primal nature, yields to freedom so that 
it can be expressed with the intelligence of the Godhead. Bjorge, Nathan. "Schelling's Nothingness - the 
Figuration of the Death Drive in German Idealism in Žižek's reading of Ages of the World. International 
Journal of Žižek Studies. vol. 10,  issue 3 (2016): 1-20.  
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inasmuch as it serves as the counterpoint to his freedom. God is not at rest, but 
perpetually in motion, and so, metaphysically, finds himself altogether dispossessed, 
ensnared in a perpetual state of deprivation. 
 What is intriguing about this description of God's "interior" life is its ironical 
status as his necessity. Traditionally, we associate the term "metaphysical necessity" with 
what must be, what is ordered, structured, and harmonized, not customarily, with a form 
of madness; and yet, ironically, it is the "order" of the potencies in the eternal will, the 
alternating systole and diastole of expansion and contraction within God's heart, which 
affects the chaos within God himself. What happens to God is perhaps best articulated in 
the two metaphors which Schelling offers us on the eternal will. The first is one which he 
develops in the second draft of the WA in which he likens the vortex of the drives to "the 
unity of forces of which one becomes aware of in the innocence of youth."331 By 
"innocence of youth" in this context, Schelling is referring to the fact that the potencies in 
the eternal will share no enmity towards each other, that, inasmuch as each drive serves 
as the ground for the positing of the others, the three as a whole are not sparked into 
conflict with each other - although they are indeed in opposition - but rather each rejoices 
in the presence of the others. The fundamental motif here is that of joy in both "finding" 
and  "being found."332 Unity and opposition both take "eternal pleasure" [Lust] in each 
                                                          
331 "Now this would be the most excellent and perfect unity, since the conflicting elements are free and yet 
at the same time one, and free movement neither cancels unity nor does unity cancel free movement. Even 
when this type of unity presents itself on perhaps a lower level, it still deserves to be kept in mind and 
indeed comprehended. If we wanted to find something similar, the most fitting comparison would probably 
be with the unity of forces of which one becomes aware in the innocence of youth. There, all forces are 
indeed present and in natural interaction amongst themselves, excited by gentle interplay; but no character, 
no I-hood, no one has stepped forth to dominate and control them. It is often said that this condition of 
innocence serves as a pattern for one which we will attain again, through the highest strife of all forces, 
after eventual reconciliation." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 146) 
332"This is the first pure joy of mutual finding and being found...For unity or for spirit, however, the 
opposition serves as an eternal pleasure [Lust], since spirit only becomes sensible to itself in the opposition; 
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other, so much so, in fact, that neither attempts to sublate the other, but instead constantly 
strives to posit the other anew. Schelling call this the "freest life," a life defined by the 
gentle interplay of the potencies, "filled with ceaseless excitement and bursting with its 
own renewed vitality."333 Such a vision presents us with a life that is at play with itself, 
which is why it stands in such stark contrast to the other metaphor which he uses to 
describe the vortex, that of the unquenchable fire: 
 This is the sanctuary, the hearth of the life that continually incinerates itself and 
 again rejuvenates itself from the tireless fire through whose quenching, as 
 Heraclitus claimed, the cosmos was created. It is circulating within itself, 
 continuously repeating itself by moving backward and again forward as was 
 shown in the visions of one of the prophets. This is the object of the ancient Magi 
 teachings and of that doctrine of fire as a consequence of which the Jewish 
 lawgiver left behind to his people: "The Lord your God is a devouring fire," that 
 is, not in God's inner and authentic being [Wesen], but certainly in accordance 
 with God's nature.334 
Schelling's association of God's eternal will with an unquenchable, self-sustaining fire 
calls our attention to the fact that, though the potencies appear to circulate in an orderly 
fashion, deep within, the axis upon which this motion hinges is the absence of unity 
altogether (i.e. chaos). We see how the vortex of drives creates this affect, for inasmuch 
as the positing of the opposition - and thus, the negation of identity - leads to the positing 
of identity - and thus, the negation of opposition - each potency usurps the other, and so 
once the vortex is set in motion, it becomes impossible to distinguish one potency from 
the other. This indeed is our intuitive understanding of chaos, a world in which the only 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and far from sublating this opposition, spirit seeks instead to constantly posit and confirm it. But those 
opposites rejoice just as much in the discovered unity, in which they have also become conscious and have 
been delivered from blind essence; they hold fast to this unity with all forces." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 
145) 
333 "Now because the opposites are not bound to each other or to unity by a necessary link, but rather only 
be the inexhaustible pleasure of having and feeling the presence of each other, this is the freest life, the life 
that plays with itself, as it were, filled with ceaseless excitement and bursting with its own renewed 
vitality." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 145) 
334 (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 20-21) 
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"rule," to so speak, is that there is no "rule," where no one thing is a something - i.e. a 
determinate identity - but where everything can and does become everything else. It is a 
world without an organizing center, without  an "I" that purposefully directs all the other 
drives. Such a world is horrific inasmuch as it perpetually lacks stability; each of the 
potencies is "consumed" by the others, and so it is a world which is continuously self-
destructive, where nothing outside the consuming act of its negated "I-hood" persists. As 
Schelling writes, this negated "I-hood" embodies the qualities of "substance," as defined 
etymologically by its roots in antiquity.335 It is what "stands under" everything, and so is 
indeed all the potencies, but not as a cohesive whole, rather, as the absence of that unity 
altogether. In this way, the eternal will serves as the antipode to God's personality as 
satiated will. God is absolutely "perfect,"  having everything within himself, and so, qua 
his freedom, has no desire to exist. However, by the very fact that there is a world, 
Schelling understands that God, though having everything, must have a part in which he 
does not have himself, in which his being is not his own.     
  If we put both of both these images together, what Schelling presents us with is a 
divine microcosm - a world within a world, so to speak - that appears peaceful and 
orderly from the exterior, but horribly violent from within. From above or outside, the 
eternal will is clockwork, each potency taking its turn being posited and then negated, but 
from within, it is relentlessly disorienting inasmuch as the self-destructive nature of the 
rotary motion consistently, and without fail, draws God back and forth from one extreme 
to another. God, in this context, lacks the vantage point from which he can see the 
                                                          
335 "Through that constant retreat to the beginning and the eternal recommencement, it makes itself into 
substance in the real sense of the word (id quod substat), into the always abiding. It is the constant inner 
mechanism and clockwork, time, eternally commencing, eternally becoming, always devouring itself and 
always again giving birth to itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 20) 
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"whole" of his nature (i.e. the identity and opposition of being and what-is), and so with 
every turn of the wheel his entire world is once again turned upside down. There is no 
rest, no tranquility, no firm ground upon which to stand, only the self-devouring fire, 
which, minus the perspective from outside, appears random, senseless, and unceasing. 
 Director Bong Joon-Ho gives poignant expression to this juxtaposition of 
isolation and madness in his recent science-fiction film, Snowpierecer.336 In a not-too-
distant future, in a world engulfed in a new ice age, the final remnants of humanity (and 
of all life on earth) reside on a train, the Snowpiercer, which circles the globe via a 
perpetual motion machine. The train is separated into haves and have-nots, the latter of 
which are crowded into the tail section, while the former enjoy the comforts of the front. 
The oppressive nature of the have-nots' conditions leads them to embark on the most 
brutal of rebellions to take back the train. As they move from car to car, ever more 
bloodshed ensues, until finally they confront the train's conductor and inventor, only to 
learn from him that the oppression of some is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the 
train. As he informs them, without violence, the train would outstrip its resources, and so 
some must be incited to rebel against the rest, lest the train run off the rails. In this way, 
the oppressed learn that theirs is simply the completion of yet another cycle of brutality 
without which the train - and, thus, humanity - would cease to exist. The juxtaposition 
which Joon-Ho emphasizes in the film between the self-sustaining mechanism of the 
globe-spanning train and the self-sustaining chaos within its walls is analogous to 
Schelling's depiction of God's interior life prior to the creation of time. As the old saying 
goes, "what on the surface appears cool, calm, and collected, is raging beneath." Like the 
train, which travels in a frozen, desolate tundra, God, before time, finds himself 
                                                          
336 Snowpiercer. Dir. Bong Joon-Ho. Perf. Chris Evans. Koch  Media, 2014. 
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completely alone. At first, this does not necessarily appear problematic, but just like the 
train, within whose walls chaos reigns, so too within God's heart a self-sustaining insanity 
has taken hold. This insanity is the fulcrum around which the drives rotate; correlatively, 
it is the center which "organizes" the potencies such that they literally produce in God a 
feeling of restlessness. As we are going to observe in the next chapter, for Schelling, this 
is the pivotal moment in which God learns the possibility of alternatives for himself, 













 The goal of this third chapter is to analyze the decision [Entscheidung] through 
which God expresses the contradiction of the a priori successively in time.337 The 
previous chapter was an attempt to establish the irreducibility of God's existence relative 
to his eternal will - that necessity is the condition for the expression of God's freedom . 
Now we seek to understand how freedom and necessity share the same "essentiality and 
originality" in the making of that eternal beginning, how they make it inconceivable for 
God not to exist, and yet also inconceivable that his decision is coerced.338 For Schelling, 
this is the ironical truth at the center of God's becoming real, namely, that because God 
exists by virtue of his freedom, the fact that he does exist means his choice is also fated. I 
am speaking here about the making of the beginning, as if to suggest that each of these 
components precedes the decision, but in truth, each of them already is the decision, for 
each has equal claim to be the unconditioned and, thus, exists only in relation with the 
other.339 This is the point of congruency with Schelling's philosophy of nature, for in the 
same way that the "whole" of an organism cannot exist without its "parts," and vice versa, 
                                                          
337 "But precisely that one commences and one of them is the first, must result from a decision that 
certainly has not been made consciously or through deliberation but can happen rather only when a violent 
power blindly breaks the unity in the jostling between the necessity and the impossibility to be." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 13) 
338 "It is not enough to see the antithesis. It must also be recognized that what has been set against each 
other has the same essentiality and originality...Each has its own root and neither can be deduced from the 
other. If this were so, then the antithesis would again immediately come to an end." (the WA, 1815 edition, 
pg. 6) 
339 "That which has been set apart are already in themselves not to be brought apart. The negating and 
contracting force could not be for itself without something that it negates and contracts, and that which has 
been negated and contracted cannot be anything other than precisely that which is in itself affirmative and 
flowing from itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 9) 
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the same can be said with respect to the Godhead (i.e. God's freedom) and primal nature 
(i.e. the vortex of drives). One constituent necessarily grounds the existence of other, so 
while each is not reducible to its opposite, neither can become real without its opposite. 
God's existence, then, could not have followed from the Godhead or primal nature, but 
only from a "ground" which is always already both. For Schelling, this notion of an 
indeterminate "ground" underscores his insight about the nature of becoming as a 
seemingly impossible occurrence.340 Becoming involves a contradiction; the notion that 
life conquers death, or that something emerges from nothing, is a paradox. 
Correspondingly, to consider God's decision is to be confronted by its infinite 
impenetrability, that existence itself presupposes the possibility of the impossible. 341 For 
our purposes, that is the insight we intend to focus our attention on in this chapter, how 
Schelling's philosophy of beginnings is a philosophy about the inexpressible "ground" at 
the root of creation.   
 In accomplishing our goal of articulating the decision, we will be paying close 
attention to the role of negativity, which is an especially intriguing feature of Schelling's 
metaphysics and perhaps its most enduring facet. As a point of reference, Heidegger's 
famous articulation of the "Nothing" which "nothings"  [Das Nichts nichtet] is probably 
"ground's" closest analogue, for like the concept of "ground," it harkens to an absolute 
which is indeterminate, yet still capable of expressing itself - or, rather, an absolute which 
is capable of expressing itself because it is indeterminate. "Ground" is literally no thing 
                                                          
340 "God, in accordance with His highest self, is not manifest. God manifests Himself. He is not actual. He 
becomes actual. It is precisely by this that God may appear as the most supremely free being." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 80) 
341 "As with the coming time, God self-referentially [fuersichtig] shrouds the point of departure for the past 
beginning in dark night." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg.3) 
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because it is both everything and nothing - essence and primal nature;342 and yet, 
precisely because of this indeterminacy, it must undergo the crisis [Chrisis] from which it 
will necessarily - but still freely - posit itself.343 In this way, Schelling would agree with 
Heidegger that the unconditioned "nothings" but does not "nothing" something, for 
though it is driven by an internal necessity to affirm itself, because this necessity is 
grounded in the eternal contradiction, it can only reproduce the indeterminacy from 
which its positing originates. To be sure, in referencing Heidegger's later work, my 
intention here is not to reduce Schelling's metaphysical worldview to his successor's, nor 
vice versa, only to suggest instead that Schelling himself echoes a similar insight in the 
opening of the WA when he declares so boldly that "all beginning is rooted in negation." 
Schelling's intent in suggesting as much is to critique the presupposition which he 
believes has dominated metaphysical inquiry for too long, namely, the belief that the 
existence of things is deducible from a single, undifferentiated identity, what Heidegger 
refers to as the problem of onto-theology. In Schelling's words: 
 Indeed, humans show a natural predilection for the affirmative just as much as 
 they turn away from the negative. Everything that is outpouring and goes forth 
 from itself is clear to them. They cannot grasp as straightforwardly that which 
 closes itself off and takes itself, and even though it is equivalently essential and it 
 encounters them everywhere and in many forms. Most people would find nothing 
                                                          
342 "When we look at philosophy as the subject, however, things are very different. It is simply indefinable. 
For it is nothing - not something, and even this would at least be a negative definition. But it is also not 
nothing, i.e., it is everything. Only it is nothing individual, static, particular; it is B,C,D, and so on, only in 
so far as each of these elements belongs to the flow of an inseparable movement. There is nothing that it 
would be and nothing that it would not be." (On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science, pg. 217) 
343 By "crisis," I am referring to our discussion of the vortex of drives in the previous chapter. Recall that 
the vortex is God's desire to exist, which strictu sensu follows from God's inability to express himself. This 
vortex engenders a crisis for God insofar as it awakens him  to the fact that he can choose whether or not to 
exist. Previously, God was indifferent to this fact, so now this revelations foists upon him the crisis of 
having to choose once and for all whether or not he will emerge into existence. As Schelling writes, "Not 
even one time is there a momentary standstill. Pain, anxiety, loathing of the past life, come undone as has 
been shown, through that crisis or setting into mutual opposition of forces." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 55)     
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 more natural than if everything in the world were to consist of pure gentleness and 
 goodness, at which point they would soon become aware of the opposite.344     
The "predilection for the affirmative" which Schelling takes issue with is mirrored in a 
predilection for the ontological argument, which attempts to prove God's existence on the 
basis of his infinity.345 Humans naturally show preference for the affirmative; most of us 
would not think twice if everything in the world were made of God's "infinite 
communicativity and emanation." 346 But there is a problem in assuming this, for though 
God himself is indeed the purest love, that love cannot reach being on its own. Why not? 
Because being [Seyn] is particularity [Seinheit] and love is not particular a priori. Love is 
God's ability to express himself, so while it is indeed constitutive of God from before the 
moment he actually emergences into existence, it only becomes real inasmuch as it 
differentiates itself from its opposite, what Schelling calls "the eternal force of selfhood" 
[Egoitaet].347 Schelling's point here is to refute the long-standing belief that God qua his 
status as the ground of creation, could have produced the world from the fullness of his 
essence - which, to the extent that it is the essence of the world, is being as totality.348 Put 
differently, it is the assumption that God, simply by having the ability to create, 
necessarily will create the world. Love is indeed "what-eternally-is," God's freedom, his 
                                                          
344 (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 6) 
345 "Idealism, which really consists in the denial and non-acknowledgment of that negating primordial, is 
the universal system of our times. Without this force, God is that empty infinite that modern philosophy has 
put in its stead...Being infinite is for itself not a perfection. It is rather the marker of that which is imperfect. 
The perfected is precisely the in itself full, concluded, finished." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 7)  
346 "Everyone agrees that the Godhead is the Supreme Being, the purest Love, infinite communicativity and 
emanation. Yet at the same time they want it to exist as such. But Love does not reach Being [Seyn] from 
itself. Being is ipseity [Seinheit], particularity. It is dislocation. But Love has nothing to do with 
particularity. Love does not seek its own [das Ihre] and therefore it cannot be that which has being [seyend 
seyn] with regard to itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 5-6) 
347 "An equivalently eternal force of selfhood, of egoity [Egoitaet], is required so that the being which is 
Love might exist as its own and might be for itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 6). As a point of 
clarification, the "eternal force of selfhood" is the opposite of love. 
348 Alternatively, one might summarize the ontological argument as the deduction of the world's existence 
from God's ontological difference. 
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essence,349 and yet, what Schelling wants us to see is that the only way for this love to 
become real - and become real as love - is for it to "dislocate" [die Absonderung] itself 
from the isolation of the a priori and posit selfhood as its ground. God can become real 
only as himself inasmuch as he negates without sublating what is not him, and so, qua his 
status as the ground of creation, he can never simply be the undifferentiated whole which 
emanates creation spontaneously, but rather that which is always already himself and his 
negativity. What we are left with, then, is a God who is irreducibly one with himself and 
his opposite, who, as a self-negating negativity, is irreducibly indeterminate350 inasmuch 
as he is both everything (infinity) and nothing (finitude), but neither everything nor 
nothing. We will learn in this chapter how it is this absolute indeterminacy which 
produces the indeterminate world we inhabit, a world that is simultaneously free and not 
free, knowable while still thoroughly contingent.  
 Beyond the scope of metaphysics, we will see how this understanding of "ground" 
proves that time is the absolute, and thus, the horizon within which being and knowledge 
are made real. This is Schelling's response to the Parmenidean understanding of being as 
totality, which argues that being logically must be, and thus, eternally is. Our focus 
concerns Parmenides' denial of becoming, which, in turn, cannot account for our 
perception of time. Schelling, of course, is not the first to address this issue, however, the 
                                                          
349 "What is a being from nature and what is as such through freedom are completely different. If God were 
already everything from necessity, then God would be nothing freedom. And yet God, according to general 
consensus, the most voluntaristic being." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 5) 
350 "What is this subject that is in everything and that does not remain in anything? What should we call 
it?...The answer: the indefinable itself, the aspect of the subject which cannot be defined, has to be made 
the definition." (On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science, pg. 217)  
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manner in which he does marks a clear departure from the likes of his predecessors,351 
many of whom follow the Platonic model - as argued for in the Divided Line - that time 
is a mere derivative of the eternal. 352 Schelling is the first to argue that time is the 
absolute itself, and it is what he means when he says that the beginning of something is 
the negation of what follows from it.353 For just as the beginning of a line is the negation 
of extension (i.e. a point) and the beginning of multiplicity is the negation of number (i.e. 
one), the beginning of an intelligible, external world is the negation of being and 
knowledge, an absolute from which being and knowledge emerge, but which nevertheless 
does not "exist," nor is intelligible.354 As we will see in this chapter, to confront this 
indeterminate negativity, which Schelling alternatively refers to as "ground," is to 
confront the absolute irreducibility of time, that time is the inexpressible, transcendental 
condition of our intelligible, physical world.  
 Schelling's use of the term "existence" underscores his criticism of ontology by 
differentiating the WA from a purely theoretical metaphysics, which typically concerns 
itself with being, and, thus, carries with it the baggage of  the Parmenidean tradition. 
What Schelling takes issue with is the attempt to identify being with its concept, which, 
                                                          
351 I am thinking specifically of Plato, however, we could also include others, such as Aristotle, Augustine, 
and Aquinas, among others, all of whom argue explicitly or implicitly that things in time are less real than 
things outside of it.   
352 "Were the first nature in harmony with itself, it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would 
never become Two. It would be an eternal rigidity without progress. The contradiction in the first nature is 
as certain as life is. As certainly the being of knowledge consists in progression, it necessarily has as its 
first posit the positing of the contradiction." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 12) 
353 "For since there is no time in God itself, how should God create the world in time if there is not a time 
outside of God? Or how would a determination of this time be possible if there is not already, before 
creation, a movement outside of God, according to whose repetition time is measured?" (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 80) 
354 "There is a question that is so nature that it is already raised in childhood: What kept God busy before 
God created the world? But examined more exactly, all thoughts pass away, if creation is to be a free deed, 
with the necessary concept of a duration of that unexpressed state. Since eternity, in itself or by itself, has 
no duration and only has duration in relationship to time, that eternity before the world immediately 




in turn, robs life of its freedom. If being is, then it must be out of logical necessity, 
eliminating the possibility that it could undergo change. The result is that any such 
metaphysics which begins with this locus will invariably invalidate our intuition of time. 
On the contrary, Schelling believes "existence" is a more suitable a term for metaphysics 
because it coincides with the verbal nature of life, by which I mean the fact that it is 
defined through an ongoing process of self-differentiation. We see this in the case of 
God, who must first posit necessity as his ground in order to reveal himself as free. God's 
freedom is not fully actualized through the concept alone,355 leading to the decision 
through which he becomes free - or, rather, actualizes his freedom completely - by 
affirming his antipode first. In the WA, Schelling argues that this process of "standing 
out" is constitutive of all living things insofar as it marks the process through which each 
organism actualizes its own freedom. 
   Undoubtedly, to a new reader of Schelling, it will appear strange to apply the 
term "freedom" to an organic nature, since it is not an association we are prone to make. 
After all, how can plants, animals, and all other types of non-human organisms be 
free?356 Perhaps "freedom" is not the most suitable term since these entities are not 
rational, and, thus, incapable of making a conscious choice. But then again, this is why 
Schelling calls his a metaphysics of freedom, since even though these beings are 
                                                          
355 God's freedom is the equivalent of his concept (i.e. the idea of God), whereas his necessity is equivalent 
with his desire to exist. Correspondingly, when I speak of the "concept alone," I am arguing that, for 
Schelling, the fact that God is free - and, thus, capable of creating - does not necessitate that he will create. 
In fact, if God was simply his freedom - meaning that he had no desire to exist - he would not create at all, 
despite the fact that he always retains the ability to do so.  
356 "While this dark principle is effective in animals, as in all other natural beings, it has not yet been born 
into light in them as it has in man; it is not spirit and understanding, but blind craving and desire. In short, 
no fall is possible here, no separation of the principles, where there still is no absolute or personal unity. 
The conscious and unconscious are united in animal instinct only in a certain and determined manner, 
which for this reason is unalterable." (Freedom Essay, pg. 249) 
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unconscious, they must still be free, for the very fact that they change at all implies that 
they must be capable of changing in an infinite number of ways, lest they be unable to 
change at all. This is true even if an organism has changed always in the same way, since 
if it did not have this infinite potential, it would not be capable of change, and, instead, 
simply be whatever it already is. Take, for instance, our previous example of the acorn. 
No matter how many times we observe the acorn grow into an oak tree, the fact that it 
grows at all means it always holds the capacity to grow differently than it does. If the 
opposite were true, it would simply be an acorn. In turn, the fact that the acorn does grow 
into oak tree means it could only do so as the result of a decision, even if an unconscious 
one.357 Without this decision, and, thus, a demonstration of the organism's freedom, the 
acorn would remain what it is. As it relates to our previous discussions, this notion of 
freedom underscores Schelling's indebtedness to Hume, who also acknowledges our 
inability to translate past experience into certain knowledge of the future. Whereas Hume 
discusses the contingency of becoming as an epistemological issue, Schelling goes the 
extra step in arguing that this gap in our knowledge is itself constitutive of thing 
themselves in terms. No matter the regularity with which nature operates, the fact that it 
is given to grow and develop means that there is indeed an "irreducible remainder" as 
Žižek writes, an element which is contingent, and, thus, not resolvable into some 
necessity.       
 From a historical perspective, we might be inclined to associate Schelling's 
emphasis on the inexpressible root of creation with his successors - in particular, 
                                                          
357 "Thus, precisely because they are only relative expressions of unity, they stand beneath it, and the force 
working in the ground maintains the unity of principles befitting them ever in the same proportion. Animals 
can never remove themselves from unity, whereas man can voluntarily rend the eternal bond of the forces. 
Hence Franz Baader correctly states that it would be desirable that man's depravity go only as far as 
animalization; but unfortunately man can only stand above or beneath animals." (Freedom Essay, pg. 249) 
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Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger - however, we will see that Schelling himself not 
only anticipates these figures, but shows how this insight is a distinctly modern one. For 
even though "ground" is the "irreducible remainder" at the basis of reality, as Schelling 
reminds us, it is also the precondition of an intelligible world. In this way, the WA is less 
an argument for a radical nihilism than an attempt to juxtapose the intelligibility of nature 
with the mystery of its origin. I describe this as an especially "modern" insight because it 
coincides with modern philosophy's attempts to appropriate the emergence of modern 
science, specifically its growing compendium of facts about nature. Schelling's 
philosophy of nature, with its emphasis on "ground," highlights the irony emerging with 
this development, namely, that in spite of its tremendous progress, science is still no 
closer to answering the questions we most want answered: the questions about life's 
origins. It is no coincidence, then, that Schelling's philosophy of beginnings emerges 
simultaneously with Hegel's phenomenology, for though Schelling and Hegel appear to 
be at odds with each other, for Schelling, they are congruent parts of the same 
progression inasmuch as "ground" is the unsystematic precondition of systematic 
philosophy. Through our analysis of the WA, we will observe how this "ground" 
translates to the irreducibility of time in relation to being and knowledge, that time is the 
precondition for spirit's self-consciousness, which, qua its status as ground, spirit itself 
cannot comprehend. We will see how this acknowledgment leads Schelling to infer that 
the decision which defines time is itself not a predestined one, but rather an expression of 
the highest freedom.358 
                                                          
358 "There would be no real history of the world without a free beginning. Those who could not understand 
the free beginning also could not find the access to real history." (1815, pg. 79) 
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 To begin, we will resume our analysis of the WA from where we concluded at the 
end of the previous chapter, the primordial antithesis of the Godhead (i.e. God's freedom) 
with primal nature (i.e. God's necessity, the eternal will). We will start at the juncture 
where Schelling begins to discuss the interaction of these two principles in the making of 
the beginning: the introduction of the concept of spirit. 
1 
The Role of Spirit in Primal Nature 
 According to Schelling, spirit [Geist] is the "link" between the indifference of 
eternity and the life built up from below which moves the still concealed expressing of 
eternity into action by representing to God what within his eternal being is only a 
possibility.359 The use of the term "spirit" is an homage to the original meaning of the 
term "idea" as it is presented in antiquity.360 An idea is what is seen, and so for Schelling, 
spirit enables self-reflection inasmuch as it enables God to view for the first time, what 
will one day be his creation.361 Structurally speaking, God produces this vision from the 
unremitting systole and diastole of the eternal will. He is the unity of the three potencies - 
the will not to exist (i.e. what-is), the will to exist (i.e. being and what-is) and their 
                                                          
359 "Now that the spirit of nature wants to be the link between eternity and nature, it strives to express 
actually in matter - as material that is subordinated to it - what is contained only as possibility in eternal 
being." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 154)  
360 "The original meaning of the word Idea, [Idea] which we have so felicitously inherited, is actually no 
different from that of the German word for vision [Gesicht]. Indeed, both words mean two things, denoting 
as much a view  [Blick] as what is viewed." (the WA, 1813 edition, pg. 161) 
361 "The doctrine of the archetypes of things is lost in deepest antiquity; the Greeks already regarded it as a 
sacred legacy. This certainly fosters the suspicion that the doctrine had lost something of its original 
meaning by then, since even Plato was only a reporter and interpreter of this ancient teaching. Later on, the 
true meaning became obscured in several ways; first it was understood far too supernaturally, and then in 
an entirely vulgar sense. The production of such archetypes or visions of future things is a necessary 
moment in the overall development of life, and even if these archetypal images cannot be understood as 
physical natures in precisely the normal sense, they certainly cannot be thought apart from all physicality. 
They are neither merely universal concepts of the understanding, nor fixed models; for they are Ideas 




unity362 -  such that, in the case of the eternal will, no "I-hood" comes to dominate them, 
resulting in the inexorable progression through which he continuously, but 
unsuccessfully, attempts to externalize himself. We articulated these events as Schelling 
described them in the previous chapter. Eternal being negates itself as that which has 
being, thereby positing essence outside itself and generating the contradiction between 
being and what-is through which God longs to be outside himself. The difficulty here lies 
in the fact that each potency contains its antipode negated within itself, and so necessarily 
implies the unity of the potencies as its ground. The opposition between the forces 
establishes their desire to be together, but given that this unity takes the opposition as its 
ground, upon its realization - and, thus, the negation of the opposition - it can only sustain 
itself by reestablishing that opposition, and thus, negating itself once again. For 
Schelling, the production of this unity - which he refers to as spirit - is "the eternal ectype 
[Gegenbildliches], or what is objective of God," that within God which "contains in an 
eternal manner everything that will one day be objectively actual by virtue of God's 
being."363 Schelling frequently oscillates in the text between a description of spirit as the 
"link"364 between eternity and nature through which the eternal comes to view itself as in 
a mirror, and one in which it serves as an actual counterpoint [Gegenwurf] to "what-
eternally-is."365 These formulations combined encapsulate the relationship of identity and 
difference between God's freedom and eternal being. Spirit is indeed the eternal essence 
inasmuch as it is God's desire to express himself as both being and what-is, but whereas 
                                                          
362 Schelling himself refers to these as "A," "A^2," and "A^3" respectively. 
363 (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 154) 
364 "Spirit cannot pull this being of eternity to itself without thereby positing it as object in relation to what-
eternally-is, thereby making a division in eternity, and finally also moving that very innermost principle, 
the still concealed expressing of eternity, to action." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 153) 
365 "But through just this pulling-toward, eternal being is at the same time pulled away from what-eternally-




in the case of eternity that affirming principle is conjoined with its antipode such that 
their difference is negated, in the eternal will, that relation is reversed, leading to the 
unrelenting alternation of the drives constitutive of the chaos in the eternal will. Spirit, 
then, is the "link" between the will that wills nothing and the life built up from below 
inasmuch as it is the eternal reflected "outside" itself - although still internal to God - the 
unity of being and what-is within God's own negativity such that the Godhead can 
become cognizant of his own capacity to come into existence.  
 By introducing the concept of spirit, Schelling is expounding on a point he makes 
earlier in the WA regarding the relationship between God's essence and his nature. All 
truth must indeed pass through the dialectic,366 but whereas in the case of the philosophy 
of nature that dialectic takes place between subject and object, my ideas and what is 
external to me, in the case of this primordial life - which happens before time, before 
existence, and before subject and object - it takes place within God367 himself between a 
"questioning being" and an "answering one," an "unknowing being that seeks knowledge" 
and an inner oracle "that does not know its knowledge."368 Schelling refers to this 
conversation as the "silent dialogue" between God's essence and his nature, of which 
dialectical knowledge itself is only a "copy" [Nachbild].369 We will discuss what 
                                                          
366 "Therefore, all knowledge must pass through the dialectic." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxix) 
367 "Everything, absolutely everything, even that which by nature is eternal, must have already become 
internal to us before we can present it externally or objectively." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxvii) 
368 "This cision, this doubling of ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two beings, a 
questioning being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks knowledge and unknowing 
being that does not know its knowledge, this silent dialogue, this inner art of conversation, is the authentic 
mystery of the philosopher." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxvi) 
369 "From the outside this conversation is thereby called the dialectic and the dialectic is a copy of this 
conversation. When the dialectic has become only form, it is this conversation's empty semblance and 
shadow." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxvii). To be sure, in this particular passage, Schelling is referring to 
the process of anamnesis by which we ourselves recount the moment of the unprethinkable decision. 
However, this recounting, which takes the form of a dialogue, has its analogue in God insofar as the 
127 
 
Schelling means by "copy" at a later juncture in this chapter, but suffice it to say that 
Schelling himself believes the conversation is not reducible to the intelligibility between 
my ideas and external things. This dialogue - which Schelling says constitutes the 
"authentic mystery of the philosopher" - has the character of "ground," so while it is in 
fact dialectical inasmuch as it is the condition of the dialectic, simultaneously, it exceeds 
the knowledge which the dialectic purports to offer. Of course, this is not to say that the 
interaction between subject and object does not yield knowledge, rather, that in 
comparison with "ground," that knowledge is distinctly "lower."370 Hence the reason why 
Schelling declares so boldly in the introduction to the 1815 edition that "the very 
existence and necessity of the dialectic proves that it is still in no way actual knowledge." 
By "actual" [wirklich] in this instance,371 Schelling does not seek to repudiate the 
credibility of my knowledge of the external world, rather, to make room for a type of 
understanding that is indeed "higher"372 and from which necessarily follows the 
expression of one's own character.373 This type of understanding is the a priori of the 
knowledge achieved in the dialectic, and so is "actual" in the sense that it is a real 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decision is the product of the interaction between God's subjectivity and objectivity ( his freedom and 
longing to express himself respectively).   
370 "Hence the view, harbored from age to age, that philosophy can be finally transformed into actual 
knowledge through the dialectic and to regard the most consummate dialect as knowledge itself, betrays 
more than a little narrowness. The very existence and necessity of the dialectic proves that it is still in no 
way actual knowledge." (the WA, 1815 edition, xxxvii) 
371 Schelling uses the term "actual" similarly to the manner he uses "freedom," by which I mean that both 
terms admit of varying degrees. Just as God, qua his status as free, becomes more free after he decides to 
exist - thus, positing primal nature as his ground - God becomes more actual by positing the vortex of 
drives as his eternal past.  
372 "How else could the person alone climb up to the beginning of the ages if there were not in the person a 
principle of the beginning of the ages? Created out of the source of things and the same as it, the human 
soul is conscientious of creation. In the soul lies the highest clarity of all things, and the soul is not so much 
knowing as knowledge itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxvi) 
373 "Proceeding from the unconscious existence of the eternal, science guides it up to the highest 
transfiguration and into divine consciousness. The most supersensible thoughts now receive physical power 
and life, and vice versa, nature becomes ever more the visible imprint of the highest concepts. Soon the 
contempt with which only the ignorant still look down on everything physical will cease and once again the 
following saying will be true. The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. xl) 
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beginning, leading to the externalization of God's essence. It is knowledge that has 
become "free and lively," in which the instant God "has" it, he cannot help but emerge 
into time.374  
 In the text, Schelling makes a crucial distinction here between what we 
traditionally refer to as "knowledge" and "knowledge itself."375 The former is more of a 
striving toward anamnesis [Wiederbewusstwerden], a recounting of history, while the 
latter is the production of history, the moment when science and history coincide. It is 
knowledge that stands on equal footing with being, thus making it implausible for the 
former to become real lest it also externalizes itself. In the beginning of the 1815 edition, 
Schelling echoes this distinction when he asks, "what holds back that intimated golden 
age in which truth again becomes fable and fable again becomes truth?"376 The use of the 
term "fable" is especially important because it foreshadows Schelling's future claims 
about the "unprethinkability" of the decision, which is suggestive of an intelligibility that 
transcends rational truth. When science assumes that subjectivity is the sole condition of 
intelligibility, it drives a wedge between the "knowable world" and the "external one," 
                                                          
374 "Yet it is another question as to whether the point will ever come where knowledge comes free and 
lively, as the image of the ages is for the writer of history who no longer recalls their investigations in their 
presentation. Can the recollection of the primordial beginning of things ever again become so vital that 
knowledge, which, according to its matter and the meaning of the word, is history, could also be history 
according to its external from? And is the philosophy able to turn back to the simplicity of history, like the 
divine Plato, who, for the entire series of his works is thoroughly dialectical, but who, at the pinnacle and 
final point of transfiguration in all of them, becomes historical." (the WA, 1815 edition, xxxix) 
375 "The first light of knowledge must rise through an internal cision and liberation before it can illuminate. 
What we call knowledge is only the striving toward anamnesis [Wiederbewusstwerden] and hence more of 
a striving toward knowledge than knowledge itself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxvii) 
376 "Why was or is this impossible until now? Why cannot what is known in the highest knowledge also be 
narrated with the rectitude and simplicity of all else that is known. What holds back that intimated golden 
age in which truth again becomes fable and fable again becomes truth?" (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxv) 
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effectively reducing all knowledge to abstract concepts.377 But in the case of the 
beginning, science acknowledges truth as unconditioned as being - which, in the a priori, 
is God's desire to be, his negativity. The shift in perspective is significant, for what in the 
former is a relation of dominance in which knowledge masters and subdues being, in the 
latter is one in which knowledge and being are equal partners in ensuring their own 
becoming real. Hence Schelling's uses of the term "fable" is significant inasmuch as it 
suggests that the knowledge which produces the external world is also not-knowledge, or, 
as Schelling articulates it in the Nature of Philosophy as Science, a knowing that is 
simultaneously an ignorance.378 The term "fable" fits this description well because it 
suggests a brand of intelligibility whose truth can be conveyed to others only indirectly. I 
do not intend to delve too deeply into this insight mainly because it forms the centerpiece 
of Schelling's later philosophy, which focuses on mythology; however, we can already 
infer what is at stake in this notion of "truth as fable." Fables not only convey their moral 
indirectly, but are practical in nature, meaning they deal with the state of affairs as they 
already are. They teach us how to navigate a world that is already governed by certain 
rules and limitations, to focus less on why the world is the way it is, and instead, how to 
thrive given its current infrastructure. A similar attitude emerges in Schelling's notion of 
the beginning, for to understand how the beginning operates is to acknowledge that the 
world itself is just as unconditioned as is God's power to affirm it. Why did God create 
the world the way he did? Not because he understood it through and through prior to 
                                                          
377 "Then there will no longer be a distinction between the world of thought and the world of actuality. 
There will be one world and the peace of the golden age heralds itself first in the concordant conjunction of 
the sciences." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xl) 
378 "When the absolute subject is restored, knowledge must wither away into ignorance; B that had become 
A becomes B again, i.e. ignorance, but as brought back from knowledge it is no longer just ignorance, it is 
a knowing ignorance." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 231). 
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producing it; rather, because it was always already with him, as they are one act.379 Ergo, 
Schelling's conception of God resembles more closely an artist whose desire to create is 
irreducible to himself, whose inspiration even God himself is unable to explain. 380  
 Looking forward, we get a preview of what Schelling is up to when we keep in 
mind that the eternal beginning is the deed by which God takes the contradiction in the a 
priori and expresses it successively in time. Since the past and the present have a 
"grounding relation" - meaning that neither can exist without the other - "ground" must 
express them simultaneously; however, for the same reason, neither time is reducible to 
the other, so when God does express them, he must do so as two separate results. The 
beginning, then, is only possible for God inasmuch as he sublates the simultaneity of the 
times in "ground" and posits each separately. For Schelling, the difference in how the 
expressed past and expressed present relate to each other, compared with their 
simultaneity in "ground," underscores the distinction between expressed knowledge - 
dialectical knowledge, the expressed unity of subject and knowledge - and knowledge as 
it exists before the decision. Whereas the former can never become being, in "ground," 
knowledge is already its opposite. Expressed knowledge follows after the decision, 
meaning it is the relic of a deed that has already taken place, while knowledge in God's 
"ground" is the presupposition of that beginning. Schelling intimates that this 
preconscious knowing is God's sensitivity to the limitlessness of his own power, that he is 
in fact a contradiction. Spirit rouses God to the fact that he is the possibility of the 
                                                          
379 "We must also not imagine that thought precedes and posits the absolute subject, but that both emerge in 
one and the same act in the same decision. Both are born together and emerge at the same time from a 
primordial unity." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 235) 
380 "The following is also true: the beginning does not know itself as such. Which really means: it may not 
know itself as a beginning. In the very beginning, nothing is or discerns itself as merely ground or 




impossible; the result of this self-awakening is the becoming of creation. In the WA, 
Schelling intimates that there is a brand of necessity in "ground," as if he is offering a 
unique take on the ontological argument.381 I think we can already intimate what that 
necessity looks like in this context: it is the presentiment of destiny, i.e. that God is called 
to validate his own desire to exist. For Schelling, this is the irresolvable tension which 
grounds the decision: that divinity - which, qua its status as divinity, desires nothing - 
necessarily desires to be. For God, then, to confront his paradoxicality is for him to 
become conscious of the fact that not only is he able to create, but that he desires to 
create.  
2 
The Life of Spirit: God's Mesmeric Sleep 
 Schelling frequently refers to the development of spirit within God's eternal will 
as a brand of "mesmeric sleep" in which God himself becomes transfixed by the 
archetypes or vision of future things, momentarily losing touch with himself as a 
knowing subject.382 The metaphor of sleep juxtaposes the relation of the affirming and 
negating principles in the eternal will with the relation of the same principles in "what-
eternally-is." Internally, there is no difference between a waking man and sleeping one; 
both are comprised of the same forces, the same abilities, the same powers. But whereas 
                                                          
381 "Everything else leaves the active in some sense open. Only the contradiction is absolutely not allowed 
not to act and is alone what drives, nay, what coerces action. Therefore, without contradiction, there would 
be no movement, no life, and no progress. There would only be eternal stoppage, a deathly slumber of all 
the forces." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 12) 
382 Rajan juxtaposes Schelling's description of God's magnetic sleep, which appears in the the WA, 1813 
edition, , with Schelling's introduction of the drives in the 1815 one. Both of these descriptions correspond 
to the same referent, God's existential desire, which, for Rajan, indicates a shift in Schelling's attitude about 
God's necessity, namely, that Schelling is establishing the groundwork for a psychoanalytic approach to the 
absolute.  For more on this strain of thought, please see her article, The Abyss of the Past; Psychoanalysis 
in the Schelling's Ages of the World. 
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in the case of the waking man, these individual principles are subjugated by an external 
one - i.e. the outer unity of the organism - in the case of the sleeping man, that common 
exponent is negated, allowing for "the freest play and intercommunication of forces to 
unfold on the inside."383 In a marginal note of the 1813 edition, Schelling's son refers to 
this condition as "a state in which there is, externally, no subject all, and yet there is an 
inner subject who judges, concludes, thinks and comprehends, often considerably 
exceeding his normal capacity, and is fully alive and operational."384 This "inner subject" 
is the identity of the potencies negated in the eternal will around which the systole and 
diastole of the vortex pivots. Schelling is once again referencing his philosophy of a 
nature and his articulation of the organic relation of identity and difference expressed in 
every living thing. An organism's parts and its whole presuppose each other, and so their 
existence presupposes a "ground" in which their sameness and difference is 
simultaneously articulated. For him, that same relation defines God himself, for inasmuch 
as his freedom is the identity of the principles, and his necessity, their free interplay, the 
former is necessarily his "whole," while the latter is his "parts." The irony is that this state 
of mesmeric sleep is the circumstance under which God is first roused to the possibility 
                                                          
383 "Internally, a waking man and a sleeping man are entirely the same. None of the inner forces that are 
active in the waking state are lost in sleep. From this it is already evident that the difference between these 
states, as well as their alternation, is not determined from within the organism; rather, it is the effect of a 
potency external to the organism, now attracting, now releasing. All forces of a man in the waking state are 
apparently governed by a unity that holds them together like a common exponent (or expressing), as it 
were. In sleep, by contrast, each force and each instrument seems to work for itself, and a freely willed 
sympathy takes the place of an externally determined unity. And while the whole looks as though it were 
dead and ineffective on the outside, the freest play and intercommunication of forces seems to unfold on 
the inside." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 158) 
384 "However it is understood, in mesmeric sleep we have the example of a state in which there is, 
externally, no subject all, and yet there is an inner subject who judges, concludes, thinks and comprehends, 
often considerably exceeding his normal capacity, and is fully alive and operational." (the WA, 1813 
edition, , 160). 
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of entering into existence.385 In fact, Schelling calls it a "necessary moment" in the 
"overall development of life" inasmuch as the vortex generates the visions of that future 
world God will create, thereby putting him in touch with his own capacities and their 
desire to be expressed.386 We can see how this line of argumentation bears the seed for 
the future inquiries of psychoanalysis and psychology, for it takes seriously the reality of 
dreams - acknowledging their significance as revelatory of the true self. But even more 
so, we can see how it represents a clear departure from the likes of Schelling's 
predecessor Descartes, whose insistence on trying to determine that he is awake with 
absolute, metaphysical certainty exhibits a clear proclivity otherwise. Schelling believes 
there is a modicum of freedom in our dreams, not afforded to us in the state of 
wakefulness, that is essential to our own self-awakening. Dreams bring us into contact 
with the primordial self, the self a priori which desires nothing other than to be 
expressed; they facilitate a moment of self-realization in which the self is put in contact 
with itself via its own negativity. Although Schelling is very clear that these dreams do 
not yield knowledge, arguing that the visions in the eternal will are not "universal 
concepts of the understanding," nor even "fixed models,"387 they do make it possible for 
                                                          
385 "The visions of these very innermost thoughts of God that arise actualized from eternal being were 
nothing other than the visions of future spirits whose creation was determined at the same time as that of 
natural things." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 155) 
386 "The production of such archetypes or visions of future things is a necessary moment in the overall 
development of life, and even if these archetypal images cannot be understood as physical natures in 
precisely the normal sense, they certainly cannot be thought apart from all physicality." (the WA, 1813 
edition, , pg. 161)  
387 "[Dreams] are neither merely universal concepts of the understanding, nor fixed models; for they are 
Idea precisely because they are eternally full of life, in ceaseless motion and production." (the WA, 1813 
edition, , pg. 161) 
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God to know himself on a sub-conscious level, or perhaps, more appropriately speaking, 
a preconscious level.388     
 Without going too far ahead of ourselves, we can infer how Schelling's 
introduction of the concept of spirit helps clarify the eternal will's relation to the 
Godhead. Strictly speaking, eternal being is not God, for it is a negation of the very unity 
which defines him as "what-eternally-is." Nevertheless, it is still indeed him, for although 
it is his negativity, that negativity is no less essential to the abandonment of his 
concealment than the freedom by which he affirms himself.389 In other words, the power 
by which God negates himself, that is, the force by which he desires to be outside 
himself, is just as irreducible a condition of his existence as the unbounded power of his 
freedom to decide.390 To be sure, by "negating power," I am speaking here about God's 
primal nature, however, Schelling himself shows this truth to persist at every level of the 
unconditioned. In the same way that the negating and affirming wills each hold equal 
right to be God in his freedom, and how neither the negating principle (i.e. the 
contradiction of the first and second potencies) nor affirming one (i.e. their unity, the 
third potency) is able to subjugate the other in eternal being, primal nature on the whole  
has just as much right to claim itself as God as the Godhead.391 This does not mean that 
                                                          
388 I say "preconscious" because we are talking about God's consciousness before it becomes real as 
consciousness. 
389 "Precisely that which negates all revelation must be made the ground of revelation." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 16) 
390 "For nature was not present in the original eternity; rather, it was first presented as a companion to 
eternity by a productive -though eternal - force. On the other hand, what we view as the foundation of the 
world of spirits was already present in the unbeginning eternity; it was eternally near God and with God 
(what-eternally-is)...For if God were understood as what-eternally-is, such a transition without destruction 
of character would be unimaginable." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 156)  
391 "Hence, it is certainly impossible that the Ideal as such is ever the Real and vice versa, and that the Yes 
is ever a No and that the No is ever a Yes. To assert this would mean sublimating human comprehension, 
the possibility of expressing oneself, even the contradiction itself. But it is certainly possible that one and 
the same = x is both Yes and No, Love and Wrath, Leniency and Strictness." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 8) 
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the Godhead is not still "higher" than eternal being in a relative sense - for it is indeed 
still God whereas primal nature is not - rather, that both are equally necessary to God's 
emergence into existence, and, in this way, equally unconditioned.392  
 From a historical perspective, this is one of Schelling's more enduring insights 
from the WA, namely, that God's negativity has just as much claim to be the 
unconditioned as the positivity of his freedom. In the introduction to the 1815 edition of 
the WA, Schelling argues that our knowledge is grounded in time, meaning that "it must 
be generated piece by piece, according to sections and grades, all of which cannot happen 
without reflection."393 Herein he develops that claim performatively, for what we observe 
in his argument about the significance of God's negativity is the culmination of a line of 
inquiry which began with Kant and which Schelling finds unsatisfactorily answered by 
Hegel.394 For if it was Kant who first criticized realism's claim that objects cause us to 
experience them, only then to be criticized by Fichte for not arguing strongly enough in 
favor of the subjective conditions of experience - namely, that subjectivity causes 
objectivity - and if it was Hegel who attempted to settle the dispute by arguing for the 
irreducibility of spirit - by which he means the union of subject and object - then it is 
Schelling who attempts to reconcile all three positions with the concept of "ground." 
"Ground," for him, is the recognition that subject, object, and spirit are all equally 
unconditioned. God is irreducibly subject, and irreducibly object, and irreducibly spirit, 
                                                          
392 "It is not enough to see the antithesis. It must also be recognized that what has been set against each 
other has the same essentiality and originality. The force with which the being closes itself off, denies 
itself, is actual in its kind as the opposite principle. Each has its own root and neither can be deduce from 
the other." If this were so, then the antithesis would again immediately come to an end. But it is impossible 
per se than an exact opposite would derive from its exact opposite." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 6)  
393 "Our knowledge is piecemeal, that is, it must be generated piece by piece, according to sections and 
grades, all of which cannot happen without reflection." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxviii) 
394 "Idealism, which really consists in the denial and nonacknowledgment of that negating primordial force, 
is the universal system of our times." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 7) 
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so while it can be said that each is "first," to add that one is the cause of the others 
conveys some narrowness, for each is only a necessary condition of reality, not a 
necessary and sufficient one.395 Each component depends on the other two in order to 
become real, and so it cannot be said that one causes the other, rather that they are all 
equally unbounded. Ergo, Schelling's insistence on the irreducibility of primal nature 
returns us to the importance of his question about beginnings,396 for what it signifies is a 
rejection of the tendency within philosophy - which he associates most closely with 
idealism - to reduce God to a single, undifferentiated locus in which no contradiction can 
persist. Schelling demonstrates this position to be more detrimental than we may initially 
realize, for not only does it render inconceivable the fact that there is indeed particularity, 
time, and difference, but also, it presupposes God's existence as self-evident, and so 
makes inconceivable any answer to the question of why he exists in the first place. For 
Schelling, it is this last point which is especially crucial, because without the question of 
why God exists - or, why there is something rather than nothing - there is no knowledge, 
no understanding, and no intelligibility. The ground of knowledge is one's cognizance of 
one's own ignorance - meaning the question precedes the answer - so without negativity, 
specifically a negativity that is just as original in God as his essence, and not simply a 
product of that essence, there can be no knowledge. Primal nature, then, that unremitting 
                                                          
395 "And here, first after the consummate unfurling of that initial concept, can we glimpse the first nature in 
its full vitality. We see it, in an equally originary way, decomposed, as it were, into three powers. Each of 
these powers can be for itself. hence the unity is a unity for itself and each of the opposite powers is a 
whole and complete being. Yet not one of them can be without the others also being and hence, only 
together do they fulfill the whole concept of the Godhead and only that God is necessary." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 11) 
396 "But the power of a beginning is only in wanting in general. For that which is wanted and therefore that 
which should actually be in accord with the intention is posited as that which does not have being precisely 
because it is that which is wanted. But all beginning is founded on that which is not, on what actually 
should be (that which in itself has being). Since a being that has nothing outside of itself can want nothing 
other than simply itself, the unconditioned and absolutely first beginning can lie only in self-wanting. But 
wanting oneself and negating oneself as having being is one and the same. Therefore, the first beginning 
can only be in negating oneself as that which has being." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 16) 
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chaos within God through which he does not have himself, is the condition for God's own 
externalization, and thus, the condition of his self-consciousness. 
3 
The Life of Spirit: The Wisdom of the Lord 
 Apart from the metaphor of "mesmeric sleep," Schelling alternatively refers to the 
expression of spirit within the eternal will as God's "wisdom,"  by which he means the 
"unblemished mirror of divine force."397 Schelling sharply distinguishes God's wisdom 
from any connotation with language. "Wisdom," he says, is not Logos, or the Word, but 
like a child playing before the Lord, self-less in nature, whose excitement wakens him to 
the germinal life within.398 "The Lord had Wisdom, she played before him, he saw in her 
what will one day be; for what is true of being and what-is, is also true of the Lord."399 
The use of the feminine pronoun "she" in translation is consistent with previous claims in 
the Freedom Essay and in the WA about the priority of the "receptive sex" when it comes 
to the generation of organic nature.400 Schelling's choice of language may seem 
regrettable in light of contemporary concerns, along with his presupposition that the 
                                                          
397 "The people of the Orient have recognized a playful pleasure at the beginning of the life of God, which 
they have eloquently termed Wisdom; it is an unblemished mirror of divine force and (due to passive 
qualities) an image of his benevolence. With astonishing precision, they everywhere ascribed more of a 
passive than an active nature to this essence. For this reason, they did not call it spirit, nor did they call it 
the Word or the Logos, although wisdom was later often incorrectly confused with this term." (the WA, 
1813 edition, , pg. 163) 
398 "Wisdom is compared to a child: a child can be called self-less when, in the earliest time, all of its inner 
forces worth with each other, but without a will having come forth to hold them together and make itself 
their collective force and unity." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 165) 
399 (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 166) 
400 "Although we are positing the unbeginning of eternal divinity above all being, we make no secret of our 
claim that nature's priority with respect to revealed, active existence is just as certain. As high as we place 
actuosity [Actuositaet] in any other respect, we must indeed deny that it is the First (with respect to 
revelation.) For even that essence in which the active will first produced itself reveals itself in more of a 
passive than an active manner. A merely potential life precedes the active. I find it plausible for many 
reasons that in organic nature the receptive sex is present first and on its own, and that the supposedly 
asexual character of the lower species of animals is based partly on this." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 149) 
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passive and active elements in nature can be distinguished along the lines of gender. 
However, if we disentangle this distinction between passive and active from its ties with 
male and female, we can begin to understand why Schelling describes wisdom as 
"receptive" to God's self-expression. Wisdom is the fertile soil, both literally and 
metaphorically, by which God externalizes himself.401 In the literal sense, it is the first 
corporeal essence, i.e. the physical world which God will create, while metaphorically, it 
is the necessary condition of God's emergence from his eternal indifference. It contains 
all the conditions for supporting life, but inasmuch as it lacks the seed, it cannot do so on 
its own, and so remains but a passive material for the "higher essence." Thus, wisdom is 
characterized by a deep, internal longing to be affirmed by God's freedom, to emerge 
from its mute, ineffective unity and be posited as an active one.402 
 The proximity of wisdom in relation to freedom is the precondition for God's 
becoming conscious of himself as Lord, i.e. as the expressing of being and what-is. As 
Schelling writes, it is insufficient "for a man's complete actuality that he merely be 
something or implicitly have something; in addition, he needs to become aware of what 
                                                          
401 "...we see the whole of nature to be equally full of longing; the earth sucks the force of heaven into itself 
through countless mouths; the seed strives toward light and air, in order to catch sigh of an image, a spirit; 
the flower sways in the sun's rays in order to pull them into itself as color. And the same holds true for that 
passive life: the more it unfolds the more it calls upon the invisible to accept it, pull it in, and recognize as 
its own." ( the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 165) 
402 As Hay argues, the longing felt by God's existential desire holds out the possibility of becoming 
detrimental if it takes the form of a longing for the Godhead itself, and, thus, for what Hay calls, "a 
nostalgic past," in which there is no striving whatsoever. Such a life, she says, exhibits the quality of 
freedom qua freedom, which, as we have discussed, is insufficient for becoming insofar as it is indifferent 
to its own power to be. To this insight, I would add that Schelling is once again highlighting the importance 
of desiring in the right way. Since desire is the condition of becoming, it is indeed eternal, which means 
that we cannot expect to escape it. In turn, it is crucial that we desire in a way that is not bound by the 
hopes of resolution, that we affirm desire apart from the hope of ridding ourselves of it. Hay, Katia. "The 
Role of Narration and the Overcoming of the Past in Schelling's Ages of the World." Comparative and 
Continental Philosophy. vol. 8, issue 3 (2016): 271-287. 
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he is and what he has."403 God already is being and what-is insofar as they are expressible 
of him, and yet inasmuch as he does not actually express them, he is still not them. 
Correlatively, for God to become his "complete actuality," he cannot remain concealed in 
eternity, but instead must emerge into time by positing himself as both being and what-is. 
The proximity of the eternal will in relation to God's freedom is indeed a necessary 
precondition of this development; however, as Schelling acknowledges, it is not enough 
for God simply to have the desire to be, but also, he must acknowledge that desire as his 
own.404 In other words, for God to become himself, he must undergo an experience of 
self-discovery in which he acknowledges the unremitting systole and diastole of the 
drives as his very own nature to be.405 God is indifferent to his own ability to exist qua 
his freedom, and so his beginning presupposes a "moment of awakening" in which he 
becomes aware of himself "in the truest sense."406 The dialectical nature of this insight, 
particularly its consonance with Schelling's epistemology, is especially striking. Just as 
my ideas are only real for me insofar as they correspond with what is legitimately 
external, God only becomes aware of himself insofar as he locates himself in his own 
negativity. Thus, the God of freedom, the God whose identity is the unity of the 
potencies, can become conscious of what is expressible in him only inasmuch as he 
                                                          
403 (the WA, 1813 edition, , 166) 
404 "It is not enough that forces or abilities be present in a man; he must recognize them as his own, and 
only then is it possible for him to grasp onto them and put them to work and into effect." (the WA, 1813 
edition, , pg. 166) 
405 "Everything has happened only so that what was concealed - namely, the expressing of what-is and 
being - becomes aware of this thing-that-is, and of this being, as its self. But it cannot recognize itself as 
what-is, and as being, without at the same time recognizing nature as its own, previously unconscious, 
longing for its self, a long that it hitherto did not know." 
406 "It can likewise be said of the will of eternity - which has remained at rest until now - that this moment, 
the moment it becomes aware of what it is, is the moment of awakening, of coming-to-itself in the true 
sense. This will was not added to being or to what-is, as something foreign to them; rather, it was in them 
from eternity and simply did not externalize itself. So the will does not happen upon anything foreign, it 
comes upon itself, upon what it was before eternity, and of which it was merely not aware." (the WA, 1813 
edition, , pg. 167) 
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carries within himself the contradiction of the potencies constitutive of his very desire to 
exist. The paradoxical nature of his insight is not to be overlooked, for though the eternal 
will is contained within God, its difference from God himself is in no way sublated. God 
is strictu sensu his freedom, not the eternal will itself, and so the fact that he does decide 
to come into time presupposes a seemingly impossible moment when God acknowledges 
what is fundamentally not him as himself.  
 In the 1815 edition of the WA, Schelling alternatively refers to the relation 
between freedom and necessity as the relationship between eternity and time.407 Eternity, 
for Schelling, is not the moments of time taken together, but rather that which 
"coexists"408 with time such that, in each single moment, "eternity again sees only its 
(whole, immeasurable) self in each single one."409 Schelling frequently vacillates in the 
text between a description of time which emphasizes the fact that time itself is produced 
by God and one in which God himself "contracts" time, as if it were a disease, 
subsequently being compelled by time to affirm himself. In essence, the correct 
interpretation seems to combine both approaches, for as God's necessity, time is the 
necessary, but not sufficient condition of God's existence. God himself produces time 
inasmuch God's nature (i.e. his desire to be) is not real unless God himself freely affirms 
it; however, the opposite is also true inasmuch as the condition for God to be stirred from 
                                                          
407 "This time outside of eternity is that movement of eternal nature where eternal nature, ascending from 
the lowest, always attains the highest, and, from the highest, always retreats anew in order to ascend again." 
(the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
408 "But since the Godhead can only actualize itself from out of its free eternity, there must something 
between free eternity and the deed of actualization that separates the deed from eternity so that eternity 
remains free and inviolable. This something can only be time, but not time within eternity itself, but rather 
time coexisting with eternity." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
409 "For eternity must not be thought as those as those moments of time taken together, but rather as co-
existing with each single moment so that eternity again sees only its (whole, immeasurable self in each 
single one." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
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his indifference, and thus, prompted to actualize his freedom, is the presence of his 
eternal will. Thus, God interacts with time as his other, but as the other which 
simultaneously belongs to himself. We can see why Schelling conceives of God's eternal 
will in this fashion - that is, why he calls it "time" - for as the active contradiction of the 
principles, it is the anti-God in the a priori which ensures God becomes his "complete 
actuality." In this way, Schelling appears to be appropriating on his own terms the 
Parmenidian understanding of time, which, in emphasizing the strict bifurcation of being 
and non-being, argues that the present "is," while the past and future "are not." For 
Schelling, the difficulty with this understanding of time is not so much its delineation of 
what is and is not, but rather, its failure to acknowledge the productivity of this 
negativity. The eternal will is the necessary condition of God's existence, so while it is 
necessarily prior to the actual God, it is simultaneously a future in the sense that it 
contributes to God's becoming real.410 Schelling, then, is reintroducing the concept of 
teleology, but with a renewed emphasis on the tension between the "telos" and it subject.  
Whereas Aristotelian teleology emphasizes the sameness between substance's formal and 
final causes, implying the sameness between something's essence and its end, Schelling 
additionally stresses their difference in order to avoid a metaphysics of determinism. 
Why determinism? Because if essence and telos are unequivocally identical, then one 
                                                          
410 Katia Hay raises that the point that the relationship between the Godhead and primal nature is one of 
futurity since "ground" makes possible the vision through which the former sees what it will become, 
which is the latter. I would add that this claim is not only consistent with Schelling's claim that the future is 
prophesied but also the fact that "ground" itself cannot appear in time. To the extent that the Godhead is 
brought in contact with its own existential desire, what the former understands best is the ground of its next 
becoming, not necessarily what it will become. In this way, the conservative and progressive natures of 
time, which Schelling means to highlight in the WA, are represented in Hay's analysis insofar as the subject 
can portend what it's future holds without knowing for certain how it will result for her. For Hay's analysis, 
please see her article, The Role of Narration and the Overcoming of the Past in Schelling's Ages of the 
World. Hay, Katia. "The Role of Narration and the Overcoming of the Past in Schelling's Ages of the 




must be reducible to the other, in which case, there is no becoming. For there to be a true 
beginning, essence and telos must be irreducible to each other - meaning their difference, 
along with their sameness, must be preserved - so God and his desire to express himself 
must be equally him.   
4 
The Crisis, the Contradiction, and the Decision 
 The relation of time to eternity, through which eternity becomes aware of itself, 
sets the stage for the decision that will ultimately "mark the boundary between the past 
state and the one to follow."411 Primal nature forms the "framework" of an action: its 
forces, interacting playfully with each other in the eternal will, yearn to give birth to the 
unity that grounds their motion;412 however, inasmuch as they "merely were in that 
action, but not as being in that action," they only incline toward some production without 
actually executing it.413 An action is not posited as active without the decision 
[Entschluss] that puts it into effect, and so inasmuch as primal nature lacks this ability, it 
merely intends toward some action without actually expressing it.414 Only God, by virtue 
of his freedom, can make that decision, so the eternal will needs its antipode in order to 
confirm its intention in deed. Primal nature, then, is not a sufficient condition of God's 
                                                          
411 "We thus see everything ready for a decision; and for the Eternal, this last stage in which it becomes 
aware of itself marks the boundary between the past and the one to follow." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 
167) 
412 "The unity we have considered up until now was mute and ineffective. Yet all the forces were in blissful 
interaction. This was the case first in the first of nature, but this action was not itself expressed and posited 
again as active." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 168) 
413 "The forces merely were in that action, but not as being in that action. There was merely a framework 
for an action, just as when the forces inside of us incline toward some operation or production, but the 
decision [Entschluss] that puts the action into effect is not present." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 168) 
414 "The situation was the same with what-eternally-is, and with the being of eternity; being was indeed 
summoned, and it was ready to posit itself as what immediately affirms nature. But it was ready only 




existence; however, it is nonetheless crucial for the beginning of things insofar as it 
rouses God from the absolute indifference of his freedom by forcing him to decide 
whether to accept or reject his own nature.415 God, qua his freedom, is the will that wills 
nothing; but as we testified to previously, this will is actually the product of two wills - an 
affirming one and a negating one. Qua his status as free, the difference between these 
two wills is negated, but in the presence of the primal nature, that opposition is made 
active such that God becomes aware of his capacity for self-expression. What was once a 
single, pure will, so blissfully content with itself that it willed nothing out of indifference, 
is now two wills, a positively negating one and "the will of love," which actually wills 
itself as what-is and as being. 
 Although activation of the opposition in "what-eternally-is" summons God to 
choose between the two wills, he cannot do so qua his status as free.416 God must choose 
whether or not to reveal himself, and yet since he is always already both wills, either 
choice he makes appears to abrogate what he "eternally-is." 417 Either God acts as the 
affirming will, positing himself as both being and what-is, or he acts as the negating one, 
concealing his essence in eternity; either way, it appears he is unable to reveal himself as 
                                                          
415 "But even if they were neither able nor willing to decide straightaway, they were indeed drawn to 
decide. Actual opposition is thereby generated, and they thereby become perceptible to the will that wills 
nothing. As long as the opposition remained dormant, the will remained in its indifference and did not 
know the opposition. Now the opposition is put to work and is made perceptible to the will that wills 
nothing, which is now pulled into action, becoming an actual will, whereas it was previously a merely 
possible will." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 168) 
416 "For if the Godhead is to be eternal freedom, to actualize itself, to manifest, then actual Being or self-
actualizing cannot already be posited with the eternal capacity for Being or self-actualizing. There must be 
something between possibility and deed if is to be a free deed." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 1815). 
417 "Hence, it was impossible that the Godhead became active as the eternal if it did not become active as 
the eternal Yes, and vice versa. And yet it is precisely as impossible that one and the same thing can have 
being as Yes and as No. It is absolutely necessary that the Godhead should decide either to be one and then 
not to be the other or to be this and then not to be that. Hence, here is the highest conceivable contradiction. 
This is not going to be reconciled, for instance, by claiming that God is already subordinate by nature as 
one or the other of the two (as the Yes or as the No) and hence, with respect to the other, could assume the 
relationship of the non-active one. For God is at the same time essentially both of them. Hence, God must 
also be absolutely active as both of them." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 75) 
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he really is, which is free.418 In the case of the former, he exists self-evidently - it was 
never possible for him not to exist - while in the case of the latter, he remains non-
existent; either way, his choice results in the negation of himself as both wills, and thus, 
his ability to choose whether or not he exists. For Schelling, then, the question naturally 
follows: how is any decision possible for God? How can God emerge into existence and 
still reveal himself as free? Previously, the fact that God was the unity of the two wills 
rendered him indifferent to his own power to choose, making it inconceivable that he 
would ever decide to exist. Now, as a result of the eternal will, he must choose, but 
between two, equally unattractive options. The only legitimately free decision God can 
make is one which affirms him as both the affirming and negating wills, i.e., as the will 
that wills nothing.419 Correspondingly, since either choice he makes appears to amputate 
his freedom, it appears inconceivable how he would ever make a move in one direction or 
another.420  
 Schelling here is highlighting the symbiotic relationship between the affirming 
and negating wills. The wills are equally unconditioned, meaning that neither one is 
caused by the other, and each is free to affirm or negate the other. The irony, however, is 
that the nature of this equipollence prohibits God from making any choice between 
                                                          
418 But when two conflicting wills are present - one affirming and one negating - spirit is already called for 
as well. Or rather, spirit is present according to possibility and should emerge but cannot, because it is the 
free unity of both wills, but a unity is impossible." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 169) 
419 "Now the opposition is put to work and is made perceptible to the will that wills nothing, which is now 
pulled into action, becoming an actual will, whereas it was previously a merely possible will. But it can 
only become actual as what it is. Once and for all, it is impossible for anything to be sublated. The will can 
therefore only become actual as the will that wills nothing." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 168) 
420 "How is a decision possible here? Perhaps someone might say that one of the wills by nature subservient 
to the other, in which case it would necessarily be overcome by the other will, and this other would then be 
the victor. But this presupposition is false. Both wills are by nature equally important, each has the same 
right to be active, and it is necessarily true that neither retreats before the other. But all this must be case if 
God is to appear as the freest essence of all, if a necessary origin of the world is to be revealed rather than 




them,421 for it is because of the parity of the wills that he cannot "be entirely the one or 
entirely the other, either entirely affirmation or entirely negation." 422 In other words, the 
equipollence disallows God from doing precisely what any choice between the wills 
appears to precipitate, namely, that only one of the wills becomes active, and thus, God 
himself becomes exclusively one of them. Each will is free to affirm or negate the other, 
but because they are both equally unconditioned, neither can posit itself without also 
positing the other, nor can it negate the other without also negating itself. 423 
Correlatively, though the wills are strictu sensu unbound to each other, each is beholden 
to the other as the condition for its own existence. The wills' absolute parity, then, is 
paradoxical, for though each is fully self-sufficient, in order for either one to reveal itself 
as itself, i.e., as unconditioned, it must take its antipode as its ground. For Schelling, this 
absolute parity reveals the contradictory nature of God's existence. The unity of the 
Godhead is not reducible to any of its parts, so the fact that God exists presupposes a 
"ground" beyond it, a "ground" that is not simply the unity of the wills, but also their 
difference. Primal nature affirms this independence, so the fact that God exists means his 
decision is just as much a product of the eternal will as it is of the Godhead, that God can 
reveal himself as free only inasmuch as he also reveals himself as necessary. This 
                                                          
421 "How is a decision possible here, even only with respect to the What? A decision is hampered by 
absolute parity of both wills, by the fact that neither has more of a claim to be active than the other. If one 
were active, then the other could certainly be as well. The only impossible state of affairs would be for one 
to be active when the other is not, since that would conflict with the equipollence." (the WA, 1813 edition, , 
pg. 172) 
422 "At the present moment, however, the conflicting wills balance each other out. Indeed, the will that is 
both must absolutely be entirely the one or entirely the other, either entirely affirmation or entirely 
negation, entirely love or wrath. It is in precisely this way that the very highest freedom emerges. 
Unconditioned freedom is not a characteristic of particular actions; it is rather the capacity to be entirely 
one or entirely the other of two contradictory things." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 171) 
423 Each of the wills is individual and self-sufficient, and each has the complete freedom to posit itself and 
to negate the other. But precisely because they are equally unconditioned, neither will can negate the other 
without being negated by it in turn; and similarly the other way around: neither can posit itself without also 
positing the other." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 172) 
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contradictory "ground," which is simultaneously the identity and negativity of the wills, 
is the ultimate condition of God's self-revelation, the logically inconsistent root at the 
beginning of creation.424 
  Schelling calls the ultimate "ground" of God's existence the "absolute I of 
divinity" and defines it as the "inexpressible" principle grounding the decision: 
 It is apparent that none of these - not the negating, not the affirming will, and not 
 the merely potentially extant will that is their unity - is that absolute I of divinity 
 as it was before the activation; but precisely because it is none of these and yet is 
 all three, precisely thereby it appears as actual, as what is in principle 
 inexpressible; it appears as what in principle is the inexpressible essence of 
 divinity.425 
In revealing what must occur in order for a decision to take place, Schelling demonstrates 
that existence itself is a contradiction, and thus, implies a contradictory a priori in order 
to become real. As he writes, "only contradiction at the highest grade of increase is able 
to break open eternity and disclose the complete system of times."426 Of course, 
Schelling's suggestion here is an impossibility;427 however, for him, that is the point, for 
becoming necessarily assumes the possibility of the impossible.428 In short, this is the 
conclusion Schelling has been building towards through his analysis of the equipollent 
wills: that because God exists, and exists by positing both wills simultaneously, the 
"ground" of their becoming must be both. How does "ground" accomplish the feat of 
expressing both wills simultaneously? By positing each in its own time, the negating one 
                                                          
424 "Thereby, this primordial deed becomes a beginning that can never be sublimated, a root of reality that 
cannot be reached through anything." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg.85) 
425 (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 170) 
426 (the WA, 1813 edition, , 65) 
427 "The doctrine that God created the world in time is a pillar of genuine faith. The labor of this present 
work would be adequately rewarded had it only made this thought comprehensible and intelligible." (the 
WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
428 "So that there would be a true beginning, this higher life had to sink back down into unconsciousness of 
itself. There is a law in humanity: there is an incessant primordial deed that precedes each and every single 
action and through which is actually Oneself." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 85) 
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in the past, and the affirming one in the present.429 This is how any experience of 
becoming is conceivable, for there is no genuine "present" without also a consciousness 
of something "being put behind."430 Correspondingly, for God to reveal himself as free, 
he must posit primal nature as his eternal past and the Godhead as his eternal present. 
We see how this is possible structurally, for as the concealment of God's essence, primal 
nature is the negativity grounding his self-revelation. It is God's desire to exist, and so 
makes possible the decision by stirring God from the slumber of his absolute 
indifference. Primal nature inclines but does not coerce God, so while it is a condition of 
his decision, it necessarily requires the positing power of freedom in order to achieve its 
end. The decision, then, necessarily presupposes a contradictory "ground," for as the 
beginning of existence - and, thus, of time - it requires a moment in which God sees 
himself as his other, in which the Godhead recognizes in primal nature its very own 
desire to be.  
 As an explanatory concept, the uniqueness of "ground" lies in its capacity to 
articulate how the decision occurs while reinforcing the unintelligibility of its possibility. 
Systematic philosophy cannot make sense of "ground;" however the difficulty has 
nothing to do with a failure on the part of the system, but rather with the nature of the 
unconditioned itself, which, given its irreducible indeterminacy, resists all delimitation. 
After all, "ground" is what expresses time, and thus makes real God's past and present, so 
                                                          
429 "In the same act it was discerned that this revelation could only occur in accordance with times or in a 
succession. And precisely that which would have to be posited as the beginning is that which was 
overcome, namely, what is necessary of the freedom of God, the No of all external Being, and revelation so 
far (for there is no beginning without overcoming)." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 78) 
430 "We said that the negating force represses the will of Love and the will of the spirit, but only by 
displacing them from the present. It posits these as not having being [nicht seyend], but hence in no way as 
non-being [nichtseyend]. Rather, they are posited as future and certainly, as such, also as having (merely 
concealed) being)". (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 86) 
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it cannot be expressed because it is a contradiction.431 "Ground" is simultaneously both 
wills, so while it can separate both wills from each other and posit each in its own time, 
as the condition of that becoming, it can never sublate the simultaneity of the principles 
within itself. Hence "ground," as the condition of God's decision, is the possibility of the 
impossible, making the fact that there is indeed a world rationally untenable. For 
Schelling, this is the upshot of a philosophy which takes seriously the reality of time and 
which, correspondingly, resists the temptation to deduce God's existence from his 
essence. The latter, in its attempt to make the fact of God's existence intelligible, 
eliminates all explanations of how becoming occurs. Conversely, when it comes to the 
decision, the more appropriate question is not why it happens, but rather how it happens, 
for though existence itself is a rational impossibility, this in no way changes the fact that 
it still is.432 Schelling reflects this distinction in his own description of the decision when 
he argues that no such deed could have followed from "reasoning or reflection," for 
though "ground" prohibits God from expressing why he acts, it does not mean that God 
acted in an entirely ignorant manner. Why? Because the fact that God cannot express 
why he acts does not take away from the fact that he knows he must. 433  This is one of 
                                                          
431 "This recasting of the unconscious  leads to the pivotal contention that unconscious, concealed behind 
the veils of repression, is not to be understood merely as an aggregate of overdetermining factors and forces 
compromising or impeding the individual's autonomous capacities as free agent (this being a crude yet 
common depiction of the psychoanalytic unconscious). Rather, repression frequently conceal the opposite: 
namely, the Schellingian ' abyss of freedom,' a radical indeterminacy and groundlessness covered over by 
various psychic layers seeking to avoid this void." Here Adrian Johnston raises a similar point in his article 
comparing the WA with Lacanian psychoanalysis. The "unconscious" which the decision "represses" is not 
the vortex of the drives, but the rather the contradiction which facilitates the decision, namely, "ground." 
Johnston, Adrian. “Ghosts of Substance Past: Schelling, Lacan, and the Denaturalization of Nature,” 
Lacan: The Silent Partners [ed. Slavoj Žižek], London: Verso Books, pg. 44. 
432 "So much for what would have to occur should a decision ensue. But the 'how?' has not yet been 
explained." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 77) 
433 "If the visionary lacks this organ or intentionally pushes it away from themselves in order to speak 
immediately from vision, then they lose their necessary standard and are one with the object and, for any 
third person, they are like the object itself. For this reason, they are not a master of their thoughts and 
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the more crucial points in Schelling's philosophy of beginnings: the idea that the highest 
form of knowing, the knowing which accompanies the highest expression of freedom (i.e. 
absolute freedom) is also a form of not knowing. 434According to Schelling, this explains 
why "most people are frightened by this abyssal freedom," and "turn away from it as if 
from an utterly injurious flash of lightning."435 They fear being called by "ground," and 
thus, by a truth which defies expression, a truth which, relative to our rational 
understanding of ground, is itself "groundless."436 Ultimately, this is what it means to 
affirm self-knowledge as the contradictory "ground" of becoming. It is to recognize that 
real becoming requires a willingness on the part of the subject to engage with what is 
other than itself, and to do so without sublating its alterity. God accomplishes this in the 
decision and it is the reason why we cannot take for granted that his decision was easy; 
for though we may be inclined to think otherwise, our struggle is ultimately the same as 
his, namely, to allow ourselves to be freely existent and have a destiny. 
 Aside from the incompleteness of the WA, this notion of an "inexpressible" root of 
creation raises some serious concerns about the future potential of "ground" as an 
explanatory concept. This is most apparent in Schelling's metaphor of the lightning bolt, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
struggle in vain to express the inexpressible without any certainty. What they find they just find without, 
however, being certain of it, without being able to hold it steadily in front of themselves and without being 
able to again look at it intellectually as in a mirror." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. xxxix)  
434 "The [eternal] will no doubt feels that spirit [freedom] is the will's true being and, despite the spirit's 
gentleness, that it is stronger than the will in its severity. At the sight of that spirit, the will becomes as if 
insensate and seeks blindly to grasp spirit and to copy it inwardly in what the will produces, as if it could 
somehow keep a firm hold on spirit. But the will only acts as if with an alien intellect over which it has no 
command. This intellect is an intermediary between the utter night of consciousness and levelheaded 
spirit." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 102) 
435 "But most people are frightened precisely by this abyssal freedom in the same way that they are 
frightened by the necessity to be utterly one thing or another. And where they see a flash of freedom, they 
turn away from it as if from an utterly injurious flash of freedom..."(1815 edition, pg. 78) 
436 "And where they see a flash of freedom, they turn feel prostrated by freedom as an appearance that 
comes from the ineffable, from eternal freedom, from where there is no ground whatsoever." (the WA, 1815 
edition, pg. 78) 
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which acts so resolutely as to slip through our grasp before we have a chance to analyze 
it. Immediately, this metaphor raises significant concerns about the potential of "ground" 
to explain acts of becoming, since it is a concept which is indefinable. After all, how can 
a concept, which itself is not strictu sensu a concept since it is logically inconsistent, 
deliver a substantive and compelling reason why history evolves in the way that it does? 
Although I sympathize with these concerns, I also believe it is important for us to 
remember that Schelling's metaphysics is just as much a critique of the criteria we use to 
evaluate concepts as it is an attempt to identify what those explanatory concepts are. We 
see this in the case of "ground," which not only reconciles our divergent notions of 
freedom, but also exposes the self-contradiction latent in a purely theoretical account of 
becoming. To the extent that the latter attempts to reduce becoming to a logical necessity, 
this approach presupposes the limitlessness of our capacity to understand the universe, a 
presupposition which Schelling would likely argue carries with it the profound possibility 
of causing our own destruction. For if there is anything we learn from the WA, it is that 
becoming is living, and that this becoming involves the careful nurturing and balancing 
out of reason and our desires. This means we have to be cautious, since if one of the 
forces becomes too strong, particularly at the expense of the other, then becoming halts, 
resulting in death.437  
 In the case of reason, this is the threat posed whenever we allow our thoughts to 
become the sole, totalizing "ground" of our actions, which, in turn, holds out the 
possibility of stunting our growth. We see this in the modern case of climate change, 
                                                          
437 We have to remember that, for Schelling, when it comes to human beings, the relation between freedom 
and necessity is not thoroughly determined. Rather, as Schelling discusses in greater detail in the Freedom 
Essay, his system is always an open one insofar as it is possible for either freedom or necessity to take the 




which, to the extent that it poses an existential threat to humanity, poses a threat to reason 
as well. The very fact that we find ourselves in this situation is ironic, since it is the 
byproduct of our attempts to systematize and bring nature under our control, by which I 
mean our attempts to utilize and manipulate it to our advantage. Clearly, this is an insight 
better developed and articulated by Heidegger. Still, I argue that the essence of it is 
embryonic in the WA. To acknowledge that human development is responsible for 
climate change is to recognize that comporting ourselves to the world solely from the 
perspective of practical reason can be detrimental to both us and the world. Since reason 
demands sober, dispassionate thought, it inclines us to treat the world with cold 
indifference, making us less likely to regard it as something living, and instead as a mere 
object at our disposal.438 We see this in the case of the stereotypical super villain from 
movies and television, whose competency is matched only by his ruthlessness and lack of 
empathy towards others. These two traits coincide with the each other insofar as the latter 
is a byproduct of the former's attempts to usurp the position of "ground," cutting ties with 
nature and any affinity for difference. When reason overthrows "ground," it becomes 
increasingly tyrannical, consolidating its power through the domination of the other. The 
result is that reason destroys nature by consuming it, subsequently endangering itself in 
the process. In the WA, this manner of sublating one's antipode is characteristic of the 
                                                          
438 "Conscientiousness can have a completely formal appearance in the strict fulfillment of duty, where 
even a harsh and acerbic character is added, as in the soul of M. Cato, to whom one ancient ascribed this 
inner, almost divine necessity of action when he said that Cato was most virtuous in that he never acted 
rightly in order to act so (out of respect for the law), but because he could not have acted otherwise. This 
severity of disposition is, as the severity of life in nature, the seed from which true grace and divinity first 
blossom forth; but the supposedly more distinguished morality, of the opinion that it may despite this seed, 
is like a sterile blossom which bears no fruit. What is highest is not, just because it highest, always 
universally valid: and whoever has become acquainted with the trace of spiritual voluptuaries, who must 
appropriate what is highest in science and feeling in order to indulge in the most abandoned indecencies of 
the spirit and to elevate themselves above so-called common duty, will think twice before speaks of this 
highest in these terms." (Freedom Essay, 266)  
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vortex of drives, whose self-destructive pattern is the result of each potency's 
consumption of the other. On the contrary, Schelling believes that true becoming follows 
from an inverse logic, wherein the act of self-sustaining growth begins with the positing 
of one's opposite as its ground. Thus, the WA directly challenges the Kantian belief that 
pure reason is the motivation guiding us to treat others as ends in themselves. For 
Schelling, this comportment is one of love - which is "ground" - and while reason is a 
necessary condition of that love, the latter is not reducible to the former. Without reason, 
the indulgences of the external world become all-consuming, and without desire, reason 
is inclined towards totalitarianism. Therefore, in order to avoid self-destruction, both 
reason and desire need each other, which is why they must be engaged in a constant back 
and forth in which each takes the turn affirming the other. Through this back and forth, 
each tempers the other such that they avoid the danger of one consuming the subject. 
 To be sure, I recognize that the circular nature of this explanation does not answer 
the ultimate question of why things happen as they do, however, as Schelling himself 
implies, to ask this question with the expectation that it has a single, definitive answer is 
itself an attitude which presupposes the non-existence of becoming. Instead, with the 
acknowledgment of time comes the acknowledgement that, like the absolute, each of us 
stands in an open system, not a prohibitively closed one. This means that our standards of 
what constitutes an explanatory concept must adapt as well, since "ground" is indeed that 
remainder which no explanation can resolve.439        
                                                          
439 Those familiar with the history of metaphysics may raise the objection that in this claim Schelling 
himself rejects idealism insofar as he argues that explanatory concepts must adapt to the rhythm of living 
things. On the contrary, Schelling argues against this objection insofar as "ground" affirms our capacity for 
knowledge as well as the limits of that knowledge. Living things are not knowable or unknowable, but both 




The Unprethinkability of the Decision 
 Terminologically speaking, Schelling sometimes refers to the groundlessness of 
the decision in terms of its "unprethinkability" [Unvordenklichkeit]. 440 The term is a 
precursor to Heidegger's critique of onto-theology and encompasses Schelling's belief 
that God's existence is not deducible from a determinate identity - thus, making it a fact 
of brute necessity.441 As we observe in the WA, the nature of "ground" rules out this 
possibility, for if God's existence were purely necessary, then everything would be 
reducible to the self-same of the absolute. A necessary God makes any experience of 
becoming inconceivable; correlatively, with our acknowledgment of time comes the 
recognition that reality is not thoroughly predestined, but both free and necessary - 
rendering it irreducibly mysterious. God's existence, then, is "unprethinkable" in the 
sense that it is not a foregone conclusion, and thus, not knowable before it actually 
happens. The contradiction of "ground" is the Schellingian response to the Hegelian 
treatment of time, which also argues that time is the precondition of spirit's self-
consciousness, but diverges in its subsequent claim that history can accomplish its final 
end. For Schelling, this is a contradiction, because to say that spirit's insight presupposes 
time is to suggest implicitly that it is always ongoing. Time is indeed teleological - God 
can only reveal himself as free insofar as he already stands in relation to his negativity; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
concepts. In this way, Schelling is arguing for a brand of metaphysics which embraces the middle ground 
between these two extremes, one which does not treat living things purely from the perspective of theory, 
nor one which rejects theory, and, thus, treats organisms as products of chance.  
440 (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 12) 
441 "Were the Godhead eternally actual (in the adequately determined meaning of 'externally revealed'), 
then it would not be the power to actualize itself. But since the Godhead can only actualize itself from out 
of its free eternity, there must be something between free eternity and the dead of actualization that 
separates the deed from eternity so that eternity remains free and inviolable" (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 79) 
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however, since teleology presupposes "ground," meaning it presupposes a basis which 
simultaneously affirms the sameness and difference of God and his telos, to say it has an 
achievable, determinate end is to contradict its very nature. Ergo, the difficulty with 
Hegel's conception of time is that it privileges the identity of God's essence and his 
negativity over their difference, leading him to suggest that time is only a vehicle for the 
eternal and not the eternal itself. For Schelling, this is what it means to acknowledge time 
as the precondition of knowledge and being: that we are always already in media res, so 
to speak, never without an inherited past, but also never at the end towards which that 
past directs us. Moreover, this is what it means for us to encounter "ground" as the 
absolute, that to be real is to be in time. 
 The concept of "unprethinkability" underscores the timeliness of time. Time is 
becoming, and that becoming begins with the simultaneous production of the past and 
present. However, since the beginning itself is beyond time, the force of this productive 
power - though immense - is purely momentary, fleeing from consciousness 
instantaneously after it acts.442 As Schelling writes, it is much like a lightning flash 
during a thunderstorm: it happens, but so quickly that one questions whether or not it 
actually happened.443 The beginning cannot be "recalled" [Erinnerung] by consciousness, 
444 so while it necessarily produces time, it also conceals time's paradoxical origin.445 We 
                                                          
442 "Since eternity, in itself or by itself, has no duration and only has duration in relationship to time, that 
eternity before the world immediately vanishes into nothing, or what likewise says as much, it vanishes into 
a mere moment." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
443 "Hence, one can think that everything occurred just as if in a lightning flash, for it is epitomized as a 
happening without actually (explicite) being something that happened. This resolution [Ent-Schliessung], 
coming out of innermost unity, is only comparable to that incomprehensible primordial act in which the 
freedom of a person is decided for the first time." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 78) 
444 "The decision that would make any kind of act into a true beginning may not be brought before 
consciousness. It may not be recalled, which rightly means as much as taking it back. Whoever reserves it 
to themselves again and again to bring a decision to light never makes a beginning.  
155 
 
see how this true for us when we reflect on our experience of time as a continuum. For if 
the present is, while the past and future are not, then the fact that the future becomes the 
present and the present becomes the past implies a contradiction, for it suggests that being 
can become non-being and vice versa. Time, then, necessarily presupposes a paradoxical 
"ground," which is why Schelling himself is quick to acknowledge the strangeness of its 
very existence. This logical inconsistency is the enduring insight of the WA, and, in the 
case of "unprethinkability," the jumping off point for Schelling's discussion of "ground's" 
positive aspect. "Ground" is the negativity operating between the moments of time, the 
nothingness which, as the condition of all becoming, functions in the eternally-
reoccurring, yet imperceptible instant between past and present. To attune ourselves to 
this instant is to hear the original truth of the universe, the truth which prompted God to 
create the heavens and the earth.  It is to confront the nature of one's character,446 which, 
as the eternity prior to both the Godhead and primal nature, has "no duration," and which 
"vanishes into a mere moment " after revealing itself.447 God's existence, then, is 
"unprethinkable" in the sense that it follows from a timely insight, a truth which reveals 
itself only when it is ready, not before and not after. Only God carried primal nature with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
445 "This incomprehensible but not imperceptible being, always ready to overflow and yet always held 
again, and which alone grants to all things the full charm, gleam, and glint of life, is that which is at the 
same time most manifest and most concealed. Because it only shows itself amidst a constant mutability, it 
draws all the more as the glimpse of the actual being that lies concealed within all things of this world and 
which simply awaits its liberation (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 62) 
446 "If you wish to form an image - albeit a vague and distant one - of what occurs, imagine the moment of 
a sudden need: you have fallen unexpectedly into danger, and, without understanding or deliberation, 
divine inspiration takes hold and you do the only thing that could save you. Alternatively, to connect this 
with higher matters - indeed, the only genuinely comparable situation - ask yourself this: did you honestly 
take factors into consideration, engage in deliberation and reach a decision, when you grasped yourself for 
the first time and expressed yourself as who you are?" (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 175) 
447 "Since eternity, in itself or by itself, has no duration and only has duration in relationship to time, that 
eternity before the world immediately vanishes into nothing, or what likewise says as much, it vanishes into 
a mere moment." (the WA, 1815 edition, pg. 80) 
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him in that time before time; correlatively, only he can know the "Good" which 
motivated him to become real.448  
 There is far too much to discuss about the concept of "unprethinkability" for this 
particular project, but I think we are able to get a flavor of what it conveys about 
Schelling's philosophy of beginnings. In a concrete sense, Schelling is articulating a 
vision of time which emphasizes equally its conservative and progressive nature. Time 
affirms both freedom and necessity, so to be in it is to be confronted by the contradiction 
that things are simultaneously the way they ought to be, and yet could still always be 
otherwise. We see how this is true of God himself - for though it was necessary that he 
endured the vortex of the drives, it was still of his own volition that he honored its desire. 
However, it is also true for us, for in our own dealings with nature, we are confronted by 
a world that appears both orderly and chaotic, purposeful, yet still malleable. The same 
rains which sustain life also flood cities, and the same winds which scatter seeds also turn 
into typhoons. Correlatively, the same things which convince us the world is the 
masterpiece of a supremely intelligent God also lead us to question if such a God could 
ever exist. In this way, our situation is very much like the Biblical character of Job, 
whose inquiries into the meaning of existence are answered by God's cryptic speech 
certifying him as the author of creation. God's resume is impressive to be sure, however, 
one cannot help but wonder what its revelation is intended to accomplish. Is the speech a 
way of affirming that "God's ways are not our ways," so to speak, that God is so 
intellectually superior to us that only he understands how Job's suffering serves the 
                                                          
448 "Hence, God, to the extent that God is the eternal NO, cannot be overwhelmed. God can only be 
overcome by the Good such that God yields to Love and makes Himself into Love's ground." (the WA, 
1815 edition, pg. 77) 
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greatest good? Or, is it perhaps a way of establishing God's status as a tyrant, that he is so 
powerful as to be exempt from any ethical judgment whatsoever. There are reasonable 
grounds for interpreting the narrative in either direction, which is why Schelling himself 
would say it is not up to us to decide which one is best, but rather to dwell in the 
perplexity the situation evokes. This is how Schelling would respond to Hegel's famous 
injunction to tarry with the negative. Such tarrying, Schelling would say, should be with 
the inexpressible nature of "ground," and thus, to resist the urge to resolve the 
contradictory nature of reality. For him, this is what it means to say that time is the 
absolute. While in the case of the former, time is the contradiction to be explained away, 
resolved into the identity of the absolute, in the WA, time is the mystery of existence 
which invites interrogation.  
 For the remainder of this chapter, I want to focus on how the concept of "ground" 
attempts to revise traditional standards of intelligibility. There is a line of argumentation 
in the secondary literature which treats "ground" as an invitation to radical nihilism - by 
which I mean the belief that the world is rationally unknowable. My goal in the 
remaining two sections of this chapter is to reflect on how this approach fundamentally 
misunderstands the core of the WA's thesis regarding the nature of time's beginning. For 
Schelling, what is stake in the discussion of "ground" is not an answer to the question of 
whether or not reality is intelligible, but rather an insight into the various ways it can be 
intelligible. This is the ironic truth about "ground," after all; it is the "ground" of being 
and knowledge, so it transcends knowledge at the same time as it produces it. 
Correlatively, while "ground" affirms reason, it simultaneously makes space for a 
knowing that is indeed higher. My objective in the following section is to examine more 
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closely what this intelligibility looks like. It is to investigate how Schelling's metaphysics 
constitutes a new beginning for idealism insofar as it extends the concept of intelligibility 
beyond that of scientific inquiry into the realm of self-creativity.   
6 
"Ground" as an Argument against Nihilism 
 I would like to begin this reflection with a brief selection from Andrew Bowie's 
commentary on the WA in which he criticizes the efficaciousness of Schelling's attempt to 
resolve the contradiction within God between his freedom and necessity: 
 Schelling will in the last analysis assume an a priori theological basis for his 
 argument, which he spends much of his later work developing, despite all his later 
 demonstrations of the inadequacy of the onto-theological arguments of Descartes 
 and Hegel. This will finally make his overall project unworkable. The trouble is 
 that if one does not presuppose a theological understanding of ontological 
 difference, the idea of freedom here can easily become indistinguishable from the 
 idea that the emergence of a manifest universe is inexplicable or merely 
 contingent. If there were actually nothing in  our world that can make such 
 freedom intelligible, then the Idealist idea that the intelligibility which is our 
 highest aspect is the universe's own intelligibility becomes  untenable.449 
The claim that Schelling's system is defective because it is unintelligible gainsays the 
original intentions of its author, which is to demonstrate the transcendent "ground" of 
intelligibility, not the consonance of intelligibility with "ground." This is the deleterious 
predisposition in idealism which Schelling seeks to combat in the WA. In the same way 
that idealism questions the presumption that external objects cause us to perceive them as 
they truly are, Schelling questions prior idealism's presumption that intelligibility is 
synonymous with the unconditioned, that the mere idea of God acts as both cause and 
effect, producing itself from itself. We have already observed Schelling making this 
                                                          
449 Bowie, Andrew. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 
1993. (pg. 125) 
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claim repeatedly in his corpus, both in his philosophy of nature, and in the WA. While in 
the philosophy of nature it is the essence of his argument that our capacity for knowledge 
is just as much grounded in things as it is in ideas, in the WA, it is his argument that God 
qua his freedom is not the creator deity.450 Existence, for Schelling, is produced not 
deduced, and so, to the degree that Bowie criticizes Schelling's project on the basis of its 
unintelligibility, he runs aground of Schelling's original insight that metaphysics is a 
philosophy about "ground" - and, thus, about the production of being and consciousness 
from decision - not the deduction of being from consciousness.451 
 Schelling's system is indeed unworkable, and yet its unwieldiness is precisely 
why it constitutes a new "beginning" - in the Schellingian sense of the term - for 
metaphysics and epistemology. A "beginning" is the creation of difference, when one is 
conscious of having separated himself from himself, and posited part of himself behind 
himself.452 In the case of the WA, it is the moment in which the past and present are 
created simultaneously, when God puts the horrors perpetuated by the vortex of drives in 
his eternal past and steps into existence, thus creating the present. However, with respect 
to the history of philosophy, Schelling alternatively conceives of the WA as a new 
                                                          
450 "According to the usual concept, freedom is posited in an entirely undetermined capability for willing 
one of two contradictory opposites without any determining grounds except that this is wanted, purely and 
simply. While this concept of freedom has the idea of the original indecision of human essence to its credit, 
it leads to the greatest incongruities when applied to individual action. To be able to decide for A or ~A 
without any motivating grounds would, to tell the truth, be but the prerogative to act entirely irrationally, 
and certainly would not distinguish man outstandingly from Buridan's famous beast, which, according to 
the opinion held by the defenders of this concept of volition, would have to starve between two equidistant 
haystacks of equal size and kind (because it does not have this prerogative of volition)." (Freedom Essay, 
pg. 256-257) 
451 "In freedom, it was asserted, is found the final potentiating act through which all of nature is 
transfigured into sensation, intelligence, and finally into will. In the final and highest instance there is no 
being other than will. Will is original being, and to it alone all predicates of being apply: groundlessness, 
eternality, independence of time, self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest 
expression." (Freedom Essay, pg. 231) 
452 "Only the man with the strength to rise above himself is able to create a true past; he alone can savor a 
true present." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 120) 
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epistemological "beginning" which rebukes the bifurcation of metaphysics into the 
either/or of idealism and materialism. To say that metaphysics is a philosophy about 
"ground" - and, thus, "put in the past," so to speak, the bifurcation constitutive of 
previous metaphysical conceptions - is to take seriously the notion that the intelligibility 
of the world does not imply the equivalence of thought or being with "ground's" power 
for self-expression. Herein Schelling reveals his indebtedness to Kant, for what we 
observe in the WA is Schelling's attempt improve upon the vision which Kant himself 
lays out in the First Critique, namely, of affirming reason by delimiting it and making 
room for transcendence.453 "Ground," as Schelling's core metaphysical concept, does 
indeed represent an alternative to idealism, nevertheless it does not repudiate idealism's 
claim that we inhabit an intelligible universe, but instead dissociates it from the deduction 
that consciousness is the cause of existence. This is what Schelling means in the 
philosophy of nature when he argues that intelligibility presupposes the difference 
between subject and object just as much as their identity. My ideas are real for me only 
insofar as they correspond with objects not reducible to consciousness, and so the fact 
that I have knowledge means I have it as a result of a "ground" beyond my subjectivity. 
In this way, Bowie's criticism that Schelling's system is "unworkable" due to its 
unintelligibility is inconsistent with Schelling's own belief that the disequilibrium 
between consciousness and the unconditioned is not itself the destruction of intelligibility 
but rather the condition of its possibility. This is what we mean when we say that the 
                                                          
453 "From what has already been said, it is evident that even the assumption - as made on behalf of the 
necessary practical employment of my reason - of God, freedom, and immortality is not permissible unless 
at the same time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order to 
arrive at such insight it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible 
experience, and which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience, always really change this 
into an appearance, thus rendering all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I have therefore found 
it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." (Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx, pg. 29) 
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"failure" of Schelling's systematic philosophy is the touchstone of its success, not that the 
evidence of "ground" repudiates intelligibility, or that Schelling's systematic philosophy 
is defective because it is inconsistent with our belief that we inhabit an intelligible world, 
but rather that the effectiveness of thought and of our capacity for knowledge testify to 
the transcendent "ground" on which they both depend. Schelling's system is indeed 
"unworkable" from the perspective of idealism - in the sense which Bowie articulates, 
that the entirety of nature emanates from the uncaused "I" - however, given that that 
which is "unworkable" for Bowie is precisely the condition of knowledge, for him to 
abandon Schelling's system on the basis of its lack of intelligibility is for him to fall into 
the trap of presuming the very false dichotomy which the metaphysics of "ground" seeks 
to avoid, namely, that either subjectivity or objectivity is identical with "ground." It is 
this propensity in idealism - which typically results in the reduction of objectivity to 
subjectivity - that Schelling's successor Kierkegaard would later critique in Fear and 
Trembling, and which becomes the basis for his argument that faith, not reason, is the 
means by which one relates "absolutely" to the "absolute."454 Reason, according to him, 
"rounds off" the entirety of human existence into a "perfect, self-contained sphere," 
reducing God to "an invisible vanishing point, an impotent thought;" 455correspondingly, 
it does violence to what is truly universal (i.e. God) by truncating it into the universal that 
                                                          
454 "The paradox may be expressed in this way: that there is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship 
of duty the individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute." (Fear and 
Trembling, pg. 70) 
455 "The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also divine. Thus it is proper to say that every duty is 
essentially duty to God, but if no more can be said of this, then it is also said that I actually have no duty to 
God. The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God, but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation 
to God...The whole existence of the human race rounds itself off as a perfect, self-contained sphere, and 
then the ethical is that which limits and fills at one and the same time. God comes to be an invisible 
vanishing point, an impotent thought; his power is only in the ethical, which fails of existence." (Fear and 
Trembling, pg. 68) 
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we understand (i.e. the ethical).456 Kierkegaard's concern about reducing God to an 
"impotent thought" coincides with Schelling's sustained criticism of idealism, and with 
the transition he seeks to make in the WA regarding how metaphysics can break through 
the mutually-exclusive binary under which he believes it continues to operate.457 To 
acknowledge metaphysics as a philosophy about "ground" is to recognize the 
irreducibility of the unconditioned's power for self-expression, not the equivalence of 
thought or being with this power. 458 It is the moment when the philosopher becomes like 
the Biblical character of Job, who humbles himself before an omnipotent, yet 
indecipherable God.459 Job concedes precisely what his friends Eliphaz460and Bildad461 
refuse to concede, namely, that God's actions - and, thus, Job's suffering - are 
unintelligible. Similarly, a metaphysics centered on "ground" requires us to give up the 
deleterious, anthropocentric bias that the world follows directly from the idea of God, as 
if it is reasonable for us to insist that God's ways are our ways, so to speak, that the 
                                                          
456 "The paradox of faith, then, is this: that the single individual is higher than the universal, that the single 
individual - to recall a distinction in dogmatics rather rare these days - determines this relation to the 
universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal." 
(Fear and Trembling, pg. 70) 
457 Jason Wirth makes a similar connection in his book, The Conspiracy of Life: "Following Kant, but 
claiming that Kant was only a beginning, that his thinking has not at all exhausted the matter at hand, the 
System fragment argues that all true ideas are fundamentally ethical statements that this is so because the 
Good implicitly precedes the True. Indeed, in some way, one would only desire the true if somehow desire 
came to relate to the True as worthy of desire." (The Conspiracy of Life, pg.7) 
458 "Consciousness is the positing of self; however the I is nothing different, but it is itself this very-self-
positing. This consciousness, however, insofar as it is thought of merely as apprehending the self or 
knowing the I, does not come first, but presupposes true being, as does all mere knowledge. But this being 
presumed to be prior to knowledge is not being, though it is not knowledge either; it is real self-positing; it 
is original, basic willing that makes itself into something and is the ground and basis of all essence." 
(Freedom Essay, pg. 259) 
459 "Then Job replied to the Lord: 'I know that you can do all things; no purpose of yours can be thwarted. 
You asked, 'Who is this that obscures my plans without knowledge?' Surely I spoke of things I did not 
understand, things too wonderful for me to know. You said, 'Listen now, and I will speak; I will question 
you, and you shall answer me.' My ears had heard of you but now my eyes have seen you. Therefore  I 
despise myself and repent in dust and ashes.'" (Job 42: 1-7) 
460 Eliphaz: "Should not your piety be your confidence and your blameless ways your hope?...Consider 
now: Who, being innocent, has ever perished? Where were the upright ever destroyed? As I have observed, 
those who plow evil and those who sow trouble reap it." (Job 4:6-8) 
461 Bildad: "Surely God does not reject a blameless man or strengthen the hand of evildoers." (Job 8:20) 
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beginning of things - and thus, his decision to exist - conform to the parameters of our 
understanding.  
 Bowie's comments are in reference to the seminal difficulty of the WA, namely, 
how it is that God's freedom and necessity, his divine subjectivity and objectivity, interact 
with each other such that they precipitate God's emergence into time. God qua his 
freedom is indifferent towards his own capacity to be, and so does not affirm himself, lest 
he is brought in proximity with the dispossessed will of the drives. However, even though 
the vortex is the precondition of God's existence, this does not mean that his existence is 
necessary, for though freedom is moved to action only by the presence of the drives, 
God's necessity cannot be said to exist lest it is affirmed by God's freedom. The vortex is 
God's desire to exist, not existence itself, so while it wants to be, it is not being, nor can it 
produce being without the help of its antipode. If we remind ourselves of the very 
beginning of our investigation, this was the reason for discussing God in terms of both 
the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason, for though being must be, it 
does not posit itself, and so must have a ground from which it differs in order to exist. 
Thus, God must freely choose his own necessity if he is indeed to exist, leaving us in a 
difficult position inasmuch as it suggests a contradiction. How can God qua his freedom 
affirm what is fundamentally not him? God's desire to be is precisely his not-self, so how 
can he choose to come into existence? Since God can exist only by virtue of both his 
freedom and his necessity, and since his decision to exist is not reducible to either one, 
for Schelling, the answer lies in a third term in which both his freedom and necessity are 
already combined, a "ground" which affirms them both without eliminating their 
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respective differences.462 Herein we discover what Schelling means when he describes 
God as the organism of time. 463 Like all living things, he is comprised of parts (i.e. his 
freedom and necessity) and these parts come together to produce a whole, but the parts 
and the whole mutually presuppose each other, so their unity is not reducible to either one 
but instead established by a positive third. The productive power of this third term is what 
Schelling means to highlight in the WA. It is not the whole which leads to the creation of 
time, nor its parts, but rather something distinctly higher, a "ground" which is both the 
parts and the whole yet neither one nor the other. 464 This further explains why we should 
be cautious about distancing ourselves from Schelling's system on the basis of its 
unintelligibility. In the same way that freedom becomes free only in relation to necessity, 
consciousness becomes real only in conjunction with its opposite, so while it is indeed a 
necessary condition of God's existence, inasmuch as it is not also a sufficient condition, 
consciousness is not the unconditioned itself. "Ground" is consciousness before it 
                                                          
462 "It must be established in every higher view as well that the individual action results from an inner 
necessity of free essence, and accordingly is itself necessary. But this necessity must be not mistaken, as 
still happens, for empirical necessity based on compulsion (itself only disguised accidentalness). But what 
is this inner necessity of essence itself? Here is the point at which necessity and freedom must be united, if 
they can be united at all. If this essence were dead being and with respect to man something merely given 
to him, then since the act can proceed from him only by necessity, responsibility and all freedom would be 
annulled. But precisely this inner necessity is itself freedom; man's essence is essentiality his own deed; 
necessity and freedom are interrelated as one being which appears as the one or the other only when viewed 
from different aspects: in itself it is freedom, formally it is necessity." (Freedom Essay, pg. 259) 
463 "All new European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does 
not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground. Thus Spinoza's realism is as abstract as the idealism of 
Leibniz. Idealism is the soul  of philosophy, realism is its body; only both together constitute a living 
whole. The latter can never provide the principle, but must be the ground and the means by which the 
former actualizes itself and assumes flesh and blood. If a philosophy lacks this living foundation - which 
usually is a sign that its ideal principle, too, was originally only weakly effective - then it becomes lost in 
those systems whose abstract concepts of aseity, modifications, etc., stand in sharpest  contrast to the force 
of life and the fullness of actuality." (Freedom Essay, pg. 236) 
464 "It is apparent that none of these - not the negating, not the affirming will, and not the merely potentially 
extant will that is their unity - is that absolute I of divinity as it was before the activation; but precisely 
because it is none of these and yet is all three, precisely thereby it appears actual, as what is principle 
inexpressible; (it appears as what in principle is the inexpressible essence of divinity.)" (the WA, 1813 
edition, , pg. 170) 
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becomes consciousness, and so its status as the beginning means that the world follows 
from God's pre-consciousness state, a time before knowledge and before intelligibility.  
 The main thrust of Bowie's criticism concerning a metaphysics of freedom 
focuses on the manner in which Schelling conceives of ontological difference.465 "The 
danger lies in the insistence that God's 'freedom,' which is conceived of as a spontaneity 
in the Idealist manner, is beyond the principle of sufficient reason: 'one cannot give a 
further ground/reason for an action of absolute freedom; it is so because it is so, i.e. it is 
absolutely, and, as such necessarily.'" Bowie's association of Schelling's work with a 
brand of "onto-theology" belays his concern that Schelling's metaphysics enforces the 
ontological difference between ground and being only to try and deduce God's existence - 
and, thus, the existence of the world - from that difference. This is what we observe in 
Anselm's Proslogion and Descartes' Mediations.466 God's unique ontological status as 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought,467 or, in Descartes' case, infinite 
substance,468 guarantees that he must exist, meaning he exists as a function of his perfect 
nature. From the perspective of onto-theology, this type of argument is a false-positive 
                                                          
465 "How general is the expression that finite beings are modifications or consequences of God! What a gulf 
must be filled in here, and what questions must be answered! One could view Spinozism in its rigidity as 
Pygmalion's statue: it needed to be a given a soul by the warm breath of love." (Freedom Essay, pg. 230) 
466 "Since I have been accustomed to distinguish between existence and essence in everything else, I find it 
easy to persuade myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence that God 
can be thought of as not existing. But when I concentrate more carefully, it is quite evident that existence 
can no more be separated from the essence of God than the fact that its three angles equal two right angles 
can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the 
idea of a valley." (Descartes, pg. 46) 
467 "This being exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to exist. For it is possible to think that something 
exists that cannot be thought not to exist, and such a being is greater than one that can be thought not to 
exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought not to exist, then that than 
which a greater cannot be thought is not that than which a greater cannot be thought; and this is a 
contradiction. So that than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to 
exist." (Anselm, pg. 100) 
468 "So there remains only the idea of God; and I must consider whether there is anything in the idea which 
would could not have originated in myself. By the word 'God' I understand a substance that is infinite, 
<eternal, immutable,> independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both 
myself and everything (if anything else there be) that exists." (Descartes, pg. 31)  
166 
 
inasmuch as it treats God's existence as logically self-evident, thereby contradicting his 
status as ground by insisting that he always already is, and thus, without a history. Bowie 
is concerned that Schelling's insistence on the groundlessness of God's free choice 
follows a similar trajectory - as if to suggest that Schelling believes God exists by virtue 
of his groundlessness -  however, Schelling himself shows this line of argumentation to 
be self-contradictory,469 for not only is it inconceivable that God qua his perfection steps 
into existence,  but also, the notion that God exists qua his perfection gainsays the very 
ontological difference it claims to presuppose insofar as all creation gets reduced to the 
uniformity of God's essence - in which case, the difference between creator and creation, 
existence and the condition of existence, is eliminated.470 In fact, it is this critique of the 
ontological argument which forms the basis for Schelling's argument in the WA that 
modern philosophy needs an "intermediate concept" between being and ground, creator 
and creation, freedom and necessity:  
 It is not difficult to observe that the main weakness of all modern philosophy lies 
 in the lack of an intermediate concept and hence, such that, for instance, 
 everything that does not have being is nothing, and everything that is not spiritual 
 in the highest sense is  material in the crudest sense, and everything that is  not 
 morally free is mechanical, and everything that is not intelligent 
                                                          
469 "For if God were understood as what-eternally-is, such a transition without destruction of character 
(individuality) would be unimaginable. Similarly, if spirits were created from what-is of God, or were mere 
forms of it, there would be nothing between God and spirits through which they could be distinguished. It 
would consequently be impossible for spirits to have a freedom with respect to God, Anything that has a 
freedom with respect to God must come from a ground independent of him; and even if something is 
originally and in a narrower sense in God, it must come from something other than God himself, although it 
is within him." (the WA, 1813 edition, , 156) By "transition," Schelling is referring to God's existence, his 
becoming real. 
470 "God is not a God of the dead, but of the living. It is incomprehensible how the most perfect being could 
delight in a machine, even the most perfect one possible. However one might think of the manner of 
consecution of beings from God, it can never be mechanical, never a mere effect of positing, where what is 
effected is nothing for itself. Nor can it anymore be emanation, in which case what flows out remains the 
same as that from which it flowed, and thus nothing of its own, nothing autonomous. The consecution of 
things from God is a self-revelation of God. God can reveal himself only in what is like him, in free beings 
that act by themselves, for whose being there is no ground except God, but who are as God is." (Freedom 
Essay, pg. 228) 
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 uncomprehending. But the intermediate concepts are precisely the most 
 important concepts, nay, the only concepts that actually explain anything, in all of 
 science.471  
The notion of "ground" is precisely this "intermediate concept" which Schelling believes 
clarifies God's emergence into time. It is the middle point between the idea of God and 
God himself actu, which, as the condition of their becoming real, is simultaneously both, 
yet neither one nor the other. As the unconditioned, it is the unity composed from the 
difference between freedom and necessity through which God, qua his status as the 
unconditioned, paradoxically reproduces himself from himself. Thus, Schelling's 
emphasis on "ground" is an attempt to reconcile the traditional understanding of 
ontological difference with the fact of God's existence. For him, the unconditioned is not 
the antipode of creation, the God of perfection with boundless freedom, but rather the 
God who, in conjunction with this freedom, is always already one with what he will 
create.472 This is what we encounter in the WA, namely, a God who, despite his 
contentedness, is always forced to deal with his own unrelenting desire to express 
himself, and thus, have being.473 For our purposes, this analysis helps clarify Bowie's 
                                                          
471 (Third Edition, pg. 64) 
472 "Free action follows immediately from the intelligible in man. But this is necessarily a determined 
action, one that is, for example (to mention what is closest at hand), either good or evil. However, there is 
no transition from absolutely undetermined to the determined. The statement that intelligible essence 
should determine itself from pure, utter indetermination without any basis, leads back to the above-
mentioned system of the impartiality of volition. In order for the intelligible essence to be able to determine 
itself, it would have to be already determined in itself, not from outside, of course, since this contradicts its 
nature, nor from within by some merely accidental or empirical necessity, since all this (the psychological 
as well as the physical) lies beneath it; but it itself, as its essence, i.e., as its own nature, would have to be 
its determination. This is no indefinite generality, but is definitely the intelligible essence of this man. In no 
sense does the saying, determinatio est negatio, hold true for this kind of determinacy, since the latter is 
one with the position and the concept of essence, thus actually is the essence within the essence." (Freedom 
Essay, pg. 258) 
473 "The will that produces itself through itself without the knowledge of eternity - this will is the first 
distant beginning toward a revelation [Offernbarung]. Without deliberation, driven by dark presentiment 
and longing, it posits itself as negated, as not being what-is. But it negates itself only in order to reach 
essence. In negating, it is thus immediately an eternal seeking and desiring of essence; and precisely in so 
desiring, it posits essence as in itself independent of it, as the eternal good itself, as that which alone 
deserves to have being in itself." (the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 143) 
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concerns regarding the groundlessness of God's decision to exist. "Ground" is indeed the 
unintelligible basis of intelligibility, but whereas Bowie takes this to mean that the 
decision is purely contingent, for Schelling, it references the fact that God's decision is 
both equally contingent and necessary, determined and yet indeterminate. That is the 
"inexpressible" nature of the decision, that God necessarily exists, and yet his decision is 
no less free.474 Here, Schelling's use of the term "inexpressible"475 is especially helpful, 
for it is not that "ground" is entirely inaccessible to us which makes it "unintelligible," 
but rather that its accessibility is subjective, and thus, "unintelligible" in the sense that its 
truth cannot be objectively expressed. We see how this dynamic plays out in the WA, for 
inasmuch as God, qua his freedom, is blissfully ignorant of himself, he can understand 
himself only on the condition that he externalizes himself, thus making himself objective. 
The problem, however, is that God cannot externalize himself by virtue of his own 
freedom, and so the fact that he ultimately does so means that his objectivity must already 
be in proximity with his freedom - or, to use Schelling's language, with freedom in the 
"absolute subject."476 The difference between this objectivity (i.e. God's desire to be, his 
                                                          
474 "We can therefore see that in the very moment when the Highest is supposed to express itself, it 
becomes the inexpressible. Let no one be mistaken about this, or waste time in debate against those who 
deny it. One must in fact insist on this very inexpressibility, because it is necessary for the highest life." 
(the WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 170) 
475 "If what wills to express itself in all life were not inexpressible by nature, how would there be any vital 
motion? How would there be an impulse toward expressibility, articulation, or organic relation? And 
moreover, without this, how would there be an absolutely Highest that never becomes the expressible, but 
eternally remains only the expressing? For in precisely this inexpressibility - where it is not to be said that 
the Eternal is the will that wills nothing, nor that the Eternal is the will that wills, nor that it is the unity of 
both - in just this inexpressibility, something which is none of them, the pure I of divinity, becomes actual 
and ascends in the inaccessible glare of its purity (which no created thing may approach)." (the WA, the 
WA, 1813 edition, , pg. 170) 
476 "How can we know this absolute subject, or eternal freedom? This question is founded on a more 
general one: how can it be known at all?...Certainly it should know itself, as this is its aim; what else would 
there be for it to know other than itself, when nothing is outside it? Thus, it ought to be subject and object 
of itself, even though the two poles are kept separate throughout the movement. Precisely this, however, 
creates the movement, and the two ends must not coincide, for as soon as they meet, the movement stops. 
This can be clarified by the example of a magnetic needle: if the two poles in the magnetic needle were to 
coincide, its life would cease." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 225)  
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necessity) and freedom (i.e. God's subjectivity, the will that wills nothing) which reside 
within the "absolute subject" is maintained, so what we are left with in terms of a 
beginning is an intuition strictly internal to the subject, a "knowing" that is without an 
external ground. To this effect, Schelling's understanding of "ground" is strikingly 
dissimilar from "onto-theology's" claim that God's existence is metaphysically 
determinable, for whereas "onto-theology" attempts to prove God's existence from his 
idea (as if to say his existence is as transparent to us as the statement A = A), for 
Schelling, that beginning is the seemingly impossible moment when God acknowledges 
his not-self (i.e. his objectivity) as belonging to him.  
7 
"Ground" as the Unconditioned Good 
 The disequilibrium between "ground" and knowledge forms the basis for 
Schelling's metaphysics of transcendence,477 which embraces "ground's" status as the 
condition of knowledge, and thus, that which makes knowledge possible, while 
simultaneously exceeding it. Jason Wirth broaches this topic in his book, the Conspiracy 
of Life, wherein he highlights a key passage from the Freedom Essay in which Schelling 
argues that "the light of thought" first germinates from a decidedly object-free striving, a 
"desire for the unknown nameless Good."478 Wirth points out the seeming paradox of this 
striving, first, with respect to the absence of a true desideratum, and second, with respect 
                                                          
477 "There is a contradiction in the idea of knowing eternal freedom. It is absolute subject = primordial 
state. How, then, can it become object? It is impossible for it to become object as absolute subject, for, as 
such, it has no object-like relation to anything; it is contained in its primordial state and nothing can 
interfere with it, and thus far it is truly the transcendent." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 224) 
478 "In a striking passage in the Freedom essay, Schelling argued that the human is 'formed in the mother's 
love' and that 'the light of thought first grows out of the darkness of the incomprehensible (out of feeling, 
Sehnsucht, the sovereign mother of knowledge. In this dark longing, in the paradoxically object-free 
striving of Sehnsucht, one finds, as the dark, concealed origin of the understanding, the "desire for the 
unknown nameless Good.'" (pg. The Conspiracy of Life, pg. 5) 
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to naming: "On the one hand, this quasi object is named the Good, and on the other hand, 
this Good is qualified as being nameless. What manner of naming is this that names 
without naming, and without naming, nonetheless names?"479 The use of the term "the 
Good" in this context belays Schelling's indebtedness to Plato, whose articulation of this 
concept bears many of the same qualities which Schelling himself associates with the 
unconditioned.480 Like the sun, the Good is the source of the knower and thing known, 
and, simultaneously, what makes it possible for the knower to know and the knowable 
thing to be known. It is the light which both nourishes and illuminates, the source from 
which everything derives its being, and what enables vision, both physically and 
intellectually. The key distinction which Plato makes here - and, by "here," I mean Book 
VI of the Republic in which he famously introduces the Divided Line - and which 
Schelling himself echoes in the WA, is the one he makes between knowledge and the 
unconditioned. The Good is the source of being and knowledge - meaning, in more 
Schellingian terms, it affirms both the difference and identity of subject and object - so 
while it is indeed both being and knowledge, as their "ground," it is yet "still higher." 
Wirth highlights the significance of this metaphysical insight as it relates to Schelling's 
epistemology: the Good takes priority over the True, and so inasmuch as all knowledge is 
                                                          
479 "We are confronted with two aporias. In the first, the aporia of desire, Sehnsucht strives, but it does not 
have a specific object towards which it strives. Sehnsucht is a ceaseless striving without a clearly delineated 
desideratum. In the second, the aporia of naming, in so far as this desire can be spoken of as having an 
object (which, strictu sensu, it does not), Schelling named this quasi object the 'nameless Good.' On the one 
hand, this quasi object is named the Good, and on the other hand, this Good is qualified as being nameless. 
What manner of naming is this that names without naming, and without naming, nonetheless names?"479  
(The Conspiracy of Life, pg. 5-6) 
480 "In this respect, Schelling emerges, almost a century and a half after his death, as a deeply contemporary 
figure in continental philosophy, contributing directly to the current debate about the primacy of the Good 
(beyond good and evil) and in the wake of Nietzsche and Levinas. Schelling, like Levinas, puts 'forth the 
Platonic word, Good beyond being. It excludes being from the Good, for could one understand the conatus 
of being in the goodness of the Good?' (Conspiracy of Life, pg. 6) 
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a longing for the Good, it is a longing for that which is higher than knowledge.481 By 
"knowledge" in this context, we mean knowledge as Schelling articulates it in his 
philosophy of nature, that is, in the dialectical sense, as the unity of subject and object - 
or, more colloquially, as the consonance of my ideas with things.482 To answer Wirth's 
question, knowledge is indeed this naming that names without naming, and without 
naming, nonetheless names, for inasmuch as it is the unity of subject and object, but not 
the unity which affirms their sameness and difference, it is only the expressed idea of 
God, and thus, that which names him, but not exhaustively - for God himself is the 
inexpressible.483 In other words, knowledge is the expressible in God that gets expressed 
through his inexpressible "ground," and so inasmuch as all thinking aims at the Good, it 
aims at the "ideatum" which transcends the very idea it grounds.484 Schelling expounds 
on this relationship in his essay On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science.485 To expect 
an expressible answer to the question of our existence - and, thus, treat God as an object 
of knowledge -is to contradict his status as "ground," and so thinking him  requires 
rejecting all preconceptions of knowing him.  In this way, as Schelling himself argues, 
the (old) biblical motto proves true: "whoever wants to preserve it will lose it, and 
                                                          
481 "Rather I simply begin by noting that all three implicitly agree that in some way the primary concern of 
thinking, the question that births philosophy's noblest endeavors, is not the True , but the Good." 
(Conspiracy of Life, pg. 7) 
482 "In the Ages of the World Schelling acknowledged that thinking begins with the dialectic but insists that 
it does not conclude with it." (Conspiracy of Life, pg. 13) 
483 "The idea of freedom is the idea of sovereignty, of that which remains free from what it engenders, of 
that whose ideatum always exceeds its idea." (Conspiracy of Life, pg. 8) 
484 "This excess, the incessant sovereignty of all beginnings, is, for Schelling, the power of life, the life of 
freedom, which, if subsumed by the machinery of the state and its bureaucrats of the truth (the Good whose 
ideatum is resolved in the idea), always leads to the necessity that the state 'treat free human beings like 
mechanical cog wheels.' German Idealism, at least as expressed in this fragment, would be opposed to all 
totalitarian modes of thinking as an unacceptable betrayal of the Goodness that engenders thinking." 
(Conspiracy of Life, pg. 8) 
485 "There is a contradiction in the idea of knowing eternal freedom. It is absolute subject - primordial state. 
How, then, can it become object? It is impossible for it to become object as absolute subject, for, as such, it 
has no object-life relation to anything; it is contained in its primordial state and nothing can interfere with 
it, and thus far it is truly the transcendent." (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science, pg. 224) 
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whoever abandons it will find." Whoever wants to understand the beginning must, 
ironically, forego any preconception that he can and will. 
 A metaphysics centered on self-expression - and, thus, one that takes seriously the 
priority of the Good over the True - makes room for the possibility that God's existence 
follows from an imperative not reducible to his knowledge. To think the unconditioned is 
to think "ground," and thus, that which precedes knowledge; however, this does not mean 
that the unconditioned is unthinkable, for "ground" is indeed still knowledge - one might 
even say knowledge before it becomes knowledge, or knowledge before it is expressed - 
just not so in the traditionally rational sense, that is, by giving a true account of one's 
belief. Plato makes a similar distinction in the Republic concerning noesis, which is the 
highest form of intelligibility vis-a-vis an immediate grasping because its object is 
ontologically first, and thus, what is groundless. As a word of caution, I do not mean to 
enter into a comprehensive discussion of Plato's metaphysical picture here, or its likeness 
to Schelling's. However, I do believe this comparison helps clarify why Schelling's 
articulation of the unconditioned in the Freedom Essay is, as Wirth points out, so deeply 
paradoxical. To take seriously the priority of the Good over the True is to make room for 
a brand of thinking which embraces "ground's" paradoxical status as both thinkable and 
yet inexpressible, as having the characteristics of being knowable but not having the 
characteristics of being communicable. In essence, this discovery marks the shift in 
Schelling's corpus from the negative philosophy of his earlier period, to the positive 
philosophy we witness in the WA and his later work. While negative philosophy marks 
reason's encounter with its own "mysterious" ground, initiating a Copernican-like 
revolution in which reason becomes self-conscious of its unhealthy egocentrism - i.e., 
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that it is not truly the epicenter of the universe - positive philosophy marks philosophy's 
attempts to make sense of "ground" in its productive power, as the origin from which 
knowledge and being arrive. The shift is to see thinking as a genuine beginning, less as 
what begins and more as the beginning itself. This is what Schelling means he hopes that 
at some point knowledge will become free. By "free" he is talking about a kind of self-
knowledge which leads to self-expression, a knowing internal to the subject - and thus, 
not objectively accessible - through which it is able to become what it always already is.  
 A  metaphysics which takes seriously the unconditioned's status as the beginning 
without abrogating its bifurcation from knowledge recognizes God's emergence into time 
as the product of an imperative whose authority is so indisputable as to defy rational 
intelligibility. The unconditioned is compelling in the sense that its goodness is 
incontrovertible; but just as Plato suggests in the Republic that this inconvertibility 
exceeds logos (i.e. noesis), for Schelling, to prepare ourselves for the Good as the 
beginning of things is to see God's emergence into time as the product of a Good whose 
alterity exceeds translation into the conceptual lucidity of the dialectic. God, qua his 
status as unconditioned, is the equipollence of freedom and necessity; however, even 
though God qua his freedom will not emerge into time lest he contains some necessity in 
him, that necessity in no way usurps his freedom, for unless freedom affirms necessity as 
its nature - or, as Schelling's sometimes writes, the ground of God's existence is free - it 
remains only the desire for existence and does not actually exist. Thus, the Good which 
takes priority over the True is one whose goodness, while indisputable, is such that it is 
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indeed "ungrounded," bearing no account, no explanation, no "logos."486 Such a 
conception of the unconditioned is, as Wirth articulates, recalcitrant to all forms of 
"mechanical" thought inasmuch as it fails to "proceed from a preordained and clearly 
defined first principle." By "mechanical" in this context, Wirth means the kind of 
thinking which treats God's existence in the same way that onto-theology does, namely, 
as a deduction from his very essence.487 We see how Schelling's metaphysics of "ground" 
repudiates this understanding of God's existence, for inasmuch as God himself is the 
equipollence of freedom and necessity, it is just as contingent that he steps into existence 
as it is necessary, and so the fact that he does exist is in no way intelligible without first 
struggling with the paradoxical nature of his decision, namely, that in deciding to exist, 
God (i.e. freedom) acknowledges his not self (i.e. necessity) as himself. 
  Herein I think a final reference to Schelling's successor Kierkegaard is most 
helpful. To have faith - i.e. "to relate absolutely to the absolute" - is to acknowledge the 
absurdity of one's finite calling. Abraham is called by God to sacrifice his only son in 
order to become a patriarch. Correlatively, what he is called to do is sacrifice his own 
rational standards of what is possible in order to become real as himself. "Only he who 
works gets bread;" likewise, only he who is willing to make himself unintelligible to 
others is capable of becoming who he really is. In the WA, this is the spiritual work God 
                                                          
486 "In these texts, Schelling led each discursive project to the incomprehensible origin of its own 
discursivity, attempting to demonstrate the first principle by which a discourse is founded cannot, in its 
turn, be founded. Hence, each and every one of these principles, themselves the progenitors of their 
respective systems, is brought face to face with the ruinous opacity of their provenance..." (Conspiracy of 
Life, pg. 8) 
487 "The idea of the Good is clearly equated with the idea of Freedom and this idea excludes the possibility 
of a mechanical conception of thinking...A machine- at least in the sense intended here - proceeds from a 
preordained and clearly discernible first principle. It is a closed, synchronic system and is hence, so to 
speak, always up to something. Its movement is always on the way to getting something done." 
(Conspiracy of Life, pg. 8) 
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puts in through the decision, for in choosing to exist, he necessarily satisfies his own 
desire to be at the same time as he surrenders to "ground." For it is irrational for God, qua 
his status as free, to choose life over death, so by deciding to exist, he necessarily makes 
himself unintelligible to all others. God's decision, then, has the effect of individualizing 
him by concealing from creation the nature of his origin. For Schelling, this is the truth of 
existence, namely, its singularity, and the role time has in facilitating it. Time is a 
constant becoming, so our journey through it is the process of individualizing ourselves. 
Just as God becomes unintelligible to us through his own beginning, every new beginning 
for us marks a deepening of our own singularity by making us less intelligible to others. 
Abraham achieves this when he raises his knife toward Isaac and it is what Schelling 
believes all life accomplishes in becoming real. "Ground," then, is inexpressible because 
its imperative is subjective, specific to each, individual subject. If to know something is 
to tarry with it as it evolves through each new moment in time, then the reason we cannot 
know why God created the world is because only he "can know," because only he 
occupied that moment before creation. Schelling's point, then, is that a metaphysics of 
self-expression is open to the timeliness - or even "time-boundedness" - of knowledge. 
Whereas onto-theology argues from the standpoint that all intelligibility exists in the 
realm of the eternal, Schelling believes that the highest intelligibility, the kind which 
leads to self-realization  is a product of the moment. As I understand it, remaining open to 
this brand of truth is the challenge Schelling presents to us in the WA. It is to consider 
truth in its most nascent state, restoring a time when thinking was not merely a source of 
information, but as something vital unto itself, something alive, something potent, and, 
most of all, something free. 
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Conclusion: An Ethics of "Ground:"Encountering the 
Other's Otherness 
 
 By way of conclusion, I would like to call attention to the possibilities I can 
imagine for the further development of this project. They concern Schelling's 
understanding of the dialectic, which sheds light on the radical nature of the insight 
grounding the decision. Insofar as "ground" is self-expression, becoming presupposes an 
engagement with what is other as other. We see this in the case of primal nature, which 
enables God to become self-conscious of his own desire to exist. God achieves this self-
realization by enduring the vortex of the drives and the chaos produced from its ceaseless 
motion. Primal nature is strictu sensu not God - although it is contained within him - and, 
thus, foreign to him as freedom; and yet, in order for God to express that freedom, 
Schelling believes that God must allow himself to suffer the blind necessity of 
unconscious longing. By doing this, God engages with his antipode in its otherness, a 
move which subsequently yields for him the insight that he, as eternal groundlessness, 
desires to affirm himself.  
 As it relates to our project, this concept of becoming reveals the radical nature of 
Schelling's metaphysics insofar as it highlights his belief that self-knowledge presupposes 
an engagement with the other that resists the temptation to annul or appropriate the 
other's difference. On the one hand, this insight explains why I chose to encounter the WA 
on its own terms without significance reference to Kant, Hegel, and other thinkers. But 
even more broadly, it serves as a jumping off point for future projects insofar as it 
establishes the significance of considering  horizons of difference. If growth or becoming 
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presupposes a willingness to encounter the other on the other's terms, then it behooves us 
to consider all contexts in which we encounter alterity. Simply put, there is an enthusiasm 
for listening and being charitable to the other which Schelling means to promote through 
his metaphysics. Just as God enters into the insanity of primal nature, allowing its insight 
about him to emerge from the logic of its ceaseless longing, a metaphysics of "ground" 
encourages us to allow the other to speak so that we might learn from the other's 
difference. Such reciprocity engenders gratitude for the other (and the other's difference) 
which avoids the pitfalls typically associated with an overemphasis on the power of 
negation. Whereas the latter lends itself to the interpretation that self-expression 
presupposes the dominance or subjugation of the other, a metaphysics of "ground" 
encourages a humbler, more reverent approach to difference. This is not to say that one 
blindly yields to the other, as if out deference to authority, simply that one affords the 
other the respect of a teacher who has valuable insights to pass on. In this way, 
Schelling's metaphysics creates the space for productive dialogue on issues where 
divisiveness and alienation are especially problematic, as is the case in discussions about 
politics, gender, race and how we relate to our environment. My goal for the future is to 
continue working closely with the WA to consider the extent to which Schelling's 
metaphysics can support an ethics which helps us to negotiate these encounters with the 
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